In Halborg v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2026] EWHC 636 (Admin) ('Halborg'), Lang J heard 2 consolidated appeals, brought by a (suspended) solicitor, pursuant to the Solicitors Act 1974. The solicitor's appeal involved a challenge to the decision of the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal ('SDT'), that '...admitted facts amounted to a lack of integrity.' The SDT had then gone on to impose a sanction of 12 months suspension from practice as a solicitor.
In determining the appeal, under the heading 'Legal Framework'[1] and 'Integrity' Lang J said, at paragraphs 22 to 23:
'In Wingate v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2018] 1 WLR 3969, Jackson LJ undertook an extensive review of the authorities on the term “integrity”. He concluded as follows:
“95. Let me now turn to integrity. As a matter of common parlance and as a matter of law, integrity is a broader concept than honesty. In this regard, I agree with the observations of the Divisional Court in Williams and I disagree with the observations of Mostyn J in Malins.
96. Integrity is a more nebulous concept than honesty. Hence it is less easy to define, as a number of judges have noted.
97. In professional codes of conduct, the term “integrity” is a useful shorthand to express the higher standards which society expects from professional persons and which the professions expect from their own members. See the judgment of Sir Brian Leveson P in Williams at [130]. The underlying rationale is that the professions have a privileged and trusted role in society. In return they are required to live up to their own professional standards.
98. I agree with Davis LJ in Chan that it is not possible to formulate an all-purpose, comprehensive definition of integrity. On the other hand, it is a counsel of despair to say: “Well you can always recognise it, but you can never describe it.”
99. The broad contours of what integrity means, at least in the context of professional conduct, are now becoming clearer. The observations of the Financial Services and Markets Tribunal in Hoodless have met with general approbation.
100. Integrity connotes adherence to the ethical standards of one’s own profession. That involves more than mere honesty. To take one example, a solicitor conducting negotiations or a barrister making submissions to a judge or arbitrator will take particular care not to mislead. Such a professional person is expected to be even more scrupulous about accuracy than a member of the general public in daily discourse.
101. The duty to act with integrity applies not only to what professional persons say, but also to what they do. It is possible to give many illustrations of what constitutes acting without integrity. For example, in the case of solicitors:
i) A sole practice giving the appearance of being a partnership and deliberately flouting the conduct rules (Emeana);
ii) Recklessly, but not dishonestly, allowing a court to be misled (Brett);
iii) Subordinating the interests of the clients to the solicitors’ own financial interests (Chan);
iv) Making improper payments out of the client account (Scott);
v) Allowing the firm to become involved in conveyancing transactions which bear the hallmarks of mortgage fraud (NewellAustin);
vi) Making false representations on behalf of the client (Williams).
102. Obviously, neither courts nor professional tribunals must set unrealistically high standards ….The duty of integrity does not require professional people to be paragons of virtue …”
Jackson LJ observed, at [103], that a professional disciplinary tribunal has specialist knowledge of the profession and its ethical standards. Accordingly it is well placed to identify want of integrity and the decisions of such a body on that issue must be respected, unless it has erred in law.'
Lang J in Halborg then referred to some submissions made by the parties. Lang J said, at paragraphs 24 to 27:
'The Appellant referred to the observations of Collins Rice J. on the issue of integrity in Hurst v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2026] EWHC 85 (Admin), at [61] and [122]:
“61. A failure to act with integrity is an imputation of unethical conduct. As such, it is more than a portmanteau reference to a corpus of professional standards. It connotes an element of personal substandard ethical behaviour or untrustworthiness – a degree of what lawyers sometimes refer to as moral turpitude.”
“122….. These, and the finding of lack of professional integrity, are findings of bad faith, to put it no higher than that. As such, they import an elevated standard of proof and of reasoning ….”
In my view, the observations of Collins Rice J. that a failure to act with integrity connotes “moral turpitude” and “bad faith”, which require an elevated standard of proof and reasoning, are not supported by the authorities. Instead, I follow the guidance of the Court of Appeal in Wingate.
I also note that, by rule 5 of the Solicitors (Disciplinary Proceedings) Rules 2019 (“the 2019 Disciplinary Rules”), the allegations had to be proved to the standard applicable in civil proceedings (the balance of probabilities), and the Tribunal expressly applied this standard.
The SRA relied upon the case of Vay Sulip v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2018] EWHC 957 (Admin) where the Divisional Court, per Lane J., held:
“161. At paragraph 162.13 of the decision, the SDT found the appellant’s bringing of judicial review proceedings showed he had failed to uphold the rule of law and the proper administration of justice. The appellant’s actions lacked integrity.
……
164. Paragraph 10 of the grounds submits that the SDT incorrectly adopted an approach at paragraph 144 of its decision, which involved assessing the morality of the appellant rather than whether he was a person of integrity. At paragraph 144, the SDT assessed the appellant –
“… as someone who lacked a steady adherence to a moral code; that it did not appear to have occurred to him that he should act as a “filter” to ensure that the system would not be clogged up with hopeless, urgent applications which neither the court nor the Home Office will consider favourably with knowledge of the true facts and circumstances; and that he demonstrated a belief that his duties were to his client, but he was blind to his duties to the court and in the wider context of the administration of justice.”
165. Read as a whole, there is nothing remotely troubling with paragraph 144. On the contrary, the SDT’s approach to integrity is entirely compatible with the judgment of Jackson LJ in Wingate and Another v Solicitors Regulation Authority; Solicitors Regulation Authority v Malins [2018] EWCA Civ 366:- …”'
Lang J in Halborg also, amongst other things, dealt with:
(1) the law on civil restraint orders (paragraph 28) - referring to Nowak v Nursing and Midwifery Council & Anor [2013] EWHC 1932 (QB);
(2) a submission about the scope of jurisdiction over conduct in a personal capacity, referring (paragraph 81 to 88) to Beckwith v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2020] EWHC 3231 (Admin) ('Beckwith'), and applying the Beckwith test (paragraph 88); and
(3) a submission that the 12 months suspension was 'manifestly excessive, unreasonable and disproportionate, and could not be justified.' (paragraph 108), referring to Bolton v Law Society [1994] 1 WLR 512, Law Society v Salsbury [2008] EWCA Civ 1285, [2009] 1 WLR 1286 and SRA v James [2018] EWHC 3058 (Admin), [2018] 4 WLR 163[2]
Collatory Case Series
The Collatory Case Series, is an series of bulletins, designed to report that one case (or two cases, here) which collates the essential principles/propositions of law, for a particular doctrine/area of law. It is not designed as a deep and comprehensive review of an area of law, but to provide that quick 'go to' case.
SIMON HILL © 2026*
BARRISTER
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NOTICE: This article is provided free of charge for information purposes only; it does not constitute legal advice and should not be relied on as such. No responsibility for the accuracy and/or correctness of the information and commentary set out in the article, or for any consequences of relying on it, is assumed or accepted by any member of Chambers or by Chambers as a whole, or the Copyright holder. No attempt has been made to provide an exhaustive review/account of the law in this area. *Copyright is owned by Barrister Search Limited.
[1] In Halborg v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2026] EWHC 636 (Admin) ('Halborg'), Lang J, also under the heading 'Legal Framework', set out the law surrounding a solicitor (Appellant) bringing an appeal against a Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal decision. At paragraphs 18 to 21, Lang J said:
'The Appellant has a statutory right of appeal to the High Court against the order of the Tribunal, pursuant to section 49 SA 1974. The High Court, on such an appeal, can make such order “as it may think fit” (section 49(4)).
The appeal is governed by CPR Pt 52 and PD 52D. Under CPR 52.21(3), the question for the Court is whether the decision of the Tribunal is “wrong” or “unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity in the proceedings in the lower court”.
The appeal proceeds by way of review unless the Court considers that it would be in the interests of justice to hold a rehearing: see CPR 52.21(1), and Salsbury v Law Society [2009] 1 WLR 1286, at [30]. The scope of the court’s powers on a review in most cases renders it unnecessary to hold a re-hearing: Adesemowo v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2013] EWHC 2020 (Admin), at [9] - [12].
In Ali v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2021] EWHC 2709 (Admin), Morris J. summarised the authorities in this field on the meaning of “wrong”, as follows:
“94. Fourthly, as regards the approach of the Court when considering whether the Tribunal was “wrong”, I refer in particular to Solicitors Regulation Authority v Day [2018] EWHC 2726 (Admin) at §§61-78, Solicitors Regulation Authority v Good [2019] EWHC 817 (Admin) at §§28-32, the Naqvi Judgment at §83, citing Solicitors Regulation Authority v Siaw [2019] EWHC 2737 (Admin) at §§32-35, and most recently, Martin v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2020] EWHC 3525 (Admin) at §§30-33. From these authorities, the following propositions can be stated:
(1) A decision is wrong where there is an error of law, error of fact or an error in the exercise of discretion.
(2) The Court should exercise particular caution and restraint before interfering with either the findings of fact or evaluative judgment of a first instance and specialist tribunal, such as the Tribunal, particularly where the findings have been reached after seeing and evaluating witnesses.
(3) It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appellate court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge would have reached. That is a high threshold. That means it must either be possible to identify a critical finding of fact which has no basis in the evidence, or a demonstrable misunderstanding of relevant evidence, or a demonstrable failure to consider relevant evidence. If there is no such identifiable error and the question is one of judgment about the weight to be given to the relevant evidence, the Court must be satisfied that the judge’s conclusion cannot reasonably be explained or justified.
(4) Therefore the Court will only interfere with the findings of fact and a finding of dishonesty if it is satisfied that that the Tribunal committed an error of principle or its evaluation was wrong in the sense of falling outside the bounds of what the Tribunal could properly and reasonably decide.
(5) The Tribunal is a specialist tribunal particularly equipped to appraise what is required of a solicitor in terms of professional judgment, and an appellate court will be cautious in interfering with such an appraisal.
Finally, as regards reasons, decisions of specialist tribunals are not expected to be the product of elaborate legal drafting. Their judgments should be read as a whole; and in assessing the reasons given, unless there is a compelling reason to the contrary, it is appropriate to take it that the Tribunal has fully taken into account all the evidence and submissions: Martin, supra, §33.”'
[2] In Halborg v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2026] EWHC 636 (Admin) ('Halborg'), Lang J, at paragraphs 109 to 111, said:
'In the seminal case of Bolton v Law Society [1994] 1 WLR 512 (cited in the ‘Guidance Note on Sanction’), Sir Thomas Bingham MR explained the fundamental importance of integrity in a solicitor, at 518A – 519B:
“It is required of lawyers practising in this country that they should discharge their professional duties with integrity, probity and complete trustworthiness.
…..
Any solicitor who is shown to have discharged his professional duties with anything less than complete integrity, probity and trustworthiness must expect severe sanctions to be imposed upon him by the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal.
….
If a solicitor is not shown to have acted dishonestly, but is shown to have fallen below the required standards of integrity, probity and trustworthiness, his lapse is less serious but it remains very serious indeed in a member of a profession whose reputation depends upon trust.
…..
The decision whether to strike off or suspend will often involve a fine and difficult exercise of judgment, to be made by the tribunal as an informed and expert body on all the facts of the case. Only in a very unusual and venial case of this kind would the tribunal be likely to regard as appropriate any order less severe than one of suspension.
It is important that there should be full understanding of the reasons why the tribunal makes orders which might otherwise seem harsh. There is, in some of these orders, a punitive element: a penalty may be visited on a solicitor who has fallen below the standards required of his profession in order to punish him for what he has done and to deter any other solicitor tempted to behave in the same way. Those are traditional objects of punishment. But often the order is not punitive in intention. Particularly is this so where a criminal penalty has been imposed and satisfied. The solicitor has paid his debt to society. There is no need, and it would be unjust, to punish him again. In most cases the order of the tribunal will be primarily directed to one or other or both of two other purposes. One is to be sure that the offender does not have the opportunity to repeat the offence. This purpose is achieved for a limited period by an order of suspension; plainly it is hoped that experience of suspension will make the offender meticulous in his future compliance with the required standards……The second purpose is the most fundamental of all: to maintain the reputation of the solicitors' profession as one in which every member, of whatever standing, may be trusted to the ends of the earth. To maintain this reputation and sustain public confidence in the integrity of the profession it is often necessary that those guilty of serious lapses are not only expelled but denied re-admission.
…..
A profession's most valuable asset is its collective reputation and the confidence which that inspires.”
In Law Society v Salsbury [2008] EWCA Civ 1285, [2009] 1 WLR 1286, Jackson LJ said, at [30]:
“…the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal comprises an expert and informed tribunal, which is particularly well placed in any case to assess what measures are required to deal with defaulting solicitors and to protect the public interest. Absent any error of law, the High Court must pay considerable respect to the sentencing decisions of the tribunal. Nevertheless if the High Court, despite paying such respect, is satisfied that the sentencing decision was clearly inappropriate, then the court will interfere.”
In SRA v James [2018] EWHC 3058 (Admin), [2018] 4 WLR 163, Flaux LJ (with whom Jeremy Baker J. agreed) made clear at [53] - [55] that the court could interfere with a decision on sanction only if the tribunal committed an error of principle, or its evaluation was wrong in the sense that it fell outside the bounds of what the tribunal could properly and reasonably decide.'