Security holders hold the security for a reason - to secure (re)payment of the relevant underlying debt[1]. Accordingly, the exercise of powers given by the security, for the purpose of protecting or realising the security, in order to (ultimately) obtain (in whole or in part) payment, will very likely be a proper purpose/motive for exercising those powers. Conversely, the exercise of those powers, for an collateral (or extraneous) purpose/motive - collateral (or extraneous) to the protection or realisation the security - in order to obtain payment - is very likely to be an improper purpose/motive.
A variation on this, is where the security holder holds more than one purpose/motive, for exercising a security power. Must there be 'purity of purpose/motive' when a security holder exercises security powers? and if not, what mixture of proper and improper purposes/motives is permissible (does not render the exercise of the powers, invalid)?
This article will consider this question, in light of:
(1) Quennell v Maltby [1979] 1 WLR 318 ('Quennell'), Court of Appeal (Lord Denning MR; Bridge LJ; Templeman LJ) on 15.11.78;
(2) Cukurova Finance International Ltd v Alfa Telecom Turkey Ltd [2013] UKPC 2; [2016] AC 923; [2015] 2 WLR 875 ('Cukurova'), Privy Council (Lord Neuberger; Lord Mance; Lord Kerr; Lord Clarke; Lord Sumption) on 30.1.13;
(3) Meretz Investments NV v ACP Ltd [2006] EWHC 74 (Ch), [2007] Ch 197 ('Meretz 74'), High Court (Lewison J) on 30.1.06 (reversed in part by the Court of Appeal on other grounds [2008] Ch 244, CA);
(4) Co-operative Bank Plc v Phillips [2014] EWHC 2862 (Ch); [2014] 5 Costs L.R. 830 [2014] BPIR 1430 ('Co-operative'), High Court (Morgan J) on 21.8.14;
(5) Devon Commercial Property Ltd v Barnett [2019] EWHC 700 (Ch) ('Devon Commercial'), High Court (HHJ Paul Matthews (sitting as a Judge of the High Court)) on 26.3.19;
(6) Wilton Student Developments (Egerton) Ltd v Ip [2025] EWHC 2750 (Ch); [2026] 2 P. & C.R. 5 ('Wilton'), High Court (Leech J) on 24.10.25;
(7) Conditioning House Ltd v JBG Enterprises Ltd [2025] EWHC 3260 (Ch) ('Conditioning'), High Court (Joanne Wicks KC sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court) on 12.12.25;
While 'purpose', 'motive' or 'reason' could be used, for brevity, just the word 'purpose' will be used (unless an extract from a judgment is being used).
This part of the wider equitable duty on security holders - that powers conferred on a security holder must be exercised: (a) in good faith; (b) for the purpose of obtaining repayment.
SUMMARY
The classic statement of Lewison J in Meretz (appeal allowed on other grounds) remains central. At paragraph 314, Lewison J said:
'Drawing the threads together, it seems to me that none of the authorities to which I was referred gives unequivocal support to [counsel's] submission that the mortgagee must have "purity of purpose". On the contrary, Nash v Eads 25 SJ 95 and Belton v Bass, Ratcliffe & Gretton Ltd [1922] 2 Ch 449 are inconsistent with it. So, too, is the statement in Fisher & Lightwood, Law of Mortgages, para 16.13. A dissection of a mortgagee's motives is likely to be difficult in practice. Moreover, unlike statutory powers conferred for the public benefit, or trustees' powers conferred for the benefit of beneficiaries (which were two analogies on which [counsel] relied) a mortgagee's powers are conferred upon him for his own benefit. In such circumstances "purity of purpose" may be difficult to achieve. The cases do support the proposition that a power of sale is improperly exercised if it is no part of the mortgagee's purpose to recover the debt secured by the mortgage. Where, however, a mortgagee has mixed motives (or purposes) one of which is a genuine purpose of recovering, in whole or in part, the amount secured by the mortgage, then in my judgment his exercise of the power of sale will not be invalidated on that ground. In addition I consider that it is legitimate for a mortgagee to exercise his powers for the purpose of protecting his security.' [bold added][2]
Agreeing with Lewison J in Meretz, Leech J in Wilton said, at paragraph 55:
'...in the absence of bad faith, the exercise of a mortgagee's power will only be vitiated where recovery of the debt or protection of the security was no part of the mortgagee's purpose.'
Leech J in Wilton also determined, at paragraph 54, that the following principles (from Lord Sumption in Eclairs Group Ltd v JXX Oil & Gas plc [2015] UKSC 71, [2015] Bus LR 1395, at paragraph 15) apply:
'...the proper purpose rule is not concerned with excess of power by doing an act which is beyond the scope of the instrument creating it as a matter of construction or implication. It is concerned with abuse of power, by doing acts which are within its scope but done for an improper reason. It follows that the test is necessarily subjective. "Where the question is one of abuse of powers," said Viscount Finlay in Hindle v John Cotton Ltd (1919) 56 Sc LR 625, 630, "the state of mind of those who acted, and the motive on which they acted, are all important"."'
CASE LAW
Quennell
In Quennell, Lord Denning MR said, at 322H:
'...in modern times equity can step in so as to prevent a mortgagee, or a transferee from him, from getting possession of a house contrary to the justice of the case. A mortgagee will be restrained from getting possession except when it is sought bona fide and reasonably for the purpose of enforcing the security and then only subject to such conditions as the court thinks fit to impose. When the bank itself or a building society lends the money, then it may well be right to allow the mortgagee to obtain possession when the borrower is in default. But so long as the interest is paid and there is nothing outstanding, equity has ample power to restrain any unjust use of the right to possession.'
Cukurova
In Cukurova, Lord Neuberger said, at paragraph 73:
'In equity, a mortgagee has a limited title which is available only to secure satisfaction of the debt. The security is enforceable for that purpose and no other: Quennell ... It follows that any act by way of enforcement of the security (at least if it is purely) for a collateral purpose will be ineffective, at any rate as between mortgagor and mortgagee. The reason is that such conduct frustrates the equity of redemption which, as Stuart V-C observed in Jenkins v Jones (1860) 2 Giff 99, 107, a court of equity "is bound to regard with great jealousy".'
Later, Lord Neuberger said, at paragraph 78:
'More generally...the Board considers that if a chargee enforces his security for the proper purpose of satisfying the debt, the mere fact that he may have additional purposes, however significant, which are collateral to that object, cannot vitiate his enforcement of the security. If the law were otherwise, the result would be that the exercise of the right to enforce the charge for its proper purpose would be indefinitely impeded because of other aspects of the chargee's state of mind which were by definition irrelevant'
Co-operative
In Co-operative, the Judge said, at paragraph 45 and 46:
'Difficulties can sometimes arise where the mortgagee has a number of reasons for seeking to exercise his powers or where the mortgagee hopes to achieve more than one purpose by doing so and where it is said that one such reason or purpose is not permissible. In Meretz Investments NV v ACP Ltd [2007] Ch 197, Lewison J held at para 314 that:
“A dissection of a mortgagee's motives is likely to be difficult in practice. Moreover, unlike statutory powers conferred for the public benefit, or trustees' powers conferred for the benefit of beneficiaries (which were two analogies on which [counsel] relied) a mortgagee's powers are conferred upon him for his own benefit. In such circumstances ‘purity of purpose’ may be difficult to achieve. The cases do support the proposition that a power of sale is improperly exercised if it is no part of the mortgagee's purpose to recover the debt secured by the mortgage. Where, however, a mortgagee has mixed motives (or purposes) one of which is a genuine purpose of recovering, in whole or in part, the amount secured by the mortgage, then in my judgment his exercise of the power of sale will not be invalidated on that ground. In addition I consider that it is legitimate for a mortgagee to exercise his powers for the purpose of protecting his security.”
The same point was made in Cukurova (cited above), where Lord Neuberger added at para 73:
“It follows that any act by way of enforcement of the security (at least if it is purely) for a collateral purpose will be ineffective, at any rate as between mortgagor and mortgagee.”'
Devon Commercial
In Devon Commercial, the first issue was:
'Did the defendants' duty of good faith require them (a) to exercise their powers only for the purpose of securing payment of the debt owed to the mortgagee, (b) for no other purpose or independent and conflicting interest of the mortgagee, and (c) not to place themselves in a position of conflict or potential conflict of interest?' (paragraph 177(1))
Under the heading 'The law', the Judge[3]:
(1) analysed 'good faith' in civil liability in private law (and defences to such liability) (paragraphs 180 to 188), concluding that:
'...in analysing different kinds of civil liability in private law (and defences to such liability) into their constituent elements, it seems to me that, absent a specific statutory context, "good faith" ought to mean more or less the same thing. Taking all of these authorities into account, therefore, I conclude that a breach of the duty of good faith owed by a receiver to the mortgagor must involve intentional conduct amounting to more than mere negligence, and encompassing either an improper motive or an element of bad faith, but it need not amount to dishonesty.'
(2) said, at paragraph 191:
'...where the receiver is exercising the powers of sale and management conferred on him or her by the mortgage, the receiver is doing so for the purpose of securing repayment of the debt owing to the mortgagee, and therefore he or she must exercise those powers in good faith and for the purpose of obtaining repayment of the debt: see Downsview Nominees, 312D-E. For this purpose it is sufficient if the receiver is exercising the power at least in part for a proper purpose, ie that at least one of the purposes for which the power is exercised is a proper one (Meretz Investments NV v ACP Ltd [2007] Ch 197, [314], [335], reversed in part on other grounds [2008] Ch 244, CA).'
(3) returned to what is, and what is not, a proper purpose. He said, at paragraph 192:
'In this context a proper purpose is one to protect or realise the security or otherwise to secure repayment of the debt. That is what the security is granted for. Exercising the powers of management or sale attached to that security so as to protect or benefit some other, collateral interest of the creditor, eg to disrupt enforcement of a lower ranking security (Downsview), to assist a friend or relative to avoid the consequences of security of tenure legislation in relation to a tenancy granted by that person (Quennell v Maltby [1979] 1 WLR 318, CA), or perhaps to injure a commercial competitor (Lightman & Moss, 13-011), would therefore not be a proper purpose.' [bold added]
Wilton
In Wilton, under the heading 'the Law' and subheading 'Collateral Purpose', the Leech J considered 4 cases:
(1) Quennell;
(2) Downsview
(2) Çukurova
(4) Meretz
At paragraph 47, Leech J considered the case of Quennell:
'In Quennell v Maltby [1979] 1 WLR 318 the landlord and mortgagor entered into an arrangement with the bank to pay off the mortgage and for his wife to take a transfer of the mortgage herself. Their motive for this arrangement was to bring possession proceedings against the sitting tenants who would otherwise have been protected under the Rent Acts. The landlord had not sought the bank's consent before letting the property and his wife relied on the absence of consent justify taking possession. The Court of Appeal overturned the trial judge's decision to make an order in her favour and Lord Denning MR (with whom Bridge and Templeman LJJ agreed) stated as follows at 322B-323A:
"Now it has been held that, when the bank holds a charge and there is a clause in it whereby there are to be no tenancies granted or surrendered except with the consent of the bank in writing, then in those circumstances, if the mortgagor does thereafter grant tenancies without the consent of the bank, then those tenancies are not binding on the bank, and the tenants are not entitled to the protection of the Rent Acts. That was decided in Dudley and District Benefit Building Society v. Emerson [1949] Ch. 707. Mrs. Quennell relies on that case. She says that, as transferee of the legal charge, she stands in the shoes of the bank and can obtain possession.
The judge accepted that submission. His decision, if right, opens the way to widespread evasion of the Rent Acts. If the owner of a house wishes to obtain vacant possession, all he has to do is charge it to the bank for a small sum. Then grant a new tenancy without telling the bank. Then get his wife to pay off the bank and take a transfer. Then get the wife to sue for possession.
That indeed was what happened here. In October 1977, when Mr. Quennell went to the bank, he told them about the tenancies. They said that they did not intend to take proceedings. So he got Mrs. Quennell to do it. In evidence, she said:
"I paid £2,500. This was for my husband. I took the charge to make the debt to his bank less onerous. I was aware he wanted to obtain possession of the house to sell it. I merely paid off the charge. These proceedings have been brought to get possession to sell."
So the objective is plain. It was not to enforce the security or to obtain repayment or anything of that kind. It was in order to get possession of the house and to overcome the protection of the Rent Acts.
Is that permissible? It seems to me that this is one of those cases where equity steps in to mitigate the rigour of the law. Long years ago it did the same when it invented the equity of redemption. As is said in Snell's Principles of Equity, 27th ed. (1973), p. 376:
"The courts of equity left the legal effect of the transaction unaltered but declared it to be unreasonable and against conscience that the mortgagee should retain as owner for his own benefit what was intended as a mere security."
So here in modern times equity can step in so as to prevent a mortgagee, or a transferee from him, from getting possession of a house contrary to the justice of the case. A mortgagee will be restrained from getting possession except when it is sought bona fide and reasonably for the purpose of enforcing the security and then only subject to such conditions as the court thinks fit to impose. When the bank itself or a building society lends the money, then it may well be right to allow the mortgagee to obtain possession when the borrower is in default. But so long as the interest is paid and there is nothing outstanding, equity has ample power to restrain any unjust use of the right to possession.
It is plain that in this transaction Mr. and Mrs. Quennell had an ulterior motive. It was not done to enforce the security or due payment of the principal or interest. It was done for the purpose of getting possession of the house in order to resell it at a profit. It was done so as to avoid the protection which the Rent Acts afford to tenants in their occupation. If Mr. Quennell himself had sought to evict the tenants, he would not be allowed to do so. He could not say the tenancies were void. He would be estopped from saying so. They certainly would be protected against him. Are they protected against his wife now that she is the transferee of the charge? In my opinion they are protected. For this simple reason, she is not seeking possession for the purpose of enforcing the loan or the interest or anything of that kind. She is doing it simply for an ulterior purpose of getting possession of the house, contrary to the intention of Parliament as expressed in the Rent Acts."'
At paragraph 48, Leech J considered the case of Downsview:
In [Downsview] the plaintiff held a second ranking debenture over a company's assets and appointed a receiver and manager over its assets. The First Defendant took an assignment of the first ranking debenture from the bank and appointed its own receiver, the Second Defendant, for the purpose of disrupting the management of the security by the receiver appointed by the plaintiff. The trial judge found that he had acted for an improper purpose and held that he was liable for negligence. The Privy Council upheld his decision on the basis that the mortgagee and receiver were acting in breach of their equitable duties: see 317F-319C. Lord Templeman (who had been a member of the Court of Appeal in Quennell v Maltby and gave the judgment of the Board) stated that there was "overwhelming evidence" that the receiver's conduct was "inspired by him for improper purposes and carried on in bad faith, ultimately verging on fraud": see 317F. He articulated the general duty of a mortgagee and of a receiver appointed by a mortgagee at 312C-313A:
"The next submission on behalf of the first and second defendants is that, even if a mortgagee owes certain duties to subsequent encumbrancers, a receiver and manager appointed by a mortgagee is not under any such duty where, as in the present case, the receiver and manager is deemed to act as agent for the mortgagor. The fallacy in the argument is the failure to appreciate that, when a receiver and manager exercises the powers of sale and management conferred on him by the mortgage, he is dealing with the security; he is not merely selling or dealing with the interests of the mortgagor. He is exercising the power of selling and dealing with the mortgaged property for the purpose of securing repayment of the debt owing to his mortgagee and must exercise his powers in good faith and for the purpose of obtaining repayment of the debt owing to his mortgagee. The receiver and manager owes these duties to the mortgagor and to all subsequent encumbrancers in whose favour the mortgaged property has been charged.
The next question is the nature and extent of the duties owed by a mortgagee and a receiver and manager respectively to subsequent encumbrancers and the mortgagor.
Several centuries ago equity evolved principles for the enforcement of mortgages and the protection of borrowers. The most basic principles were, first, that a mortgage is security for the repayment of a debt and, secondly, that a security for repayment of a debt is only a mortgage. From these principles flowed two rules, first, that powers conferred on a mortgagee must be exercised in good faith for the purpose of obtaining repayment and secondly that, subject to the first rule, powers conferred on a mortgagee may be exercised although the consequences may be disadvantageous to the borrower. These principles and rules apply also to a receiver and manager appointed by the mortgagee.
It does not follow that a receiver and manager must immediately upon appointment seize all the cash in the coffers of the company and sell all the company's assets or so much of the assets as he chooses and considers sufficient to complete the redemption of the mortgage. He is entitled, but not bound, to allow the company's business to be continued by himself or by the existing or other executives. The decisions of the receiver and manager whether to continue the business or close down the business and sell assets chosen by him cannot be impeached if those decisions are taken in good faith while protecting the interests of the debenture holder in recovering the moneys due under the debenture, even though the decisions of the receiver and manager may be disadvantageous for the company."'
At paragraph 49, Leech J considered the case of Çukurova:
In [Çukurova] a mortgagee enforced its security in highly contentious circumstances by appropriating shares in a company called Turkcell Holding AS ("TCH"). Bannister J held that no event of default had arisen under the relevant loan documentation but also that the mortgagee had acted in bad faith in seeking to enforce its security for a collateral purpose. Both the Court of Appeal of the Eastern Caribbean and the Privy Council held that an event of default had occurred and that it entitled the lender to accelerate repayment of the loan and then call in the debt. They also held that the mortgagee's purpose in seeking to obtain control over TCH did not vitiate the exercise of its powers. The Board of the Privy Council delivered a single judgment in which they stated as follows at [69] to [79]:
"The facts
69. ÇH and ÇFI contend that ATT's decision to appropriate the charged shares was void, even if there was an event of default, because it was vitiated by its improper and collateral reasons. The factual basis of this submission is as follows.
70. The judge found that ATT had originally entered into the facility agreement and its associated instruments in the expectation that ÇH and ÇFI would default, and with the aim of obtaining de facto shareholder control of Turkcell by enforcing the security.
71. As mentioned above, he also found that, in the autumn of 2006, ATT deliberately obstructed the declaration of dividends with a view to starving ÇFI of funds, in an attempt to prevent it from servicing the loan and thereby to provoke a default. He also found that after accelerating and calling in the loan, Mr Reznikovich painted an extremely unattractive picture of the Çukurova Group's financial situation at the press conference in Istanbul on 17 April, in order to hamper the Çukurova Group's attempts to refinance. ATT also issued unflattering and defamatory press releases on 30 April and 10 May at least partly with a view to making it difficult for the Çukurova Group to refinance.
72. The judge characterised the press conference and press releases as acts of bad faith on ATT's part, but found that they were irrelevant because the Çukurova Group succeeded in refinancing anyway. In every other respect, the judge considered that ATT could not be said to have acted in bad faith, because it was acting within its legal rights. He therefore rejected the defence raised by ÇH and ÇFI founded on the allegation of bad faith. The Court of Appeal agreed.
Discussion
73. In the Board's opinion the judge's findings afford no basis for treating the appropriation of the charged shares as ineffective, for essentially the reasons which he gave. In equity, a mortgagee has a limited title which is available only to secure satisfaction of the debt. The security is enforceable for that purpose and no other: Quennell v Maltby [1979] 1 WLR 318, 322H (Lord Denning MR); Downsview Nominees Ltd v First City Corpn Ltd [1993] AC 295, 312G (Lord Templeman). It follows that any act by way of enforcement of the security (at least if it is purely) for a collateral purpose will be ineffective, at any rate as between mortgagor and mortgagee. The reason is that such conduct frustrates the equity of redemption which, as Stuart V-C observed in Jenkins v Jones (1860) 2 Giff 99, 107, a court of equity "is bound to regard with great jealousy".
74. In principle, this is straightforward enough, but the facts are rarely simple. The acceleration of the loan on 16 April 2007 in this case was not part of the process of realising the security. It merely brought forward the date of repayment of the loan and ascertained the amount. Given that there was an event of default, there was a contractual right to do this. It follows that the debt of $1·352 billion (plus interest) was repayable in full at the time when ATT satisfied it by appropriating the charged shares.
75. Under clause 9.3 of the charges, ATT was entitled to "appropriate any charged asset … in or towards satisfaction of the liabilities in accordance with the Regulations", at its "fair price" (as defined). This means that, by virtue of regulation 18 of the Financial Collateral Arrangements (No 2) Regulations 2003 ("the Regulations"), the lender was entitled to appropriate the security at that price, any difference between the valuation and the liabilities being settled separately.
76. It necessarily follows from an arrangement on these terms that the lender may satisfy the debt by crediting the borrower with the Fair Value of the security and retaining the charged assets as their own property: see the advice of the Privy Council delivered by Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe: see Çukurova Finance International Ltd v Alfa Telecom Turkey Ltd [2009] Bus LR 1613, paras 12–13. As Lord Walker also observed at para 27, this is a remedy new to English law which allowed what was "in effect a sale by the collateral-taker to himself, at a price determined by an agreed valuation process".
77. ÇH and ÇFI do not dispute that ATT appropriated the charged shares in order to satisfy the debt. They hardly could do so, since appropriation is a mode of satisfying the debt. Their real complaint is that ATT only wanted to do so because that would enable it to obtain control over ÇFI and ÇTH and indirectly of Turkcell, instead of (say) selling the shares onto the market. Since this was the very thing that the contract and the Regulations permitted, it is impossible for them to contend that ATT was exercising its power of enforcement for a collateral purpose. The acquisition of control was a necessary incident of a permitted mode of satisfying the debt. The fact that it was an incident which was highly attractive to ATT does not mean that the right of appropriation was exercised in bad faith.
78. That is enough to decide this particular issue in the present case. More generally, however, the Board considers that if a chargee enforces his security for the proper purpose of satisfying the debt, the mere fact that he may have additional purposes, however significant, which are collateral to that object, cannot vitiate his enforcement of the security. If the law were otherwise, the result would be that the exercise of the right to enforce the charge for its proper purpose would be indefinitely impeded because of other aspects of the chargee's state of mind which were by definition irrelevant."
Lastly, at paragraph 50, Leech J considered the case of Meretz 74:
'Finally, in [Meretz 74] Lewison J rejected an argument that a mortgagee was only entitled to exercise a power of sale where it had "purity of purpose", i.e. its only purpose was to recover the debt due in whole or in part: see [301] to [314]. HeHe also held that one of the mortgagee's purposes (and a significant purpose) was to recover what money it could out of the project and there was no appeal on this issue to the Court of Appeal: see [2007] EWCA Civ 1303, [2008] Ch 244 at [35] (Arden LJ). The first instance decision is important in the present appeal because of the following statement of principle which Lewison J set out at [314]:
"Drawing the threads together, it seems to me that none of the authorities to which I was referred gives unequivocal support to Mr Morgan's submission that the mortgagee must have "purity of purpose". On the contrary, Nash v Eads 25 SJ 95 and Belton v Bass, Ratcliffe & Gretton Ltd [1922] 2 Ch 449 are inconsistent with it. So, too, is the statement in Fisher & Lightwood, Law of Mortgages, para 16.13. A dissection of a mortgagee's motives is likely to be difficult in practice. Moreover, unlike statutory powers conferred for the public benefit, or trustees' powers conferred for the benefit of beneficiaries (which were two analogies on which Mr Morgan relied) a mortgagee's powers are conferred upon him for his own benefit. In such circumstances "purity of purpose" may be difficult to achieve. The cases do support the proposition that a power of sale is improperly exercised if it is no part of the mortgagee's purpose to recover the debt secured by the mortgage. Where, however, a mortgagee has mixed motives (or purposes) one of which is a genuine purpose of recovering, in whole or in part, the amount secured by the mortgage, then in my judgment his exercise of the power of sale will not be invalidated on that ground. In addition I consider that it is legitimate for a mortgagee to exercise his powers for the purpose of protecting his security."'
Leech J in Wilton then said, at paragraphs 51 to 55:
'In both Quennell v Maltby and Downsview Lord Denning and Lord Templeman described the mortgagee's equitable duty in positive terms as a single duty to act in good faith and for the purpose of enforcing the security in order to repay the debt rather than in negative terms or as two independent duties. In Çukurova (where the trial judge had found bad faith) the Privy Council described the equitable duty of a mortgagee in negative terms, namely, not to act for a collateral purpose. In Meretz Lewison J also expressed the content of the duty and in negative terms. He expressed the view that the exercise of a power of sale will be set aside if it is no part of the mortgagee's purpose to recover the debt.
This is a familiar debate to company lawyers. Before the Companies Act 2006 came into force there was a question whether a director owed a single duty to act in good faith and not for any collateral purpose or two separate duties, the first to act in good faith and the second to act for proper purposes or, perhaps more accurately, not to act for an improper purpose. For example, in Hogg v Cramphorn [1967] Ch 254 Buckley J accepted that the directors had acted in good faith but also held that they had acted in breach of the proper purposes rule applying an objective standard to their conduct. The Companies Act 2006 adopted the same separation between the same duties.
Even if a mortgagee owes two separate duties, it does not follow that a breach of the duty to act in good faith should be assessed on a subjective basis and the duty not to act for an improper purpose should be assessed on an objective basis. In Eclairs Group Ltd v JXX Oil & Gas plc [2015] UKSC 71, [2015] Bus LR 1395 Lord Sumption traced the proper purposes rule back to the original doctrine of "fraud on a power" and although the principle has nothing to do with fraud, it is concerned with the subjective motive of the directors. He stated this at [15]:
"The important point for present purposes is that the proper purpose rule is not concerned with excess of power by doing an act which is beyond the scope of the instrument creating it as a matter of construction or implication. It is concerned with abuse of power, by doing acts which are within its scope but done for an improper reason. It follows that the test is necessarily subjective. "Where the question is one of abuse of powers," said Viscount Finlay in Hindle v John Cotton Ltd (1919) 56 Sc LR 625, 630, "the state of mind of those who acted, and the motive on which they acted, are all important"."
I was not taken to any authorities in which a similar debate has taken place in relation to the exercise of a mortgagee's powers. But in my judgment, the same principles ought to apply as they do in company law to the duty under section 171 of the Companies Act 2006. Although the content of the duties of a mortgagee and of a company director are not the same, the source of the principle is the same. It follows, therefore, that the exercise of a power of sale by a mortgagee (or by a receiver appointed by a mortgagee) may be set aside where that power was exercised for an improper or collateral purpose and even though the mortgagee or receiver acted in good faith. Section 171(2) now imposes a duty to only exercise powers for the purpose for which they are conferred.
However, I agree with Lewison J in Meretz that the exercise of the power will not be set aside where the mortgagee or receiver has mixed motives or purposes one of which is the recovery of the debt or the protection of the security. It may be that there is a difference here between the law of mortgages and company law in that it may be sufficient to set aside the act of a director on the basis that the improper purpose was the dominant purpose or causative of the decision. But this is a difficult and unanswered question in company law: see Palmer's Company Law (2025 release) Vol 2 at 8.2517.1. For present purposes, I am prepared to accept that in the absence of bad faith, the exercise of a mortgagee's power will only be vitiated where recovery of the debt or protection of the security was no part of the mortgagee's purpose.'
Conditioning
In Conditioning, the deputy Judge, under the heading 'Good Faith and Proper Purpose' and subheading 'Legal Principles', said, at paragraphs 151 to 152:
'In Devon Commercial Property Ltd v Barnett [2019] EWHC 700 (Ch), His Honour Judge Matthews reviewed the authorities and said, in relation to good faith, at [188]:
"… in analysing different kinds of civil liability in private law (and defences to such liability) into their constituent elements, it seems to me that, absent a specific statutory context, "good faith" ought to mean more or less the same thing. Taking all of these authorities into account, therefore, I conclude that a breach of the duty of good faith owed by a receiver to the mortgagor must involve intentional conduct amounting to more than mere negligence, and encompassing either an improper motive or an element of bad faith, but it need not amount to dishonesty. …"
and, in relation to acting for a proper purpose, at [191]-[192]:
"…where the receiver is exercising the powers of sale and management conferred on him or her by the mortgage, the receiver is doing so for the purpose of securing repayment of the debt owing to the mortgagee, and therefore he or she must exercise those powers in good faith and for the purpose of obtaining repayment of the debt: see Downsview Nominees, 312D-E. For this purpose it is sufficient if the receiver is exercising the power at least in part for a proper purpose, ie that at least one of the purposes for which the power is exercised is a proper one (Meretz Investments NV v ACP Ltd [2007] Ch 197, [314], [335], reversed in part on other grounds [2008] Ch 244, CA).
In this context a proper purpose is one to protect or realise the security or otherwise to secure repayment of the debt. That is what the security is granted for. Exercising the powers of management or sale attached to that security so as to protect or benefit some other, collateral interest of the creditor, eg to disrupt enforcement of a lower ranking security (Downsview), to assist a friend or relative to avoid the consequences of security of tenure legislation in relation to a tenancy granted by that person (Quennell v Maltby [1979] 1 WLR 318, CA), or perhaps to injure a commercial competitor (Lightman & Moss, 13-011), would therefore not be a proper purpose."
In the Meretz case, referred to above, Lewison J conducted a review of the authorities relating to the mortgagee's motives for exercising its powers. The submission made to him that a power of sale would only be properly exercised where the mortgagee had "purity of purpose", that is to say where the mortgagee's only motive was to recover the debt secured by the mortgage, was rejected. He said at [314]:
"Drawing the threads together, it seems to me that none of the authorities to which I was referred gives unequivocal support to Mr Morgan's submission that the mortgagee must have "purity of purpose". On the contrary, Nash v Eads 25 SJ 95 and Belton v Bass, Ratcliffe & Gretton Ltd [1922] 2 Ch 449 are inconsistent with it. So, too, is the statement in Fisher & Lightwood, Law of Mortgages, para 16.13. A dissection of a mortgagee's motives is likely to be difficult in practice. Moreover, unlike statutory powers conferred for the public benefit, or trustees' powers conferred for the benefit of beneficiaries (which were two analogies on which Mr Morgan relied) a mortgagee's powers are conferred upon him for his own benefit. In such circumstances "purity of purpose" may be difficult to achieve. The cases do support the proposition that a power of sale is improperly exercised if it is no part of the mortgagee's purpose to recover the debt secured by the mortgage. Where, however, a mortgagee has mixed motives (or purposes) one of which is a genuine purpose of recovering, in whole or in part, the amount secured by the mortgage, then in my judgment his exercise of the power of sale will not be invalidated on that ground. In addition I consider that it is legitimate for a mortgagee to exercise his powers for the purpose of protecting his security."'
SIMON HILL © 2026*
BARRISTER
33 BEDFORD ROW
NOTICE: This article is provided free of charge for information purposes only; it does not constitute legal advice and should not be relied on as such. No responsibility for the accuracy and/or correctness of the information and commentary set out in the article, or for any consequences of relying on it, is assumed or accepted by any member of Chambers or by Chambers as a whole, or the Copyright holder. No attempt has been made to provide an exhaustive review/account of the law in this area. *Copyright is owned by Barrister Search Limited.
[1] A couple of matters:
(1) by 'security' - what is referred to is mortgages, charges, liens and pledges. However, the focus of this article is on mortgages/charges.
(2) in Cukurova Finance International Ltd v Alfa Telecom Turkey Ltd [2013] UKPC 2; [2016] AC 923; [2015] 2 WLR 875 ('Cukurova'), Lord Neuberger said, at paragraph 73:
'In equity, a mortgagee has a limited title which is available only to secure satisfaction of the debt. The security is enforceable for that purpose and no other: Quennell v Maltby [1979] 1 WLR 318, 322H (Lord Denning MR); Downsview Nominees Ltd v First City Corpn Ltd [1993] AC 295, 312G (Lord Templeman).'
In Quennell, at 322H, Lord Denning said:
'...in modern times equity can step in so as to prevent a mortgagee, or a transferee from him, from getting possession of a house contrary to the justice of the case. A mortgagee will be restrained from getting possession except when it is sought bona fide and reasonably for the purpose of enforcing the security and then only subject to such conditions as the court thinks fit to impose. When the bank itself or a building society lends the money, then it may well be right to allow the mortgagee to obtain possession when the borrower is in default. But so long as the interest is paid and there is nothing outstanding, equity has ample power to restrain any unjust use of the right to possession.'
In Downsview, at 312G, Lord Templeman said:
'Several centuries ago equity evolved principles for the enforcement of mortgages and the protection of borrowers. The most basic principles were, first, that a mortgage is security for the repayment of a debt and, secondly, that a security for repayment of a debt is only a mortgage. From these principles flowed two rules, first, that powers conferred on a mortgagee must be exercised in good faith for the purpose of obtaining repayment and secondly that, subject to the first rule, powers conferred on a mortgagee may be exercised although the consequences may be disadvantageous to the borrower.'
[2] In Meretz Investments NV v ACP Ltd [2006] EWHC 74 (Ch), [2007] Ch 197, on the facts, the security holder had exercised its power for a proper purpose, and so, it had not breached its equitable duty owed to the security grantor. Lewison J said, at 335:
'Accordingly, I conclude that at least one of the purposes (and a significant purpose) of FP's exercise of its power of sale was to recover what money it could out of the financial wreckage of the project. I do not consider that that was an improper purpose.'
[3] In Devon Commercial Property Ltd v Barnett [2019] EWHC 700 (Ch) ('Devon Commercial'), HHJ Paul Matthews (sitting as a Judge of the High Court) gave a wider survey of the law in this area - in a receiver / mortgagee/ mortgagor situation. Under the heading 'The Law', he said:
'180. In the agreed list of issues set out above, issue no 1 is plainly a matter of law. The defendants accept that a receiver owes the mortgagor a duty to act in good faith in the course of his appointment. This is set out in paragraph 38 of their skeleton argument for trial, as the last sentence of an extract taken from the advice of the Board of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (given by Lord Templeman) in Downsview Nominees v First City Corporation [1993] AC 295, 315. However, that final sentence does not appear in the printed version in the Law Reports (at least, certainly not in the position suggested by the quotation), nor indeed in the typescript version as handed down by the Board.
181. But, in Medforth v Blake [2000] Ch 86, Sir Richard Scott V-C (with whom Swinton Thomas and Tuckey LJ J agreed) said this (at 103B):
"(1) A receiver managing mortgaged property owes duties to the mortgagor and anyone else with an interest in the equity of redemption.
(2) The duties include, but are not necessarily confined to, a duty of good faith."
182. The meaning of 'good faith' for this purpose is not entirely clear. Later in his judgment in the same case, Sir Richard Scott V-C said that
"the concepts of negligence on the one hand and fraud or bad faith on the other ought, in my view, to be kept strictly apart."
Conduct which is in breach of this duty need not be dishonest but it must be intentional. An unconscious omission which happens to benefit one principal at the expense of the other does not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty, though it may constitute a breach of the duty of skill and care…"
187. Lewison J held that the claim proposed by the amended particulars of claim was not a claim of dishonesty, but was consistent with conduct falling short of dishonesty. Accordingly the trustees were entitled to rely on the exoneration clause, the claim as proposed to be pleaded had no real prospect of success, and the amendment was accordingly refused.
188. I bear in mind that the context of some of the authorities cited is different from that of the present case. This might well matter if some of those contexts were criminal law or public law. But, in analysing different kinds of civil liability in private law (and defences to such liability) into their constituent elements, it seems to me that, absent a specific statutory context, "good faith" ought to mean more or less the same thing. Taking all of these authorities into account, therefore, I conclude that a breach of the duty of good faith owed by a receiver to the mortgagor must involve intentional conduct amounting to more than mere negligence, and encompassing either an improper motive or an element of bad faith, but it need not amount to dishonesty.
189. It is equally clear law that the mortgagee has no duty to exercise his powers to sell, take possession or appoint a receiver or otherwise to preserve or improve his or her security: see Silven Properties Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2004] 1 WLR 997, [13]-[16], per Lightman J, giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal. But if the mortgagee does take possession, he or she assumes a duty to take reasonable care of the property: see Downsview Nominees, 315B. And, although the mortgagee owes no duty to the mortgagor to sell at any particular time, and is not bound to postpone in the hope of obtaining a better price, if he or she does exercise the power of sale the mortgagee will owe a duty to the mortgagor to take reasonable care to obtain a proper price at the time of the sale: Downsview Nominees, 315C, referring to Cuckmere Brick Co Ltd v Mutual Finance Ltd [1971] Ch 949, CA; Silven, [19].
190. As I have said earlier in this judgment (at [27]), a receiver of the mortgaged property appointed by the mortgagee owes the same duty to the mortgagor as the mortgagee in relation to sale of the property (Silven, [22]). But a receiver has no right to remain passive if to do so would damage the interests of the mortgagor or the mortgagee. Instead he or she must be active in the protection and preservation of the charged property: Silven, [23]. But that does not require the receiver to await or effect any increase in value in the property before selling it: Silven, [28]. The receiver is not managing the mortgagor's property for the mortgagor's benefit, but instead is managing the mortgagee's security for the benefit of the mortgagee: Silven, [27].
191. However, where the receiver is exercising the powers of sale and management conferred on him or her by the mortgage, the receiver is doing so for the purpose of securing repayment of the debt owing to the mortgagee, and therefore he or she must exercise those powers in good faith and for the purpose of obtaining repayment of the debt: see Downsview Nominees, 312D-E. For this purpose it is sufficient if the receiver is exercising the power at least in part for a proper purpose, ie that at least one of the purposes for which the power is exercised is a proper one (Meretz Investments NV v ACP Ltd [2007] Ch 197, [314], [335], reversed in part on other grounds [2008] Ch 244, CA).
192. In this context a proper purpose is one to protect or realise the security or otherwise to secure repayment of the debt. That is what the security is granted for. Exercising the powers of management or sale attached to that security so as to protect or benefit some other, collateral interest of the creditor, eg to disrupt enforcement of a lower ranking security (Downsview), to assist a friend or relative to avoid the consequences of security of tenure legislation in relation to a tenancy granted by that person (Quennell v Maltby [1979] 1 WLR 318, CA), or perhaps to injure a commercial competitor (Lightman & Moss, 13-011), would therefore not be a proper purpose.
193. There is obviously no rule as such that forbids a receiver to place himself or herself in a position where the mortgagee's and the mortgagor's interests conflict or may conflict. On the contrary, those interests conflict from the outset, and the receiver is entitled, indeed will usually be bound, in exercising the powers for a proper purpose, to prefer the interests of the mortgagee: see Downsview, 312H-313B. The conflict of interests envisaged in issue 1 is different. It arises when the mortgagee (who owes a duty to the mortgagor in selling the mortgaged property to take reasonable care to obtain a proper price for the property) or its associate (in which the mortgagee is interested) seeks to buy the property itself. The interest of the mortgagee in purchasing for as low a price as possible conflicts with its duty to take reasonable care to obtain a proper price. So the mortgagee cannot buy at all, as this would be a breach of the equitable self-dealing rule, and the associate can only buy safely where it proves that the sale was in good faith and the mortgagee took reasonable care to obtain a proper price at the time: Tse Kwong Lam v Wong Chit Sen [1983] 1 WLR 1349, PC.
194. Where the mortgagee appoints a receiver, and the receiver exercises the power of sale to sell to the mortgagee's associate, then, as I have said, there is no self-dealing, and the receiver does not have the same interest as the mortgagee in minimising the price. He or she does not benefit directly from any lower price. The receiver's interest lies instead in performing the role properly so as to earn fees. Those fees are earned whether the price is high or low, so long as reasonable care is taken that it is a proper one. The receiver may be tempted to gratify the mortgagee's desire for the associate to purchase cheaply for other, improper reasons, for example to continue to earn fees from the current appointment or to secure further appointments in the future, but that is quite different. Thus, in my judgment, the receiver in a case where the sale is to an associate of the appointor does not have a conflict of duty and interest as such.
195. My conclusions on good faith and conflict of interest dispose of that part of the claimant's case which depends on showing that the defendants put themselves into a position of conflict of duty and interest by allowing a company in which the appointor was interested to buy the property. In my judgment, the defendants did not thereby put themselves into such a position of conflict.'