[1] In Keizon Green v Nursing and Midwifery Council [2026] EWHC 69 (Admin), Eyre J on 23.1.26, said, at paragraphs 14 to 16:

'I explained my understanding of the law concerning the duty to give reasons thus in Ali v General Medical Council [2024] EWHC 2272 (Admin) at [60] – [64]:

"60. In Shabir Hill J summarised the law in respect of a tribunal or judge's duty to give reasons. Hill J drew on the analysis undertaken by Morris J in Byrne v GMC [2021] EWHC 2237 (Admin) which in turn summarised the effect of the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Southall v GMC [2010] EWCA Civ 407 and English v Emery Reimbold & Strick [2002] EWCA Civ 605, [2002] 1 WLR 2409. At [18] Hill J explained the position thus:

'As to the duty to give reasons:

(i) The purpose of a duty to give reasons is to enable the losing party to know why they have lost and to allow them to consider whether to appeal: English v Emery Reimbold & Strick [2002] 1 WLR 2409 at [16] and Byrne at [24].

(ii) It will be satisfied if, having regard to the issues and the nature and content of the evidence, reasons for the decision are apparent, either because they are set out in terms or because they can readily be inferred from the overall form and content of the decision: English at [26] and Byrne at [24];

(iii) There is no duty on a tribunal, in giving reasons, to deal with every argument made in submissions: English at [17]-[18];

(iv) In a straightforward case, setting out the facts to be proved and finding them proved or not will generally be sufficient both to demonstrate to the parties why they have won or lost and to explain to any appellate tribunal the facts found: Southall at [56] and Gupta at [13];

(v) Where the case is not straightforward and can properly be described as exceptional", the position will be different: a few sentences dealing with "salient issues" may be essential: Southall at [56];

(vi) Specific reasons for disbelieving a practitioner are not required in every case that is not straightforward: Byrne at [119]; and

(vii) Where a Tribunal's stated reasons are not clear, the court should look at the underlying materials to seek to understand its reasoning and to identify reasons which cogently justify the decision. An appeal should not be allowed on grounds of inadequacy of reasons unless, even with the benefit of knowledge of the evidence and submissions made below, it is not possible for the appeal court to understand why the tribunal reach the decision it did: English at [89] and [118] Byrne at [27].'

61. In those cases the court was concerned with whether adequate reasons had been given for the decision under challenge. However, the need for the court or tribunal whose decision is under challenge to have given adequate reasons is in part because without such reasons the appeal court cannot understand why the decision was reached. As Lord Phillips MR said delivering the judgment of the court in English v Emery Reimbold & Strick at [19]:

'… if the appellate process is to work satisfactorily, the judgment must enable the appellate court to understand why the judge reached his decision.'

62. Such understanding is necessary in part because the appellate court needs to know the reasons which the lower court or tribunal took into account and which caused it to make the decision. It is also necessary because the appellate court needs to know that the lower court or tribunal has determined all the material issues. If that has not been done the decision under challenge cannot stand. I emphasise that it is only necessary for the material issues to be determined but I have already explained why I accept that the dispute as to the conversation between the Appellant and Miss Burbidge was a material issue. The contention is that the Tribunal failed to address and to resolve that issue.

63. It was not necessary for the relevant finding and the reasons for it to be stated formulaically. It would have been sufficient if on a fair reading of the Determination the finding and the reasons for it were apparent. Indeed, the court can go further than that. It will be sufficient if consideration of the Determination in the light of the evidence before the Tribunal and the submissions made to it enables this court to understand what it did and why (see Shabir at [18(vii)] and Byrne at [27]) and so to identify a finding on this issue and the reasons for it even when neither the finding nor the reasons were articulated. The findings and the reasons can be inherent and the court is to look to the reality of the matter. As Lord Phillips said at the conclusion of the judgment in English v Emery Reimbold & Strick:

'…an unsuccessful party should not seek to upset a judgment on the ground of inadequacy of reasons unless, despite the advantage of considering the judgment with knowledge of the evidence given and submissions made at the trial, that party is unable to understand why it is that the judge has reached an adverse decision.'

64. However, that exercise cannot be without limits and a degree of caution is needed. The obligations on a court or tribunal to grapple with the disputes on material issues; to reach conclusions on such issues; and to have identifiable reasons for the conclusions reached are important ones and the compliance with them has to be real. As I have already noted the need for reasons to be given is in part so that an appeal court and the parties can determine whether the lower court or tribunal has complied with the first two of those obligations. The role of this court on the appeal is not to construct a finding which was not made nor to formulate reasons which would have justified such a finding but which were not the reasons of the Tribunal."

In Hindle v Nursing and Midwifery Council [2025] EWHC 373 (Admin) Alan Bates, sitting as a deputy High Court judge) addressed the nature of the reasoning required thus at [52] and [53]:

"[52] That is, of course, so in every case that comes before a professional discipline or FtP tribunal. But the nature and extent of the reasoning required – including precisely what issues need to be grappled with as part of the reasoning in order to justify a finding a fact – will vary depending on the nature of the factual dispute and the relevant evidence. Where an allegation is based on factual accounts asserted by certain witnesses which are directly contradicted by the person facing the allegation or by other witnesses, the tribunal will need to carry out a careful and thorough forensic analysis for deciding whether the burden of proof is satisfied. Such an analysis should seek to draw upon all available relevant indicators as to whether each witness's account is reliable. Those indicators will often include the tribunal's overall impression of the witnesses it has seen giving oral evidence. As Baroness Hale observed in Re B (Children) (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) [2009] 1 AC 11, at [26]: 'In this country we do not require documentary proof. We rely heavily on oral evidence, especially from those who were present when the alleged events took place. Day after day, up and down the country, on issues large and small, judges are making up their minds whom to believe. They are guided by many things, including the inherent probabilities, any contemporaneous documentation or records, any circumstantial evidence tending to support one account rather than the other, and their overall impression of the characters and motivations of the witnesses. The task is a difficult one. It must be performed without prejudice and preconceived ideas. But it is the task which we are paid to perform to the best of our ability.'

[53] In such a case, it is not sufficient for the tribunal to simply consider each charge individually (i.e. in isolation from the other charges and allegations on which the witnesses have given testimony), briefly summarise the witnesses' competing narratives relevant to that charge, and then say, "We prefer the evidence of [name of witness(es)] and therefore find this charge proved". But that is the approach that the Panel has taken again and again in its Reasons. On my first reading of the Reasons, I repeatedly wrote 'Why?' in the margin, signifying my inability to understand why the Panel had chosen to prefer the evidence of one or more of the Complainant Nurses over the contrary evidence of the Appellant and, where relevant, the Paramedic."

As Mr Bates explained it is not sufficient for a panel simply to say in stark terms that it prefers the evidence of one witness to that of another without giving reasons for that preference. It is, however, to be remembered that reasons can be stated in very short terms where doing so enables the parties and an appellate court to understand why the decision has been made. As Mr Bates pointed out the nature and extent of the reasoning required will vary from case to case and it will not always be necessary to recite each stage in the "careful and thorough forensic analysis" to which Mr Bates referred. There is, moreover, no requirement upon a panel to give "reasons for reasons".'

[2] In English v Emery Reimbold & Strick [2002] 1 WLR 2409, Lord Phillips said, at paragraph 2:

'Flannery's case has inspired a large number of applications for permission to appeal on the ground of inadequate reasons. In granting permission to appeal in one of the appeals before us, Sedley LJ remarked that they were becoming a cottage industry. It is an industry which is an unwelcome feature of English justice. The rights of appeal that are afforded under statute reflect the fact that no judge is infallible. It should, however, be possible to deduce from a judgment the reason for the judge's decision. Happily the rash of applications for permission to appeal based upon the decision in Flannery's case does not reflect a widespread inability or disinclination on the part of the judiciary to explain the basis for their decisions. Rather it reflects uncertainty on the part of litigants and judges alike as the extent to which a judgment should detail the chain of reasoning which has led to the order made by the judge.'

[3] In English v Emery Reimbold & Strick [2002] 1 WLR 2409 ('English'), Lord Phillips said, at paragraphs 22 to 25:

'In Flannery's case [2000] 1 WLR 377, 383 the court made two suggestions with a view to preventing unnecessary appeals on the ground of the absence of reasons. It suggested that one remedy open to the appeal court would be to remit the matter to the trial judge with an invitation or requirement to give reasons. In Flannery's case this was not considered appropriate because more than a year had passed since the hearing. The delay between hearing and appeal will normally be too long to make a remission to the trial judge for further reasons a desirable course. The same is not true of the position shortly after judgment has been given.

The other suggestion made by the court in Flannery's case was that the respondent to an application for permission to appeal on the ground of lack of reasons should consider inviting the judge to give his reasons, and his explanation as to why they were not set out in the judgment, in an affidavit for use at the leave hearing and at the hearing if leave be granted.

We are not greatly attracted by the suggestion that a judge who has given inadequate reasons should be invited to have a second bite at the cherry. But we are much less attracted at the prospect of expensive appellate proceedings on the ground of lack of reasons. Where the judge who has heard the evidence has based a rational decision on it, the successful party will suffer an injustice if that decision is appealed, let alone set aside, simply because the judge has not included in his judgment adequate reasons for his decision. The appellate court will not be in as good a position to substitute its decision, should it decide that this course is viable, while an appeal followed by a rehearing will involve a hideous waste of costs.

Accordingly, we recommend the following course. If an application for permission to appeal on the ground of lack of reasons is made to the trial judge, the judge should consider whether his judgment is defective for lack of reasons, adjourning for that purpose should he find this necessary. If he concludes that it is, he should set out to remedy the defect by the provision of additional reasons refusing permission to appeal on the basis that he has adopted that course. If he concludes that he has given adequate reasons, he will no doubt refuse permission to appeal. If an application for permission to appeal on the ground of lack of reasons is made to the appellate court and it appears to the appellate court that the application is well founded, it should consider adjourning the application and remitting the case to the trial judge with an invitation to provide additional reasons for his decision or, where appropriate, his reasons for a specific finding or findings. Where the appellate court is in doubt as to whether the reasons are adequate, it may be appropriate to direct that the application be adjourned to an oral hearing, on notice to the respondent.'

For completeness, it may be helpful to quote what Lord Phillips in English said, under the next subheading. Under the heading 'The approach of the appellate court', he said, at paragraph 26:

'Where permission is granted to appeal on the grounds that the judgment does not contain adequate reasons, the appellate court should first review the judgment, in the context of the material evidence and submissions at the trial, in order to determine whether, when all of these are considered, it is apparent why the judge reached the decision that he did. If satisfied that the reason is apparent and that it is a valid basis for the judgment, the appeal will be dismissed. This was the approach adopted by this court, in the light of Flannery's case in Ludlow v National Power plc (unreported) 17 November 2000; Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Transcript No 1945 of 2000. If despite this exercise the reason for the decision is not apparent, then the appeal court will have to decide whether itself to proceed to a rehearing or to direct a new trial.'

[4] In English v Emery Reimbold & Strick [2002] 1 WLR 2409, Lord Phillips, under the headig 'Costs', said, at paragraphs 27 to 31:

'At the end of a trial the judge will normally do no more than direct who is to pay the costs and upon what basis. We have found that the Strasbourg jurisprudence requires the reason for an award of costs to be apparent, either from reasons or by inference from the circumstances in which costs are awarded. Before either the Human Rights Act 1998 or the new Civil Procedure Rules came into effect, Swinton Thomas LJ, in a judgment with which Sir Richard Scott V-C, who was the other member of the court, agreed, said in Brent London Borough Council v Aniedobe (unreported) 23 November 1999; Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Transcript No 2000 of 1999, in relation to an appeal against an order for costs:

“this court must be slow to interfere with the exercise of a judge's discretion, when the judge has heard the evidence and this court has not. It is also, in my view, important not to increase the burden on overworked judges in the county court by requiring them in every case to give reasons for their orders as to costs. In the great majority of cases in all probability the costs will follow the event, and the reasons for the judge's order are plain, in which case there is no need for a judge to give reasons for his order. However, having said that, if a judge does depart from the ordinary order (that is in this case the costs following the event), it is, in my judgment, incumbent on him to give reasons, albeit short reasons, for taking that unusual course.”

It is, in general, in the interests of justice that a judge should be free to dispose of applications as to costs in a speedy and uncomplicated way and even under the Civil Procedure Rules this will be possible in many cases.

However, the Civil Procedure Rules sometimes require a more complex approach to costs and judgments dealing with costs will more often need to identify the provisions of the rules that have been in play and why these have led to the order made. It is regrettable that this imposes a considerable burden on judges, but we fear that it is inescapable.

Where no express explanation is given for a costs order, an appellate court will approach the material facts on the assumption that the judge will have had good reason for the award made. The appellate court will seldom be as well placed as the trial judge to exercise a discretion in relation to costs. Where it is apparent that there is a perfectly rational explanation for the order made, the court is likely to draw the inference that this is what motivated the judge in making the order. This has always been the practice of the court: see the comments of Sachs LJ in Knight v Clifton [1971] Ch 700, 721. Thus, in practice, it is only in those cases where an order for costs is made with neither reasons nor any obvious explanation for the order that it is likely to be appropriate to give permission to appeal on the ground of lack of reasons against an order that relates only to costs.'

[5] In English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd (Practice Note) [2002] 1 WLR 2409, Lord Phillips said:

(a) at paragraphs 89 and 90, in respect to the Withers case - under the heading 'Summary':

'There were shortcomings in the judgment in this case. On a number of occasions we have had to consider the underlying material to which the judge referred in order to understand his reasoning. On one occasion, the significance of the fact that the milking cups were perpetually full of milk, we failed to follow his reasoning even with the benefit of the underlying material. At the end of the exercise, however, we have been able to identify reasons for the judge's conclusions which cogently justify his decision. While he did not express all of these with clarity in his judgment, he made sufficient reference to the evidence that had weighed with him to enable us, after considering that evidence, to follow that reasoning with confidence.

It follows that the appeal based on inadequacy of the reasons fails and must be dismissed.'

(b) at paragraph 118, under the heading 'Postscript':

'In each of these appeals, the judgment created uncertainty as to the reasons for the decision. In each appeal that uncertainty was resolved, but only after an appeal which involved consideration of the underlying evidence and submissions. We feel that in each case the claimants should have appreciated why it was that they had not been successful, but may have been tempted by the example of Flannery's case [2000] 1 WLR 377 to seek to have the decision of the trial judge set aside. There are two lessons to be drawn from these appeals. The first is that, while it is perfectly acceptable for reasons to be set out briefly in a judgment, it is the duty of the judge to produce a judgment that gives a clear explanation for his or her order. The second is that an unsuccessful party should not seek to upset a judgment on the ground of inadequacy of reasons unless, despite the advantage of considering the judgment with knowledge of the evidence given and submissions made at the trial, that party is unable to understand why it is that the judge has reached an adverse decision.'

[6] In Gupta v General Medical Council [2002] 1 WLR 1691 ('Gupta'), Privy Council (Lord Roger, Lord Hobhouse and Lord Steyn) heard an appeal in respect to whether the appellant had allowed or failed to prevent her husband (who had been erased from the medical register) from practising in her surgery.

Lord Roger giving the judgment of their lordships, said, at paragraphs 12 and 13 (rejecting the appellant doctor's submission; the 'committee' is the Professional Conduct Committee of the General Medical Council):

'...The form of the notice given to practitioners was amended in 1988 so as to ensure that they would be given considerable detail about the conduct on which the respondent council were basing their complaint. In its determination the committee finds a particular charge or head of a charge proved or not proved. The practitioner is therefore able to see, in the same detail, which allegations have been established. This in turn will usually mean that the practitioner will have a very good idea what evidence the committee has accepted. In some cases, such as the present, the committee's decision will show that it has felt able to find one allegation proved on the basis of the evidence of a particular witness, while feeling unable to find another allegation proved on the basis of some other part of the evidence given by the same witness. In this way, in cases involving issues of credibility and reliability, the structured determination of the committee dealing with the various heads of the charge, will in itself reveal much about its reasons for reaching its decision. As the European Commission of Human Rights noted in Wickramsinghe v United Kingdom [1998] EHRLR 338, the fact that the practitioner can study a transcript of the hearing, including not only the evidence but the submissions on the evidence by the respective parties, further assists the practitioner in understanding not only which witnesse's evidence the committee accepted and which it rejected, but why it did so.

To go further and to insist that in virtually all cases raising issues of credibility and reliability the committee should formally indicate which witnesses it accepted and which it rejected would be to require it to perform an essentially sterile exercise. For the reasons that their Lordships have already given, it would not in practice advance the appeal on the matters of fact which the committee had found proved on the basis of its assessment of the witnesses. In making this point, their Lordships are following the approach which the Board has taken when exercising its full appellate jurisdiction in other spheres. In Wallace v The Queen The Times, 31 December 1996, a criminal appeal from Jamaica, the trial judge had heard evidence about certain statements on a voire dire, lasting four days, in the absence of the jury. In giving his decision, the trial judge had simply said that he found that the statements had been given voluntarily by both the accused. The appellant appealed inter alia on the ground that, as a general rule, a judge should always give reasons for any procedural ruling. The Board rejected that general contention and held that whether reasons should be given, and with what particularity, would depend on the particular circumstances. Lord Mustill continued, at para 27:

“Here, the trial judge was faced with an irreconcilable conflict of evidence between the police officers and the defendant, turning on credibility alone. No principles of law were in issue, and there was no discretion to be exercised. The only question was whether the judge believed one set of witnesses or the other. His ruling leaves the answer in no doubt. Simply to announce that he accepted the account given by the officers and the justice, and found the appellant's story unworthy of credit would not have advanced an appeal. Furthermore, although in cases where reasons are given it is prudent for the judge to say no more than strictly necessary, it is hard to see how a mere summary would have been appropriate in the present case; for there was always the risk that if anything was omitted in the interests of brevity the defendants would argue on appeal that the judge had overlooked it. In practice, he could scarcely stop short of a fully reasoned analysis. Their Lordships can see nothing to recommend such a course, and good reason not to follow it.”

Their Lordships would adopt the reasoning in this passage in the present context where it applies a fortiori, given the size and composition of the committee, to which Lord Hope drew attention in Selvanathan. They are accordingly satisfied that there is no general duty on the committee to give reasons for its decisions on matters of fact and, more particularly, that there is no duty to do so in a case like the present where, as the appellant's solicitor was at pains to emphasise to the committee, its decision depended essentially on resolving questions of the credibility of the witnesses led before it. The committee's decision on the individual heads of the charge, when considered in the light of the transcript of the evidence, reveals sufficiently clearly the reasons for its decision. Nothing more was required in this case. It so happens, however, that a further indication of the committee's reasons could be found in its indication to the appellant in person that it had found her evidence to be untruthful in many respects. That made the position even clearer.'

[7] In Southall, Leveson LJ (with whom Waller LJ and Dyson LJ agreed), addressed the submission that the General Medical Council's Fitness to Practise Panel ('Panel'), at first instance, had failed to provide adequate reasons for their decision. The appellant medicial practitioner's (Dr Southall) contention was that '...Dr Southall was entitled to know why he had lost, that is to say, why he and Ms Salem had been disbelieved.' (paragraph 49). 

In Southall, at a meeting between: (a) Mrs M; (b) Dr Southall - consultant paediatrician, (c) Ms Salem, social worker, the allegation was that Dr Southall had, while investigation issues with one of Mrs M's children (M2), had accused Mrs M of murdering another of her children (M1). The narrow issue was whether Dr Southall had made the accuation, or Mrs M had felt that that was being said of her/was the insinuation. Mrs M reported the matter. The Panel had '...found him guilty of serious professional misconduct and directed that his name be erased from the register of medical practitioners pursuant to section 36 of the Medical Act 1983...' (paragraph 1) - particularly 'You accused her of drugging and then murdering M1 by hanging' (paragraph 24). Dr Southall appealed. On the first appeal, Blake J dismissed the appeal (paragraph 1). Dr Southall appealed Blake J's decision, to the Court of Appeal. 

In the Court of Appeal, it was submitted, amongst other things, that '...in the context of this case, where Mrs M gave evidence over about two thirds of a day, Dr Corfield and Mrs Parry for about an hour each, Dr Southall in the order of two days on this issue and Ms Salem for no less than 2½ days, it was essential that proper reasons be provided. As it was, although the panel had found facts proved and expressed themselves of the view that Mrs M was a clear, honest and credible witness, not a single word was addressed to Dr Southall's evidence and the only comment made about Ms Salem was that “in many [unstated] respects the panel did not find her evidence to be wholly convincing”: that was simply an insufficient basis to justify an adverse finding that could lead to Dr Southall's erasure.'

Leveson LJ in Southall, said, at paragraphs 50 to 55:

'This submission requires an analysis of the obligations placed upon the panel in connection with their decision. It is appropriate to start with Selvanathan v General Medical Council [2000] 59 BMRL 96 which concerned a complaint that a general practitioner provided information that was (i) false and (ii) misleading in answer to a complaint that he had not made a home visit to a patient when requested to do so. The purely factual allegations were not in dispute: the doctor accepted that he had handled the complaint clumsily and not in accordance with acceptable practice. He denied dishonesty, giving evidence himself and calling two character witnesses. As to the need to provide reasons, Lord Hope said (at 103):

“Their Lordships consider that, in practice, reasons should now always be given by the Professional Conduct Committee for their determination…whether or not they find the practitioner to have been guilty of serious professional misconduct and their decision on the question of penalty. Fairness requires this to be done, so that the losing party can decide in an informed fashion whether or not to accept the decision or to appeal against it…”

As to the adequacy of reasons for the adverse finding on the issue of deliberate falsity i.e. dishonesty, Lord Hope went on (at 104):

“It was plain … from the outset that their decision on this point was going to depend upon inferences which it was open to them to make from agreed facts and on the committee's assessment of the appellant's credibility. The issue was a relatively simple one, and all the appellant needed to know in order to decide what to do next was the decision which the committee had reached upon it. There are no grounds for thinking that the appellant has suffered any prejudice due to the absence of reasons directed specifically to this finding.”

In Gupta (supra), the Privy Council returned to this issue. Here, again, the question was straightforward and concerned whether the appellant had allowed or failed to prevent her husband (who had been erased from the medical register) from practising in her surgery. Having found certain of the factual allegations proved, when determining sanction, the chairman said to the doctor: “Your evidence to this committee was inconsistent and by reason of our determination untruthful in many respects”. It was suggested that, even in cases concerning credibility or reliability, the committee could and should have given reasons. The Board rejected the view that there was a general duty to give reasons suggesting that it would require performance of “an essentially sterile exercise”; when its decision depended “essentially” on resolving questions of credibility of the witnesses, the decision on the heads of charge were sufficient. Lord Rodger went on ([14] page 1699C):

“[The Board] have rejected the submission that there is a general duty to give reasons in cases where the essential issue is one of the credibility or reliability of the evidence in the case. None the less, while bearing in mind the potential pitfalls highlighted by Lord Mustill [in Wallace v The Queen, The Times, 31 December 1996], the Committee can always give reasons, if it considers it appropriate to do so in a particular case. Their Lordships would go further: there may indeed be cases where the principle of fairness may require the Committee to give reasons for their decision even on matters of fact. Nothing in Selvanathan is inconsistent with that approach…

In the present case [counsel for the GMC] accepted that in certain circumstances - which he said would be exceptional - there could indeed be a duty on the committee to give reasons for its decision on matters of fact… He urged the Board to provide guidance to the committee on the matter. Their Lordships are satisfied that no duty to give reasons arose in this case. That being so, they prefer to leave the questions of the existence of any such exceptional duty to give reasons, and of its scope, to be determined in a case where the point is live.”

Gupta was reviewed by this court in Phipps v The General Medical Council [2006] EWCA Civ 397 which refused permission for a second appeal but included a detailed analysis of this area of law. Drawing on English v Emery Reimbold & Strick [2002] 1 WLR 2409 at 2417 (“justice will not be done if it is not apparent to the parties why one has won and the other has lost”), Wall LJ cited [14] of Gupta and observed (at [73]) that:

“although counsel for the GMC in Gupta plainly submitted that it would only be in exceptional circumstances that there could be a duty on the PCC to give reasons for its decision on matters of fact, the common law does not stand still, particularly in the developing area of the need for judges and tribunals to give reasons for their decisions. Thus, it seems to me that what was exceptional in 2001 may well have become commonplace in 2006.”

Arden LJ expressed concern that counsel then appearing for the GMC did not develop submissions on this point and went on (at [103]):

“We do not know what the practical implications are. No-one would want to cause unnecessary delays in the delivery of decisions by the GMC. That would not be in the public interest. By contrast with this court, the Privy Council had enormous experience in dealing with these appeals and we should not lightly cast aside the benefit of that heritage. Indeed, I would say that in this particular field the judge was right to treat the decision in Gupta as binding on him unless it could not stand with a decision of this court or of the House of Lords.”

Sir Mark Potter P endorsed the observations of Wall LJ concerning the inter-relation of [14] of Gupta and the principles in English v Emery Reimbold and went on (at [106]):

“The latter case made clear that the so-called “duty to give reasons”, is essentially a duty which rests upon judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals to state their decisions in a form which is sufficient to make clear to the losing party why it is that he has lost. This requirement will be satisfied if, having regard to the issues as stated and decided and to the nature and content of the evidence in support, the reasons for the decision are plain, whether because they are set out in terms, or because they are implicit i.e. readily to be inferred from the overall form and content of the decision. I do not think that there is any real difference or substantial inconsistency, other than one of emphasis, between that principle and what was stated in Gupta, namely that there is no general duty on the PCC of the GMC to give reasons for its decisions on matters of fact, in particular where the essential issue is one of credibility or reliability of the evidence in the case, whilst at the same time recognising that there are cases where the principle of fairness requires reasons to be given “even on matters of fact”: see paragraph 14 of Gupta. It seems to me that such cases are those where, without such reasons, it will not be clear to the losing party why he has lost. It is not a necessary ingredient of the requisite clarity that the reasons should be expressly stated when they are otherwise plain or obvious.”

For my part, I have no difficulty in concluding that, in straightforward cases, setting out the facts to be proved (as is the present practice of the GMC) and finding them proved or not proved will generally be sufficient both to demonstrate to the parties why they won or lost and to explain to any appellate tribunal the facts found. In most cases, particularly those concerned with comparatively simple conflicts of factual evidence, it will be obvious whose evidence has been rejected and why. In that regard, I echo and respectfully endorse the observations of Sir Mark Potter.'

On the facts, the Court of Appeal held that inadequate reasons had been given by the Panel. Leveson LJ in Southall said, at paragraph 57:

'Perhaps because of the nature of the case, the panel did, of course, provide a few sentences of reasons but, in my judgment, they were simply inadequate and did not start to do justice to the case.' 

Similarly, at paragraph 63, Leveson LJ in Southall said:

'In summary, I conclude that, although superficially straightforward, this case was exceptional within the language of Gupta and required the panel to provide reasons. Contrary to the view expressed by Blake J, I do not consider the reasons which it provided were sufficient to explain why the panel rejected the defence that Mrs M might have perceived that she was accused of murder without her having been so accused.'

[7a] In Simetra Global Assets Ltd v Ikon Finance Ltd [2019] 4 WLR 112, Males LJ (with whom Peter Jackson LJ and McCombe LJ agreed), under the heading 'Inadequacy of reasons', said, at paragraphs 39 to 47:

'Failure by a judge to give adequate reasons for his conclusions may itself be a ground of appeal. Flannery v Halifax Estate Agencies Ltd (trading as Colleys Professional Services) [2000] 1 WLR 377 was a case in which the judge dismissed the claim, saying that he preferred the expert evidence for the defendant to that of the plaintiff and that, as a result, it was not right to say that the property in question was affected by structural movement. It was accepted that this would have been a conclusion open to him on the evidence and that the defendant's counsel had given in his closing submissions what would have been valid reasons for the view which the judge took. However, the Court of Appeal held that it could not speculate whether these were indeed the judge's reasons and that the judgment as it stood was “entirely opaque”. It held that failure to give reasons for a conclusion essential to the judge's decision was a good ground of appeal. Henry LJ said, at pp 381–382:

“We make the following general comments on the duty to give reasons.

“(1) The duty is a function of due process, and therefore of justice. Its rationale has two principal aspects. The first is that fairness surely requires that the parties especially the losing party should be left in no doubt why they have won or lost. This is especially so since without reasons the losing party will not know (as was said in Ex pt Dave) whether the court has misdirected itself, and thus whether he may have an available appeal on the substance of the case. The second is that a requirement to give reasons concentrates the mind; if it is fulfilled, the resulting decision is much more likely to be soundly based on the evidence than if it is not.

“(2) The first of these aspects implies that want of reasons may be a good self-standing ground of appeal. Where because no reasons are given it is impossible to tell whether the judge has gone wrong on the law or the facts, the losing party would be altogether deprived of his chance of an appeal unless the court entertains an appeal based on the lack of reasons itself.

“(3) The extent of the duty, or rather the reach of what is required to fulfil it, depends on the subject matter. Where there is a straightforward factual dispute whose resolution depends simply on which witness is telling the truth about events which he claims to recall, it is likely to be enough for the judge (having, no doubt, summarised the evidence) to indicate simply that he believes X rather than Y; indeed there may be nothing else to say. But where the dispute involves something in the nature of an intellectual exchange, with reasons and analysis advanced on either side, the judge must enter into the issues canvassed before him and explain why he prefers one case over the other. This is likely to apply particularly in litigation where as here there is disputed expert evidence; but it is not necessarily limited to such cases.

“(4) This is not to suggest that there is one rule for cases concerning the witnesses’ truthfulness or recall of events, and another for cases where the issue depends on reasoning or analysis (with experts or otherwise). The rule is the same: the judge must explain why he has reached his decision. The question is always, what is required of the judge to do so; and that will differ from case to case. Transparency should be the watchword.”

This approach was affirmed in English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd (Practice Note) [2002] EWCA Civ 605; [2002] 1 WLR 2409, where it was held that English common law on this issue was consistent with the requirements of article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Giving the judgment of this court, Lord Phillips MR explained at para 19 that what was required must depend on the nature of the case, but a judgment needs to make clear not only to the parties but to an appellate court the judge's reasons for his conclusions on the critical issues:

“It follows that, if the appellate process is to work satisfactorily, the judgment must enable the appellate court to understand why the judge reached his decision. This does not mean that every factor which weighed with the judge in his appraisal of the evidence has to be identified and explained. But the issues the resolution of which were vital to the judge's conclusion should be identified and the manner

in which he resolved them explained. It is not possible to provide a template for this process. It need not involve a lengthy judgment. It does require the judge to identify and record those matters which were critical to his decision. If the critical issue was one of fact, it may be enough to say that one witness was preferred to another because the one manifestly had a clearer recollection of the material facts or the other gave answers which demonstrated that his recollection could not be relied on.”

In Glicksman v Redbridge Healthcare NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 1097 the judge had made a series of findings which led to her conclusion that the claimant in a clinical negligence case was entitled to succeed, but had not explained why she rejected the evidence to the contrary. Henry LJ said, at para 6:

“On the medical issues considered in this case, no reasoned rebuttal of any expert's view was attempted by the judge: her conclusions alone were stated in circumstances which called out for definition of the issues, for marshalling of the evidence, and for reasons to be given. Those matters go to make up the building blocks of the reasoned judicial process, and those safeguards were not present here. Each of us was concerned at the prospect of a finding of professional negligence being made in their absence. Accordingly, we allowed the trust's appeal on liability.”

These “building blocks of the reasoned judicial process” are if anything even more important when the judge's conclusions amount to a finding, as they do in this case, that a claim has been brought in bad faith.

Finally, I would refer to the decision of this court in Baird v Thurrock Borough Council [2005] EWCA Civ 1499, where the judge accepted the evidence of the claimant as to how an accident had happened, without dealing with evidence given by the defendant's witnesses, who were accepted to be truthful witnesses. If correct, their evidence would have meant that the accident could not have happened as the claimant described. Gage LJ said, at para 17:

“It is clear that a judge is entitled to express the reasons for his decision briefly. For my part, I would wish to say nothing which would discourage a judge from expressing the reasons for his decision briefly but it is equally clear that the reasons for his or her decision must be sufficient to explain why he reached that decision. The question therefore in this appeal is: do the judge's reasons for his decision meet the test of adequacy? In my judgment, in this case they did not.”

And continued at para 18 that, one reason for this was that:

“having said that, in his opinion, neither of the two ladies were in any way trying to mislead the court, the judge did not explain on what basis their evidence was untruthful or inaccurate in respect of the position of the wheelie bin after the accident and after the vehicle drove off. In my judgment, it was necessary for him to explain that inconsistency if he was to say that he was accepting the claimant's evidence in preference to the evidence of those two witnesses.”

Ward LJ added, at para 23:

“Short judgments are, of course, all fine and well and to be encouraged but only if they are careful judgments. Second, judges do not have to deal with each and every point in issue but where the dispute is as fundamental to the case as this one then it does deserve mention and an explanation being given for the apparent inconsistency between his appearing to believe the two ladies yet also finding that they could not have been correct in saying that the right-hand bin was still up in the air.”

Without attempting to be comprehensive or prescriptive, not least because it has been said many times that what is required will depend on the nature of the case and that no universal template is possible, I would make four points which appear from the authorities and which are particularly relevant in this case. First, succinctness is as desirable in a judgment as it is in counsel's submissions, but short judgments must be careful judgments. Second, it is not necessary to deal expressly with every point, but a judge must say enough to show that care has been taken and that the evidence as a whole has been properly considered. Which points need to be dealt with and which can be omitted itself requires an exercise of judgment. Third, the best way to demonstrate the exercise of the necessary care is to make use of “the building blocks of the reasoned judicial process” by identifying the issues which need to be decided, marshalling (however briefly and without needing to recite every point) the evidence which bears on those issues, and giving reasons why the principally relevant evidence is either accepted or rejected as unreliable. Fourth, and in particular, fairness requires that a judge should deal with apparently compelling evidence, where it exists, which is contrary to the conclusion which he proposes to reach and explain why he does not accept it.

I would not go so far as to say that a judgment which fails to follow these requirements will necessarily be inadequately reasoned, but if these requirements are not followed the reasoning of the judgment will need to be particularly cogent if it is to satisfy the demands of justice. Otherwise there will be a risk that an appellate court will conclude that the judge has “plainly failed to take the evidence into account”.'

[8] In GLAS SAS (London Branch) v European Topsoho Sarl [2025] EWCA Civ 933; [2025] 1 WLR 5343, on the facts, Falk LJ (with whom Underhill LJ and Snowden LJ agreed) said, at paragraph 30:

'In this case I am unable to accept that the judge's decision contained adequate reasoning. While some elements can be discerned there is simply not enough there to explain the result to the parties or this court. In particular, and even taking account of the transcript of the hearing (which I have read), there is very little engagement with Xinbo's case as the losing party, beyond references to “surreality” and “scepticism”. The references to the judgments of Bright and Robin Knowles JJ do not plug the gap without further explanation. For example, although the judge referred to Xinbo's procedural behaviour as not being as poor as Dynamic's, he did not really explain why it was nevertheless in the interests of justice to require a payment into court, or one that was higher than had been required by Bright J from Dynamic, or to impose an additional condition relating to the return of the Unpledged Shares, effectively stipulating for the satisfaction of Robin Knowles J's later summary judgment. The reference to the need to protect the “dignity of the court process” provides a hint, but it is not enough and it does not address Xinbo's arguments.'

[9] In Byrne v General Medical Council [2021] EWHC 2237 (Admin), Morris J, under the heading 'The Legislative Framework and relevant legal principles', subheading 'The extent of the duty to give reasons', said at paragraphs 23 to 27:

'In relation to the duty to give reasons, I have been referred to a number of authorities, including in particular Selvanathan v GMC [2000] 10 WLUK 307; English v Emery Reimbold & Strick [2002] 1 WLR 2409; Gupta, supra, at §14; Phipps v GMC [2006] EWCA Civ 397 at §106; Muscat, supra at §108; Mubarak, supra, at §§9-12, 35-36; Southall, supra, at §§50-55, 56 and 59 and O v Secretary of State for Education, supra, at §§59 -63.

In the present case Rule 17(2)(j) of the Rules requires the Tribunal to give reasons for its findings of fact. In considering the extent and content of the duty to give reasons, the current leading authority is Southall, citing in detail the earlier cases of Selvanathan, Gupta, Phipps (in turn referring to English v Emery Reimbold & Strick). At §54, Leveson LJ (citing Phipps) confirmed that the purpose of such a duty to give reasons is to enable the losing party to know why he has lost and to allow him to consider whether to appeal. It will be satisfied if, having regard to the issues and the nature and content of the evidence, the reasons for the decision are plain, either because they are set out in terms or because they can be readily inferred from the overall form and content of the decision. It is not necessary for them to be expressly stated, when they are otherwise plain or obvious. Leveson LJ then continued as follows:

"55. For my part, I have no difficulty in concluding that, in straightforward cases, setting out the facts to be proved (as is the present practice of the GMC) and finding them proved or not proved will generally be sufficient both to demonstrate to the parties why they won or lost and to explain to any appellate tribunal the facts found. In most cases, particularly those concerned with comparatively simple conflicts of factual evidence, it will be obvious whose evidence has been rejected and why. In that regard, I echo and respectfully endorse the observations of Sir Mark Potter. [in Phipps]

56. When, however, the case is not straightforward and can properly be described as exceptional, the position is and will be different. Thus, although it is said that this case is no more than a simple issue of fact (namely, did Dr Southall use the words set out in the charge?), the true picture is far more complex. First, underlying the case for Dr Southall was the acceptance that Mrs M might perfectly justifiably have perceived herself as accused of murder with the result that the analysis of contemporaneous material some eight years later is of real importance: that the evidence which touched upon this conversation took over five days is testament to that complexity. Furthermore it cannot be said that the contemporaneous material was all one way: Dr Corfield's note (and, indeed, her evidence) supported the case that it was (or at least could have been) Mrs M's perception alone. Ms Salem's note (accepted by Mrs M as 100% accurate so far as it went) did not support the accusation and her evidence was that if those words had been said, she would have recorded them. I am not suggesting that a lengthy judgment was required but, in the circumstances of this case, a few sentences dealing with the salient issues was essential: this was an exceptional case and, I have no doubt, perceived to be so by the GMC, Dr Southall and the panel.

…

59. Further, once providing some reasons, in my judgment, the panel did have to say something about Dr Southall who gave evidence on this topic for some days. If (as must have been the case) they disbelieved him, in the context of this case and his defence, he was entitled to know why even if only by reference to his demeanour, his attitude or his approach to specific questions. In relation to Ms Salem, the position was worse: to say that the panel "did not find her evidence to be wholly convincing" is not good enough. If she did not make a note of the specific challenge of murder (which she said she would have done), it must have been the panel's view that she decided, at the time of the interview, that she would not do so and so have entered into an implicit agreement with Dr Southall to cover up an overly oppressive interview. That is nothing to do with not being wholly convincing: it is about honesty and integrity and if the panel were impugning her in these regards, it should have said so. (emphasis added)

As made clear at §56, the factual issue in Southall was not "a simple issue of fact" of whether the doctor did or did not use particular words; rather it was particularly complex. §56 of Southall is not authority for the proposition that specific reasons for disbelieving a practitioner are required in every case where his defence is rejected. The references to "the circumstances of this case" and "in the context of this case and his defence" in §§56 and 59 imply that there will be cases where such reasons will not be required.

Reasons and credibility

As regards reasons concerning the credibility of witnesses

(1) Where there is a dispute of fact involving a choice as to the credibility of competing accounts of two witnesses, the adequacy of reasons given will vary. In English v Emery, Lord Phillips stated that " it may be enough to say that one witness was preferred to another, because the one manifestly had a clearer recollection of the material facts or the other give answers which demonstrated that his recollection could not be relied upon ". On the other hand, Southall at §55, and Gupta at §13 and 14 suggest that even such limited reasons are not necessarily required in every case.

(2) Secondly, whilst Mr Mant accepted that it is a common practice in Tribunal decisions on fact, there is no requirement for the disciplinary body to make, at the outset of its determination, a general comparative assessment of the credibility of the principal witnesses. Indeed such a practice, undertaken without reference to the specific allegations, has been the subject of recent criticism in Dutta at §42 and Khan at §§106 and 107. In my judgment, consideration of credibility by reference to the specific allegations made is an approach which is, at least, equally appropriate.

Finally, an appeal court will not allow an appeal on grounds of inadequacy of reasons, unless, even with the benefit of knowledge of the evidence and submissions made below, it is not possible for the appeal court to understand why the judge below had reached the decision it did reach. It is appropriate for the appeal court to look at the underlying material before the judge to seek to understand the judge's reasoning and to "identify reasons for the judge's conclusions which cogently justify" the judge's decision, even if the judge did not himself clearly identify all those reasons: see English v Emery Reimbold §§89 and 118.'