Estoppel by Convention (Collatory Case)

In Musst Holdings Ltd v Astra Asset Management UK Ltd [2023] EWCA Civ 128 ('Musst 128'), Falk LJ (with whom Whipple LJ and Peter Jackson LJ agreed), under the heading 'Legal principles' and subheading 'Conventional estoppel', said, at paragraphs 61 and 62:

'No issue is taken with the judge's summary of the principles of estoppel by convention. In the context of non-contractual dealings these have recently been considered in detail by the Supreme Court in Tinkler v HMRC [2021] UKSC 39 at [45][53], where Lord Burrows approved the approach of Briggs J in Revenue and Customs Commrs v Benchdollar Ltd [2010] 1 All ER 174 ("Benchdollar"), as slightly modified subsequently, including by this court in Blindley Heath Investments Ltd v Bass [2017] Ch 389. In summary, and reflecting Lord Burrows' further explanation:

a) There must be a common assumption that is not only understood between the parties but is expressly shared between them. Thus the party seeking to rely on an estoppel (C) must know that the person against whom the estoppel is raised (D) shares the common assumption. In short, the common assumption must have "crossed the line".

b) C must in fact have relied on the common assumption to a sufficient extent, rather than merely relying on his own independent view. This requires C to at least have been strengthened or influenced in its reliance on the assumption by the knowledge that D shared the assumption.

c) The expression of the common assumption by D must be such that he may properly be said to have assumed some responsibility for C's reliance on it. This requires D to have objectively intended or expected reliance, in the sense of conveying an understanding that he expected C to rely on the common assumption.

d) That reliance must have occurred in connection with some mutual dealing between the parties.

e) Some detriment must thereby have been suffered by the person alleging the estoppel, or benefit conferred on the person alleged to be estopped, sufficient to make it unjust or unconscionable for the latter to assert the true legal or factual position.

As already indicated, Tinkler concerned non-contractual dealings. On the hypothesis that there was no novation, this case can be described as non-contractual as far as the dealings between Astra and Musst are concerned. In any event I note that Lord Burrows (with whose judgment the other members of the court agreed) observed at [78] that whilst it was not necessary to decide the point, the principles just described were in his view a correct statement of the law on estoppel by convention for contractual as well as non-contractual dealings.'[1].

In My Protection Guru Ltd v Lifesearch Partners Ltd [2026] EWHC 60 (Comm), HHJ Pearce (sitting as a Judge of the High Court) said, at paragraphs 157 to 158:

'The third argument that I consider, estoppel by convention, arises where both parties to a transaction "… act on assumed state of facts or law, the assumption being either shared by both or made by 1 and acquiesced in by the other" (see Republic of India v India Steamship (The Indian Endurance) (No. 2) [1998] AC 878 at 913). In Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Benchdollar Ltd , Briggs J, in a passage which Lord Burrows cited with approval in Tinkler v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2021] UKSC 39 at [45], stated,

(i) it is not enough that the common assumption upon which the estoppel is based is merely understood by the parties in the same way. It must be expressly shared between them.

(ii) the expression of the common assumption by the party alleged to be estopped must be such that he may properly be said to have assumed some element of responsibility for it, in the sense of conveying to the other party an understanding that he expected the other party to rely upon it.

(iii) the person alleging the estoppel must in fact have relied upon the common assumption, to a significant extent, rather than merely upon his own independent view of the matter.

(iv) That reliance must have occurred in connection with some subsequent mutual dealing between the parties.

(v) Some detriment must thereby have been suffered by the person alleging the estoppel, or benefit thereby have been conferred upon the person alleged to be estopped, sufficient to make it unjust or unconscionable for the latter to assert the true legal (or factual) position."

In respect of the first of these points, as the Court of Appeal stated in Dixon v Blindley Health Investments Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 1023 at [92] (again approved in Tinkler at [49] – [50]), "something must be shown to have 'crossed the line' sufficient to manifest an assent to the assumption."'

Collatory Case Series

The Collatory Case Series, is an series of bulletins, designed to report that one case which collates the essential principles/propositions of law, for a particular doctrine/area of law (and perhaps, as here, provide a few extra citations/quotations etc.). It is not designed as a deep and comprehensive review of an area of law, but to provide that quick 'go to' case.

SIMON HILL © 2026*

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[1] Musst Holdings Ltd v Astra Asset Management UK Ltd [2023] EWCA Civ 128 ('Musst 128') was an unsuccessful appeal against the decision of Freedman J in Musst Holdings Ltd v Astra Asset Management UK Ltd [2021] EWHC 3432 (Ch) ('Musst 3432'). In Musst 3432, Freedman J had said, under the heading 'XVI Rectification and estoppel by convention', subheading 'Estoppel by convention' and sub-subheading 'The law', from paragraphs 307 to 310:

'In Republic of India v India Steamship Co Ltd (No 2) [1998] AC 878, at 913E-G, Lord Steyn summarised the relevant legal principles as follows:

"It is settled that an estoppel by convention may arise where parties to a transaction act on an assumed state of facts or law, the assumption being either shared by them both or made by one and acquiesced in by the other. The effect of an estoppel by convention is to preclude a party from denying the assumed facts or law if it would be unjust to allow him to go back on the assumption … It is not enough that each of the two parties acts on an assumption not communicated to the other. But it was rightly accepted by counsel for both parties that a concluded agreement is not a requirement for an estoppel by convention."

The principles were further explained by Briggs J in HM Revenue & Customs v Benchdollar [2009] EWHC 1310 (Ch), [2010] 1 All ER 174 at [52], ("Benchdollar"), as amended by Briggs J in Stena Line Ltd v Merchant Navy Ratings Pension Fund Trustees Ltd [2010] EWHC 1805 (Ch); [2010] Pens LR 411 ("Stena Line"). Those amended principles were then approved by the Court of Appeal in Blindley Heath Investments Ltd v Bass [2015] EWCA Civ 1023; [2017] Ch 389 ("Blindley Heath") and by the Court of Appeal in Dixon v Blindley Heath Investments Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 1023, [2017] Ch 389, at [90]-[91]. Since the hearing concluded, the Supreme Court gave its judgment in Tinkler v HMRC [2021] UKSC 39 in which Lord Burrows, giving the lead judgment, said the following at para. 45 approving Briggs J's formulations as amended:

"(1) It is not enough that the common assumption upon which the estoppel is based is merely understood by the parties in the same way. The assumption must be shown to have crossed the line in a manner sufficient to manifest an assent to the assumption. [In Stena Line, Briggs J said that his first principle should be amended to include that "the crossing of the line between the parties may consist either of words, or conduct from which the necessary sharing can properly be inferred", as quoted by Lord Burrows at para. 49].

(2) The expression of the common assumption by the party alleged to be estopped must be such that he may properly be said to have assumed some element of responsibility for it, in the sense of conveying to the other party an understanding that he expected the other party to rely on it.

(3) The person alleging the estoppel must in fact have relied upon the common assumption, to a sufficient extent, rather than merely upon his own independent view of the matter.

(4) That reliance must have occurred in connection with some subsequent mutual dealing between the parties.

(5) Some detriment must thereby have been suffered by the person alleging the estoppel, or benefit thereby have been conferred upon the person alleged to be estopped, sufficient to make it unjust or unconscionable for the latter to assert the true legal (or factual) position."

In Seakom v Knowledgepool [2013] EWHC 4007 (Ch) 1, at paras 112-116, Carr J summarised the relevant principles and noted that silence or mere inactivity will not suffice (para 114). Referring to para 43 of Benchdollar, she noted "an estoppel can only operate for the period of time and to the extent required by the equity which the estoppel has raised" (para 115).

A conventional estoppel can arise not only by virtue of conduct after the entry into a contract, but by virtue of conduct before the entering into of a contract in relation to the meaning of a clause in the contract: see Chartbrook Limited v. Persimmon Homes Limited [2009] 1 AC 1101 at paragraph 47 per Lord Hoffman; and Dubai Islamic Bank PJSC v. PSI Energy Holding Company BSC [2011] EWHC 2718 at paragraph 72 per Hamblen J.'