Inference from failing to call a witness (Collatory Case)

Drawing adverse inferences from the failure of a party to call particular witnesses

In Ahuja Investments Ltd v Victorygame Ltd [2021] EWHC 2382 (Ch)('Ahuja'), HHJ Hodge QC (sitting as a Judge of the High Court) on 26.8.21 handed down judgment, wherein he considered when the court might draw (specific) adverse inferences from the failure of a party to call a particular witness/particular witnesses. At paragraphs 23 and 24, the Judge said:

'It is well-known that, in certain circumstances, the court may be justified in drawing adverse inferences from the absence of a witness who might have been called, and who might be expected to have material evidence to give; but the burden is on the party who invites the court to draw an adverse inference from the failure to call such a witness clearly to identify the nature of the evidence which the court is invited to infer, and to explain why the absence of evidence on the point from that witness is material to that issue. [Counsel for the defendants] referred me to the case of Magdeev v Tsvetkov [2020] EWHC 887 (Comm) where, founding themselves upon observations of Brooke LJ (with the agreement of Roch and Aldous LJJ) in what Cockerill J describes as "the increasingly relied upon authority" of Wisniewski v Central Manchester Health Authority [1998] PIQR 324, each party had suggested that the court should draw adverse inferences against the other because certain witnesses had not been called. Having reviewed the authorities, Brooke LJ derived the following principles from them in the context of the case that was before his court:

(1) In certain circumstances, a court may be entitled to draw adverse inferences from the absence, or the silence, of a witness who might be expected to have material evidence to give on an issue in that action.

(2) If a court is willing to draw such inferences, they may go to strengthen the evidence adduced on that issue by the other party, or to weaken the evidence, if any, adduced by the party who might reasonably have been expected to call the witness.

(3) There must, however, have been some evidence, however weak, adduced by the former on the matter in question before the court is entitled to draw the desired inference: in other words, there must be a case to answer on that issue.

(4) If the reason for the witness's absence or silence satisfies the court, then no such adverse inference may be drawn. If, on the other hand, there is some credible explanation given, even if it is not wholly satisfactory, the potentially detrimental effect of his or her absence or silence may be reduced or nullified.

At [150] of Magdeev, Cockerill J observed that "the tendency to rely on this principle in increasing numbers of cases is to be deprecated. It is one which is likely to genuinely arise in relatively small numbers of cases; and even within those cases the number of times when it will be appropriate to exercise the discretion is likely to be still smaller." Cockerill J proceeded to deal with the point relatively briefly at [154] thus:

(1) This evidential 'rule' is a fairly narrow one. The drawing of such inferences is not something to be lightly undertaken.

(2) Where a party relies on it, it is necessary for it to set out clearly (a) the point on which the inference is sought, (b) the reason why it is said that the 'missing' witness would have material evidence to give on that issue, and (c) why it is said that the party seeking to have the inference drawn has itself adduced relevant evidence on that issue.

(3) The court then has a discretion, and will exercise it not just in the light of those principles, but also in the light of:

(i) the overriding objective, and (ii) an understanding that it arises against the background of an evidential world which shifts - both as to burden and as to the development of the case - during the trial.'

Then, at paragraph 25, the Judge in Ahuja said:

'In my judgment, before the discretion to draw an adverse inference or inferences can arise at all, the party inviting the court to exercise that discretion must first:

(1) establish (a) that the counter-party might have called a particular person as a witness and (b) that that person had material evidence to give on that issue;

(2) identify the particular inference which the court is invited to draw; and

(3) explain why such inference is justified on the basis of other evidence that is before the court.

Where those pre-conditions are satisfied, a party who has failed to call a witness whom it might reasonably have called, and who clearly has material evidence to give, may have no good reason to complain if the court decides to exercise its discretion to draw appropriate adverse inferences from such failure.'

Eight points:

(1) the Judge in Ahuja, at paragraph 31, noted the then very recent authority of Efobi v Royal Mail Group Ltd [2021] UKSC 33, [2021] 1 WLR 3863 ('Efobi'), decided on 23.7.21 (a case concerning the burden of proof in an employment case where discrimination is alleged). In particular, that Lord Leggatt (with whom Lord Hodge, Lord Briggs, Lady Arden and Lord Hamblen agreed) had said, at paragraph 41:

"The question whether an adverse inference may be drawn from the absence of a witness is sometimes treated as a matter governed by legal criteria, for which the decision of the Court of Appeal in Wisniewski v Central Manchester Health Authority [1998] PIQR P324 is often cited as authority. Without intending to disparage the sensible statements made in that case, I think there is a risk of making overly legal and technical what really is or ought to be just a matter of ordinary rationality. So far as possible, tribunals should be free to draw, or to decline to draw, inferences from the facts of the case before them using their common sense without the need to consult law books when doing so. Whether any positive significance should be attached to the fact that a person has not given evidence depends entirely on the context and particular circumstances. Relevant considerations will naturally include such matters as whether the witness was available to give evidence, what relevant evidence it is reasonable to expect that the witness would have been able to give, what other relevant evidence there was bearing on the point(s) on which the witness could potentially have given relevant evidence, and the significance of those points in the context of the case as a whole. All these matters are inter-related and how these and any other relevant considerations should be assessed cannot be encapsulated in a set of legal rules."

(2) paragraph 23 of Ahuja was referred to by Rajah J in Brittain v Raja [2023] EWHC 2273 (Ch);

(3) there was an appealed in Ahuja but: (a) that was from a different judgment (Ahuja Investments Limited v Victorygame Limited [2021] EWHC 1543 (Ch), Robin Vos (sitting as a Deputy Judge of the Chancery Division)), and so not in respect to the law of adverse inferences; and (b) the appeal was unsuccessful anyway (see Victorygame Ltd v Ahuja Investments Ltd [2021] EWCA Civ 993)

(4) in Thomas Barnes & Sons plc v Blackburn [2022] EWHC 2598 (TCC) ('Thomas') (which involved a dispute about performance of, and termination of a contract), HHJ Stephen Davies (sitting as a High Court judge), identified three commonly encountered situations where someone who would be a useful witness is not called. He described these situations at paragraphs [31] to [34] of his judgment as follows,

"34. At one end of the spectrum is where a party has been unable to call a witness (or one who would give an open and honest account) for reasons outside its control, where it would plainly be wrong for the court to hold that against the party, whether by drawing an adverse inference against that party on a particular issue or by taking the absence of oral evidence from that witness into account more generally (e.g. by finding for the other party on an issue on the basis that there was no oral evidence to contradict what the witness called by the other had said). In such a case that party would need to adduce proof either that it had made reasonable efforts to trace and call the witness but had been reasonably unable to do so, or that the witness was so obviously hostile to that party that it would have been pointless even to try to do so.

33. The intermediate position is where, for reasons which have not been sufficiently explained or justified, a party has not called a witness who was involved in the events in question on that party's side. If the absence of such a witness means that the party is unable to adduce oral evidence in relation to one or more of the factual issues in the case, whereas the other party has adduced such evidence, then it seems to me that the court must make its decision only on the basis of the evidence before it, even if that means there is no evidence from that witness to take into account when deciding the factual issues in dispute, and can take into account the absence of evidence from any witness from that party.

34. At the other end of the spectrum is where the court is being invited to draw a positive adverse inference against that party in relation to a specific issue from its insufficiently explained or unjustified failure to call a crucial witness to give evidence on that issue. As to that, the relevant principles and the recent authorities, including some observations by the Supreme Court, were comprehensively considered by HHJ Hodge QC (sitting as a High Court judge) in Ahuja Investments v Victorygame [2021] EWHC 2382 (Ch) at [23] - [25] and at [31] - [33]."

In Advanced Multi-Technology for Medical Industry v Uniserve Ltd [2024] EWHC 1725 (Ch) ('Advanced'), Nicholas Thompsell sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge (reversed in part on appeal - see [2025] EWCA Civ 1212) referred (at paragraph 281) to Thomas and paragraphs 31 to 34 above, and then referred to Ahuja[1] and Efogi, before applying the principles identified (paragraph 287).

Interestingly, in Advanced, after referring to Lord Leggett's comments in Efobi, the Deputy High Court Judge said, at paragraph 286:

'Lord Leggett JSC made comments about the approach that an employment tribunal should take in drawing an adverse inference from the fact that a relevant witness to a key point has not been called, but I do not think I can assume that these comments apply the same way to proceedings in the High Court.'

(5) in Melia v Tamlyn and Son Ltd [2024] EWHC 3002 (Ch) ('Melia'), HHJ Berkley sitting as a Judge of the High Court, referred to Ahuja on the law of adverse inference, and said 'I respectfully agree.' (paragraph 107). The Judge in Melia then said, at paragraph 107:

'The authorities there cited, and the conclusions he himself reached are pithily summed up in Phipson on Evidence 20th Ed. ¶45-35 thus:

"It is in a comparatively small number of cases that it would be appropriate to draw an adverse inference, but where it is sought to do so, the party inviting the court to exercise such a discretion must:

(1) Set out clearly (a) the point on which the inference is sought and identifying the inference sought; (b) the reason why it is said that the missing witness would have material evidence to give on that issue; (c) why it is said that the party seeking to have the inference drawn has himself adduced relevant evidence on that issue; and (d) why the party seeking the inference could not himself be expected to call or witness summons the witness.

(2) Explain why such inference is justified on the basis of other evidence that is before the court.

It is then open to the other party to resist such an inference by giving a good reason why the witness is absent or silent. If he is able to do so, then no inference should be drawn. If there is some credible explanation given, even if not wholly satisfactory, the potentially detrimental effect of his absence or silence may be reduced or nullified.'

The Judge in Melia then, at paragraph 108, quoted Lord Leggart in Efobi at paragraph 41 (quoted above).

(6) in Woolgar v Newport Capital & Guarantee Ltd [2024] EWHC 1819 (Comm), Janet Bignell KC (sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court):

(a) noted, at paragraph 89 '....His Honour Judge Hodge KC's summary of the circumstances in which the court may be justified in drawing adverse inferences in Ahuja Investments Limited v Victorygame Limited [2021] EWHC 2382 (Ch) at [23]-[25], and the references there to Magdeev v Tsetkov [2020] EWHC 887 (Comm) and Wisniewski v Central Manchester Health Authority [1998] PIQR 324.')' and the invitation of one party to draw adverse inferences from the absence of 3 individuals

(b) held, on the facts, that: 'In the circumstances of this case, given the limit on the number of witnesses capable of being called, and notwithstanding that the limit should really have served to focus the Defendant on calling those who did have the most relevant evidence to give, I do not consider it appropriate to exercise my discretion to draw the adverse inferences I am invited to draw. Fundamentally, the contemporaneous documentation and the oral evidence I have received, is ample to enable me to form a sound judgment as to whether the Claimant or the Defendant was telling the truth. It was unnecessary for me to have additional recourse to inference to support the relevant facts as I have found them to be.' (paragraph 91)

(7) in Ocean Clap Shipping Ltd v Global Offshore Services BV [2025] EWHC 1591 (Comm) ('Ocean Clap'), Butcher J said, at paragraph 99:

'The Defendants argued that adverse inferences should be drawn from Owners' failure to call appropriate individuals to give evidence to the court, relying on Ahuja Investments Ltd v Victorygame Ltd [2021] EWHC 2382 (Ch) and Efobi v Royal Mail Group Ltd [2021] UKSC 33. In Efobi Lord Leggatt JSC, giving the judgment of the court, said as follows at [33]:

Whether any positive significance should be attached to the fact that a person has not given evidence depends entirely on the context and particular circumstances. Relevant considerations will naturally include such matters as whether the witness was available to give evidence, what relevant evidence it is reasonable to expect that the witness would have been able to give, what other relevant evidence there was bearing on the point(s) on which the witness could potentially have given relevant evidence, and the significance of those points in the context of the case as a whole. All these matters are inter-related and how these and any other relevant considerations should be assessed cannot be encapsulated in a set of legal rules.'

(on the facts in Ocean Clap, '...there are insufficient reasons to draw any adverse inferences from Owners' failure to produce more witnesses in this case' paragraph 100)

(8) see also:

(a) Fosse Urban Projects Ltd v Whyte [2023] UKUT 286 (LC), Mr Mark Higgin FRICS on 8.12.23, paragraphs 79 to 81[2];

(b) Tonstate Group Ltd (In Liquidation) v Wojakovski [2023] EWHC 3119 (Ch), Edwin Johnson J on 5.12.23, at paragraphs 134 to 138[3];

Collatory Case Series

The Collatory Case Series, is an series of bulletins, designed to report that one case which collates the essential principles/propositions of law, for a particular doctrine/area of law (and perhaps, as here, provide a few extra citations/quotations). It is not designed as a deep and comprehensive review of an area of law, but to provide that quick 'go to' case.

BARRISTER

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[1] In Advanced Multi-Technology for Medical Industry v Uniserve Ltd [2024] EWHC 1725 (Ch)('Advanced'), Nicholas Thompsell sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge:

(a) said, at paragraph 26 (after listing who, as witnesses, the court had heard from (paragraph 25)):

'There were other persons who could have been helpful to the court who were not called as witnesses....A glaring omission on the Uniserve's side was the absence of any witness evidence from a representative of Majlan International Cargo Services ("Majlan"), who played a key role.'

(b) said, at paragraphs 281 to 286:

'281. No one from Majlan has been put forward as a witness and Hitex has asked the court to make adverse inferences from both the absence of any witness and any disclosure from Majlan, citing Thomas Barnes & Sons plc v Blackburn [2022] EWHC 2598 (TCC).

282. In that case, which involved a dispute about performance of, and termination of a contract, HHJ Stephen Davies sitting as a High Court judge identified three commonly encountered situations where someone who would be a useful witness is not called. He described these situations at paragraphs [31] to [34] of his judgment as follows,

283. If I turn to the decision in Ahuja Investments v Victorygame, I see that HHJ Hodge QC there noted the conclusions of Brooke LJ (with the agreement of Roch and Aldous LJJ) in Magdeev v Tsvetkov [2020] EWHC 887 (Comm). Brook LJ noted that in certain circumstances, a court may be entitled to draw adverse inferences from the absence, or the silence, of a witness who might be expected to have material evidence to give on an issue in that action and that may go to strengthen the evidence adduced on that issue by the other party, or to weaken the evidence, if any, adduced by the party who might reasonably have been expected to call the witness. However, there must have been some evidence, however weak, adduced by the former on the matter in question before the court is entitled to draw the desired inference: in other words, there must be a case to answer on that issue. If the reason for the witness's absence or silence satisfies the court, then no such adverse inference may be drawn. If, on the other hand, there is some credible explanation given, even if it is not wholly satisfactory, the potentially detrimental effect of his or her absence or silence may be reduced or nullified.

284. HHJ Hodge QC noted further the observations of Cockerill J in Magdeev v Tsvetkov where she observed that:

"the tendency to rely on this principle in increasing numbers of cases is to be deprecated. It is one which is likely to genuinely arise in relatively small numbers of cases; and even within those cases the number of times when it will be appropriate to exercise the discretion is likely to be still smaller."

and that

"This evidential 'rule' is a fairly narrow one. The drawing of such inferences is not something to be lightly undertaken."

285. HHJ Hodge QC added his own conclusions at [25] of Ahuja Investments v Victorygame as follows:

"In my judgment, before the discretion to draw an adverse inference or inferences can arise at all, the party inviting the court to exercise that discretion must first:

(1) establish (a) that the counter-party might have called a particular person as a witness and (b) that that person had material evidence to give on that issue;

(2) identify the particular inference which the court is invited to draw; and

(3) explain why such inference is justified on the basis of other evidence that is before the court.

286. The Claimants also cited Royal Mail Group v Efogi [2021] UKSC 33 at [41]. This was a case regarding unfair dismissal and largely turned on the question of who had the burden of proof under the relevant employment legislation, however there was also a question about whether any adverse inference should be drawn from the fact that in the employment tribunal Royal Mail did not adduce evidence for anyone who had been responsible for rejecting any of the claimant's job applications. Lord Leggett JSC made comments about the approach that an employment tribunal should take in drawing an adverse inference from the fact that a relevant witness to a key point has not been called, but I do not think I can assume that these comments apply the same way to proceedings in the High Court.'

(c) then applied the principles enunciated in Ahuja Investments v Victorygame and Thomas Barnes & Sons plc v Blackburn, to the facts in the case before him. He said, at paragraphs 287 to 288:

'287. Applying the principles enunciated in Ahuja Investments v Victorygame and Thomas Barnes & Sons plc v Blackburn to the case before me, it seems to me that:

i) Evidence from Majlan was extremely important in this case as Majlan's email was one of the principal matters relied upon by Uniserve to establish a key element of its case.

ii) As far as I am aware, no explanation has been put forward as to why Majlan did not or could not appear as a witness. It would have material evidence to bring as Uniserve's case relies substantially on the 14 June email accurately recording information that had been received from Hitex by someone with the knowledge and authority to provide such information. This, in my view, brings the circumstances into the third category identified by HHJ Stephen Davies.

iii) The Claimants have explained the inference that they are asking the court to draw, which is that Majlan's email allegedly conveying information received from "the factory" was unsubstantiated or unreliable.

iv) The Claimants have provided other evidence that may tend to challenge the hearsay evidence given by the email of 14 June referred to above, in the form of Mr Khader's explanations and the so-called "Production Records".

288. Given the importance of the issue of whether the delivery due for 14 June was available on that date, and the absence of an explanation why no one from Majlan has been called to explain the circumstances leading to the statement in the 14 June email, I consider that I should draw an adverse inference from the failure to call a witness who could explain the basis on which the statement in that email was made, or to otherwise substantiate the source of that information.'

[2] In Fosse Urban Projects Ltd v Whyte [2023] UKUT 286 (LC), Mr Mark Higgin FRICS said, paragraphs 79 to 81:

'The applicant's conduct is relevant in this respect. The lack of a witness statement from anyone at the applicant company was a notable omission and has hindered an examination of its motives. It is likely, being an experienced developer in receipt of legal advice, that the company was aware of the covenant. Indeed, earlier planning applications for the development of Buttercup Drive specifically avoided development of the application land. I also note that having made an application to the Tribunal in October 2022 the construction work continued and by the time of the hearing the new house was complete and occupied. Ms Eilledge submitted in her closing remarks that it was not obvious who had the benefit of the covenant, but the applicant adduced no evidence about the steps taken to identify the occupiers of the land who were ultimately found by the Tribunal to be entitled to the benefit of the covenant. The applicant could also have provided evidence that it believed the covenant was spent or unenforceable, if that was the case, but it has chosen to remain silent.

The Supreme Court has recently encouraged courts and tribunals not to take too technical an approach to the inference which can be drawn from the absence of a witness. In Royal Mail Group Ltd v Efobi [2021] UKSC 33 , a case about proving discrimination, Lord Leggatt JSC commented as follows:

'The question whether an adverse inference may be drawn from the absence of a witness is sometimes treated as a matter governed by legal criteria, for which the decision of the Court of Appeal in Wisniewski v Central Manchester Health Authority [1998] PIQR P324is often cited as authority. Without intending to disparage the sensible statements made in that case, I think there is a risk of making overly legal and technical what really is or ought to be just a matter of ordinary rationality. So far as possible, tribunals should be free to draw, or to decline to draw, inferences from the facts of the case before them using their common sense without the need to consult law books when doing so. Whether any positive significance should be attached to the fact that a person has not given evidence depends entirely on the context and particular circumstances. Relevant considerations will naturally include such matters as whether the witness was available to give evidence, what relevant evidence it is reasonable to expect that the witness would have been able to give, what other relevant evidence there was bearing on the point(s) on which the witness could potentially have given relevant evidence, and the significance of those points in the context of the case as a whole. All these matters are inter-related and how these and any other relevant considerations should be assessed cannot be encapsulated in a set of legal rules.'

Similarly, in Ahuja Investments Ltd v Victorygame Ltd & Anor [2021] EWHC 2382 (Ch) , HHJ Hodge KC at [33] considered the same sort of issues in a case about misrepresentation where a party failed to call its own solicitor to give evidence about a transaction:

'Second, the failure to call a witness who might have been able to give evidence on a material issue may mean that the court is left with no direct evidence at all on that issue. In that situation, the party who might be expected to have called that witness cannot complain if the court rejects that party's case on that issue and either makes a finding based on the inherent probabilities presented by the limited evidence that is before the court, or simply concludes that it is unable to make any finding of fact at all on that issue.'

On the inherent probabilities presented by the limited evidence that is before me, namely that the applicant was a wellresourced developer with access to legal advice which developed the bungalows first without building on the application land and then came to it separately, I draw the inference that it was aware of the restriction and that it was enforceable, and decided to take its chance that its neighbours would not seek an injunction or resist an application to discharge made after development had commenced. The first part of that gamble was successful, as no action was taken by any of the objectors to stop the construction work either before or after the application. Whether the second part succeeds depends on the willingness of this Tribunal to overlook what I can only conclude was a deliberate breach of the covenant.'

[3] In Tonstate Group Ltd (In Liquidation) v Wojakovski [2023] EWHC 3119 (Ch), Edwin Johnson J said, at paragraphs 134 to 138:

'This leaves Mr Rugova. In the case of Mr Rugova the Defendant's counsel cite, in their Note, the decision of Rajah J in Brittain v Raja [2023] EWHC 2273 (Ch), at [11] :

"11. In this case I am being asked to draw specific inferences from the failure of the defendant to call particular witnesses. In Ahuja Investments Ltd v Victorygame Ltd [2021] EWHC 2382 (Ch) at paragraphs 23 to 25 this was said:

"In my judgment, before the discretion to draw an adverse inference or inferences can arise at all, the party inviting the court to exercise that discretion must first:

(1) establish (a) that the counter-party might have called a particular person as a witness and (b) that that person had material evidence to give on that issue;

(2) identify the particular inference which the court is invited to draw; and

(3) explain why such inference is justified on the basis of other evidence that is before the court.

As I understand the Defendant's argument in this context, it is not that adverse inferences cannot be drawn where there is a failure to call a witness in respect of whom evidence has not been filed, but who might have been expected to give material evidence. Rather, the position in the present case is that no such inferences are justified because there is no other evidence before the court which would justify the drawing of such inferences. I should not speculate on what evidence might or might not have been which was not before me in the Trial.

In evidential terms, I do not accept that the earth is as scorched as the Defendant's counsel contend in their Note. There is admissible evidence that the Sum was paid to Intelligent Legal. There is admissible evidence that Intelligent Legal and Intelligent Language paid the legal fees of Raydens and Keidan Harrison which were incurred in acting for the Defendant. For reasons which I shall explain, later in my analysis of Allegation 3, I consider that I am entitled to take account of the fact that an explanation was previously put forward on behalf of the Defendant for the payment of the Sum, in respect of which no evidence was presented at the Trial. In these circumstances it seems to that I am entitled, if I think it appropriate and for what it is worth, to draw adverse inferences from the failure to call Mr Rugova as a witness.

In summary therefore, I do not accept the Defendant's argument that I am not entitled to draw adverse inferences from the failure of the Defendant to give evidence and/or from the failure of the Defendant to adduce evidence from Mr Marx and/ or Mr Rugova. I conclude, for what it is worth, that I am entitled to draw such adverse inferences, if I consider it appropriate to do so.

Finally, and for the sake of completeness, I should mention that the Defendant's counsel have, quite properly, referred to me to what was said by Lord Leggatt JSC in Royal Mail Group Ltd v Efobi [2021] UKSC 33, at [41] , in relation to the drawing of adverse inferences from the absence of a witness. I accept the point made by Defendant's counsel that the guidance provided by Lord Leggatt was provided in the context of an employment case, and does not bear upon the question of whether I am actually entitled to draw such adverse inferences in contempt proceedings. That said, it seems to me that the guidance provided by Lord Leggatt is applicable and relevant if, as I have concluded, I am entitled to draw such adverse inferences.'

[4] In ABC v Derbyshire CC [2023] EWHC 986 (KB), Hill J said, at paragraphs 88 and 89:

'The Defendants' position was that all the professionals present at the meeting agreed with the plan to remove the children. Mr Willems contended that there was no evidential basis for this. In particular he observed that D1 had not called Dr S as a witness in the trial. In reliance on the principle set out in Ahuja Investments Limited v Victorygame Limited [2021] EWHC 2382 (Ch) at [23]-[25] , he argued that I should infer that the reason Dr S did not give evidence was because she did not support the plan for removal of the children.

89. I do not accept this submission because (i) there was an evidential basis for the Defendants' position in the form of Ms Hayward and DSI Pope's evidence at trial; (ii) Dr S's 24 May 2017 statement referred to the need for a thorough assessment by social care and urgent mental health evaluations for the family which "could not be reliably undertaken with the children resident at home", illustrating her agreement to a plan involving removal; (iii) the phrase "we all agreed" in the extract of the meeting notes set out at [85(i)] above, sensibly read, extends to the entirety of the paragraph which includes the plan for removal; (iv) Dr S made herself available via telephone during the 26 May 2017 hearing, which again illustrates her agreement to the plan; and (v) it is clear that in FII cases, social workers are often "guided by health" and that plainly occurred here, such that it is unlikely that if Dr S had not agreed with a plan for removal, the social workers would have proceeded with it.

90. Accordingly, I accept the Defendants' case that all the professionals present at the 12 May 2017 meeting agreed the plan for removal of the children.'