Appealing a case management decision (Collatory Case)

In Ward v Rai [2026] EWCA Civ 816 ('Ward'), the Court of Appeal (Falk LJ, Jeremy Baker LJ; Foxton LJ) heard a second appeal against a case management decision. 

Essential facts

In essence, during the course of a detailed assessment hearing, at the end of day 2 (6.8.24), the first instance judge, Deputy Costs Judge Friston (the 'Costs Judge'), gave an ex tempore judgmemt, making certain case management decisions ('CMDs'), contrary to what was argued by the Claimant. The CMDs were to:

(1) '...refuse to strike out a point of dispute which challenged the work on documents section of the claimant's bill of costs' (Ward, paragraph 1); and

(2) '...allow the defendant to rely on a late-filed schedule setting out details of the challenges to that section.' (Ward, paragraph 1);

The detailed assessment hearing then went into a Day 3 (8.11.24).

The disappointed claimant appealed. On the first appeal, Hill J (the 'Judge') allowed the appeal; the defendant then appealed the Judge's decision, to the Court of Appeal. 

The above are the essential facts in Ward. However a fuller description of the provided in a footnote[1]. In addition, a description was given the detailed assessment process (also in a footnote[2]).

Exposition of the law

Under the heading 'Discussion', Falk LJ (with whom Jeremy Baker LJ; Foxton LJ agreed) in Ward said, at paragraphs 34 and 35:

'It is well-established that appellate courts should not interfere with such decisions simply because they disagree with them or otherwise consider that they would have taken a different course. Rather, as Lewison LJ reiterated in Broughton v Kop Football (Cayman) Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 1743 at [51]:

"Case management decisions are discretionary decisions. They often involve an attempt to find the least worst solution where parties have diametrically opposed interests. The discretion involved is entrusted to the first instance judge. An appellate court does not exercise the discretion for itself. It can interfere with the exercise of the discretion by a first instance judge where he has misdirected himself in law, has failed to take relevant factors into account, has taken into account irrelevant factors or has come to a decision that is plainly wrong in the sense of being outside the generous ambit where reasonable decision makers may disagree. So the question is not whether we would have made the same decisions as the judge. The question is whether the judge's decision was wrong in the sense that I have explained."

Thus, as Lord Neuberger indicated when approving this passage in Global Torch Ltd v Apex Global Management Ltd (No 2) [2014] UKSC 64, [2014] 1 WLR 4495 at [13], the essential question is whether the decision could properly have been made. I would add by way of emphasis that the question is not whether the appellate court considers - however strongly - that it would have made a different decision.'

Then Falk LJ in Ward turned to the case before her, and said, at paragraph 36:

'The Judge carefully directed herself as to these principles at [62]-[65] of her judgment, and reminded herself of them again at [132]. However, I have reluctantly concluded that her decision nonetheless strayed beyond the limits set by them, such that the appeal must be allowed. ... the Costs Judge's decision disclosed no error of principle or failure to take relevant matters into account, and did not otherwise fall outside the ambit of his discretion. It should therefore not have been set aside.'

Falk LJ in Ward then said, at paragraphs 37 to 43:

'Some preliminary observations are appropriate.

First, one of the reasons why appellate courts must exercise caution when reviewing case management decisions is that it is impossible to recreate the situation before the judge. There is an analogy with an appeal on facts, where an appellate court will be island-hopping whereas the judge will have reviewed the sea of evidence (FAGE UK Ltd v Chobani UK Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 5, [2014] FSR 29 at [114]). On an appeal against a case management decision an appellate court is simply not in the same position as the judge. It will not have the same perspective of the circumstances as they appeared to the judge "on the ground" at the time, it risks being influenced by hindsight, and (as the submissions in this case have also illustrated) it also risks being influenced by arguments that were simply not made or at least were not developed before the judge, and which have benefited from a lengthy period of gestation.

The second, related, point is that case management decisions are frequently made under significant pressure. This case provides an excellent example. The Costs Judge had little option but to make an immediate decision at the end of the second day, with an unreserved judgment, because he had to decide whether to complete the assessment on that day or to adjourn.

This leads to the third point. It should not be forgotten that an ex tempore judgment is just that, unreserved and lacking in the preparation that would go into a reserved judgment. It should be read as a whole, with those points - and the circumstances in which it was delivered - in mind, rather than picked apart in minute detail. An uncontroversial example of this is that both parties proceeded in this court on the basis that striking out Point 23 and permitting reliance on the annotated schedule really stood or fell together, despite them being considered sequentially by the Costs Judge. In the pressured circumstances he was under, the quality of the Costs Judge's judgment is to be commended.

The fourth point is this. The points that have arisen in this case have included an alleged lack of reasoning on the part of the Costs Judge, as well as some confusion caused by what appears to have been a mis-recollection on his part at the adjourned hearing as to precisely what his reasoning had been at the earlier hearing. [Counsel for Mr Rai] reminded us of what Munby LJ said in In re A (Children) [2011] EWCA Civ 1205, [2012] 1 WLR 595 at [16]:

"… it is the responsibility of the advocate, whether or not invited to do so by the judge, to raise with the judge and draw to his attention any material omission in the judgment, any genuine query or ambiguity which arises on the judgment, and any perceived lack of reasons or other perceived deficiency in the judge's reasoning process."

In this case [Mr Ward's] failure to do so is all the more marked by the fact that, by the date of the adjourned hearing on 8 November, his legal team had obtained a transcript of the judgment under appeal, but had neither shared it with [Mr Rai] nor provided a final version to the Costs Judge. Further, no permission to appeal against the decision on 6 August was sought at any stage from the Costs Judge, which might also have provided an opportunity for clarification, and (relying on CPR 47.14(7)) no appeal was filed in the High Court until after the November hearing.

This brings me to my final preliminary point, costs and court resources. It does no credit to the justice system for there to be appeals on case management issues which do not, on analysis, raise material points of principle and the cost implications of which must risk outweighing the sums at stake. This reinforces the importance of parties seeking clarification, and where appropriate, reconsideration by the first instance judge. An appeal should be a last resort....'[3]

On the facts in Ward, the appeal was allowed. Falk LJ, at paragraph 60, emphasised that this was '...on the basis that this was a decision that the Costs Judge was entitled to make within the generous ambit of his discretion. It was neither the only decision he could make, nor was it one with which other judges would necessarily agree.'

Collatory Case Series

The Collatory Case Series, is an series of bulletins, designed to report that one case (perhaps, with a few extra authorities), which collates the essential principles/propositions of law, for a particular doctrine/area of law. It is not designed as a deep and comprehensive review of an area of law, but to provide that quick 'go to' case.

SIMON HILL © 2026*

BARRISTER 

33 BEDFORD ROW

NOTICE: This article is provided free of charge for information purposes only; it does not constitute legal advice and should not be relied on as such. No responsibility for the accuracy and/or correctness of the information and commentary set out in the article, or for any consequences of relying on it, is assumed or accepted by any member of Chambers or by Chambers as a whole, or the Copyright holder. No attempt has been made to provide an exhaustive review/account of the law in this area. *Copyright is owned by Barrister Search Limited.

[1] In Ward v Rai [2026] EWCA Civ 816 ('Ward'), Mr Ward (Claimant) issued proceedings against Mr Rai (Defendant) in relation to an road traffic accident. The case was settled (by acceptance of a Part 36 Offer), with the result that Mr Rai was to pay Mr Ward's costs of the claim, subject to a detailed assessment if not agreed. Mr Ward duly commenced detail assessment proceedings (paragraph 6). 

Mr Ward put in bill of costs, with Item 39 seeking c.134 hours for work on documents (paragraph 6). 

Mr Rai put in a Points of Dispute, point 23 ('Point 23') of which took issue with item 39, which

(1) stated '[Mr Rai] will rely on an annotated documents schedule of objections in support of [sic] however the following general points are made' (paragraph 7);

(2) made 8 general points, and offered, as appropriate, c.68 hours work on documents (paragraph 7);

Mr Ward put in a reply to Mr Rai's Points of Dispute, contending Point 23 ought to be dismissed, contending (amongst other things) that Mr Rai's general points meant: '...in the absence of any specific areas of reductions identified at this juncture, the Claimant is unable to provide a meaningful response. The Claimant refers to the decision in Ainsworth v Stewarts Law LLP [2020] EWCA Civ 178...' (paragraph 8) 'The claimant nonetheless responded to the general points raised, and indicated that he would be willing to accept a total of 130 hours...' (paragraph 8)

A 2 day detailed assessment hearing was listed for 5-6.8.24 (paragraph 9). Then, on 31.7.24, 

'...the defendant filed and served the annotated documents schedule referred to in the points of dispute, which identified for the first time the individual items in dispute. Objections were divided into eight categories, which were not the same as the eight points listed in Point 23. The annotated schedule offered 58.5 hours'

At the hearing, Point 23 was not addressed until the latter part of day 2. Mr Ward invited the Costs Judge to (paragraph 11:

(1) strike out Point 23 as not being compliant with Ainsworth v Stewarts Law LLP [2020] EWCA Civ 178, [2020] 1 WLR 2664 (Ainsworth'); and

(2) to refuse permission to rely on the annotated schedule.

In an ex tempore judgment, the Costs Judge:

(1) determined these case management decisions (the 'CMDs'), deciding to refuse to acceded to Mr Ward's invitations; and

(2) adjourned the detailed assessment to a day 3.

Day 3 of the detailed assessment hearing took place on 8.11.24.

Subsequently, Mr Ward appealed the Costs Judge's decision on the CMDs.

The first appeal came before Hill J (the 'Judge'), who was assisted by Costs Judge Leonard. The Judge allowed the appeal (paragraph 14), amongst other things: (1) striking out Mr Rai's Point 23; and (2) refusing Mr Rai permission to rely on the annotated documents schedule.

Mr Rai appealed (paragraph 5) to the Court of Appeal.  

[2] In Ward v Rai [2026] EWCA Civ 816 ('Ward'), under the heading 'CPR rule 47, Practice Direction 47 (PD 47) and Ainsworth', Falk LJ referred to provisions governing the detailed assessment process - with particular focus on the paying party's Points of Dispute, and the requirement that (non-general; i.e. specific) points in the Points of Dispute, challenging the bill of costs, be short and to the point (i.e. focused) - such as to enable the receiving party to know precisely what is in dispute and why, so that the receiving party may reply to them. Falk LJ in Ward said, at paragraphs 15 to 20:

'Under CPR rule 47.6, detailed assessment proceedings are commenced by serving a notice of commencement and a copy of a bill of costs in the form specified in PD 47. Rule 47.9 permits the service of points of dispute in response within 21 days (subject to extension by agreement, see paragraph 8.1 of PD 47), failing which a default costs certificate may be obtained. Rule 47.13 allows the receiving party to serve a reply to the points in dispute within 21 days. The court becomes actively involved only when a detailed assessment hearing is sought pursuant to rule 47.14. The obvious aim is to allow the parties an opportunity to reach agreement without the need for the court's intervention.

Paragraph 8 of PD 47 deals with points of dispute. Paragraph 8.2 provides:

"Points of dispute must be short and to the point… They must:

(a) identify any general points or matters of principle which require decision before the individual items in the bill are addressed; and

(b) identify specific points, stating concisely the nature and grounds of dispute…"

Paragraph 13 of PD 47 addresses the detailed assessment hearing. Paragraph 13.10 provides:

"(1) If a party wishes to vary that party's bill of costs, points of dispute or a reply, an amended or supplementary document must be filed with the court and copies of it must be served on all other relevant parties.

(2) Permission is not required to vary a bill of costs, points of dispute or a reply but the court may disallow the variation or permit it only upon conditions, including conditions as to the payment of any costs caused or wasted by the variation."

It is also worth noting that CPR rule 47.14(6) provides that only points specified in the points of dispute may be raised at the hearing, unless the court gives permission.

[Ainsworth v Stewarts Law LLP [2020] EWCA Civ 178] concerned a solicitor and own client assessment, but the court had regard to Part 47 in determining the form that points of dispute should take. Asplin LJ, with whom Lewison and Peter Jackson LJJ agreed, said this about paragraph 8.2 of PD 47:

"37. … [Paragraph 8.2] makes it absolutely clear that points of dispute should be short and to the point and, therefore, focused. Furthermore, sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) leave no doubt about the way in which the draftsman should proceed. General points and matters of principle which require consideration before individual items in the bill or bills are addressed, should be identified, and then specific points should be made 'stating concisely the nature and grounds of dispute'. Such an approach is entirely consistent with the recommendations and observations made in the Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report (December 2009) to which we were referred.

38. Common sense dictates that the points of dispute must be drafted in a way which enables the parties and the court to determine precisely what is in dispute and why. That is the very purposes of such a document. It is necessary in order to enable the receiving party, the solicitor in this case, to be able to reply to the complaints. It is also necessary in order to enable the court to deal with the issues raised in a manner which is fair, just and proportionate."

At [44] Asplin LJ also referred to the court's wide discretion to dismiss one of the points of dispute under the strike-out power in CPR rule 3.4(2)(b) or (c) (abuse of process or failure to comply with rules etc).'

Later, in Ward, Falk LJ added, at paragraph 61:

'Paying parties should be under no illusion that paragraph 8.2 of PD 47 requires an Ainsworth compliant approach. They should not assume that a lenient approach will be taken if they take a similar approach to [Mr Rai] in this case. Those who do not comply on a timely basis risk non-compliant elements of their points of dispute being struck out or, as a minimum, cost sanctions. Similarly, late variations by either party under paragraph 13.10 of PD 47 risk being disallowed or permitted only on conditions, including as to costs.'

[3] In Ward v Rai [2026] EWCA Civ 816, Falk LJ added one final point, on the end of this quotation (so, at the end of paragraph 43) - specific to the facts in the case. Falk LJ said:

'This is quite apart from the fact that the very narrow gap between the final Part 36 offers should have given serious pause for thought before embarking on the hearing in the first place.'

See paragraph 13 about the Part 36 offers.