Undue Influence

Author: Simon Hill
In: Bulletin Published: Monday 06 January 2025

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Update: This article has been updated to include the Supreme Court's decision in Waller-Edwards v One Savings Bank Plc [2025] UKSC 22, handed down on 4 June 2025

The law of undue influence has been reviewed in a number of cases, most prominently:

(a) Barclays Bank Plc v O’Brien [1994] 1 A.C. 180 [1993] 3 W.L.R. 786 (‘O’Brien’), House of Lords (Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Templeman, Lord Lowry, Lord Slynn, Lord Woolf)

(b) Royal Bank of Scotland pic v Etridge (No 2) [2002] 2 AC 773 ('Etridge No.2'), House of Lords (Lord Bingham, Lord Nicholls, Lord Hobhouse, Lord Clyde, Lord Scott)

(c) Nature Resorts Ltd v First Citizens Bank Ltd [2022] UKPC 10 [2022] 1 W.L.R. 2788 ('Nature Resorts'), Privy Council (Lord Briggs, Lord Kitchin, Lord Burrows, Lady Rose, Lady Arden JJSC)

(d) One Savings Bank plc v Waller-Edwards [2024] EWCA Civ 302 ('One Savings'), Court of Appeal (Sir Geoffrey Vos MR, Peter Jackson, Falk LJJ)

For the purposes of this article, it is convenient to start with the case of Etridge No.2, leaving the earlier case of O'Brien to an annex at the end.

Etridge No.2
In Etridge No.2, House of Lords considered the law on undue influence. Lord Nicholls gave he most authoritative judgment (Vos MR, in One Savings, at paragraph 23[1]).

The factual cases of the 8 cases on appeal, were set out by Lord Nicholls, at paragraph 5:

‘Seven of the present appeals are of this character. In each case the bank sought to enforce the charge signed by the wife. The bank claimed an order for possession of the matrimonial home. The wife raised a defence that the bank was on notice that her concurrence in the transaction had been procured by her husband's undue influence. The eighth appeal concerns a claim by a wife for damages from a solicitor who advised her before she entered into a guarantee obligation of this character.’

Under the heading ‘Undue Influence’, and after stating that it was ‘…necessary to go back to first principles.’ (paragraph 6), Lord Nicholls characterised the equitable doctrine of undue influence, at paragraphs 6 to 12:

'Undue influence is one of the grounds of relief developed by the courts of equity as a court of conscience. The objective is to ensure that the influence of one person over another is not abused. In everyday life people constantly seek to influence the decisions of others. They seek to persuade those with whom they are dealing to enter into transactions, whether great or small. The law has set limits to the means properly employable for this purpose. To this end the common law developed a principle of duress. Originally this was narrow in its scope, restricted to the more blatant forms of physical coercion, such as personal violence.

Here, as elsewhere in the law, equity supplemented the common law. Equity extended the reach of the law to other unacceptable forms of persuasion. The law will investigate the manner in which the intention to enter into the transaction was secured: "how the intention was produced", in the oft repeated words of Lord Eldon LC, from as long ago as 1807 (Huguenin v Baseley 14 Ves 273, 300). If the intention was produced by an unacceptable means, the law will not permit the transaction to stand. The means used is regarded as an exercise of improper or "undue" influence, and hence unacceptable, whenever the consent thus procured ought not fairly to be treated as the expression of a person's free will. It is impossible to be more precise or definitive. The circumstances in which one person acquires influence over another, and the manner in which influence may be exercised, vary too widely to permit of any more specific criterion.

Equity identified broadly two forms of unacceptable conduct. The first comprises overt acts of improper pressure or coercion such as unlawful threats. Today there is much overlap with the principle of duress as this principle has subsequently developed. The second form arises out of a relationship between two persons where one has acquired over another a measure of influence, or ascendancy, of which the ascendant person then takes unfair advantage. An example from the 19th century, when much of this law developed, is a case where an impoverished father prevailed upon his inexperienced children to charge their reversionary interests under their parents' marriage settlement with payment of his mortgage debts: see Bainbrigge v Browne (1881) 18 ChD 188.

In cases of this latter nature the influence one person has over another provides scope for misuse without any specific overt acts of persuasion. The relationship between two individuals may be such that, without more, one of them is disposed to agree a course of action proposed by the other. Typically this occurs when one person places trust in another to look after his affairs and interests, and the latter betrays this trust by preferring his own interests. He abuses the influence he has acquired. In Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 ChD 145, a case well known to every law student, Lindley LJ, at p 181, described this class of cases as those in which it was the duty of one party to advise the other or to manage his property for him. In Zamet v Hyman [1961] 1 WLR 1442., 1444-1445 Lord Evershed MR referred to relationships where one party owed the other an obligation of candour and protection.

The law has long recognised the need to prevent abuse of influence in these "relationship" cases despite the absence of evidence of overt acts of persuasive conduct. The types of relationship, such as parent and child, in which this principle falls to be applied cannot be listed exhaustively. Relationships are infinitely various. Sir Guenter Treitel QC has rightly noted that the question is whether one party has reposed sufficient trust and confidence in the other, rather than whether the relationship between the parties belongs to a particular type: see Treitel, The Law of Contract, 10th ed (1999), pp 380-381. For example, the relation of banker and customer will not normally meet this criterion, but exceptionally it may: see National Westminster Bank pic v Morgan [1985] AC 686, 707-709.

Even this test is not comprehensive. The principle is not confined to cases of abuse of trust and confidence. It also includes, for instance, cases where a vulnerable person has been exploited. Indeed, there is no single touchstone for determining whether the principle is applicable. Several expressions have been used in an endeavour to encapsulate the essence: trust and confidence, reliance, dependence or vulnerability on the one hand and ascendancy, domination or control on the other. None of these descriptions is perfect. None is all embracing. Each has its proper place.

In CIBC Mortgages pic v Pitt [1994] 1 AC 200 your Lordships' House decided that in cases of undue influence disadvantage is not a necessary ingredient of the cause of action. It is not essential that the transaction should be disadvantageous to the pressurised or influenced person, either in financial terms or in any other way. However, in the nature of things, questions of undue influence will not usually arise, and the exercise of undue influence is unlikely to occur, where the transaction is innocuous. The issue is likely to arise only when, in some respect, the transaction was disadvantageous either from the outset or as matters turned out.'

Under the heading ‘Burden of proof and presumptions’, Lord Nicholls said, from paragraph 13:

‘Whether a transaction was brought about by the exercise of undue influence is a question of fact. Here, as elsewhere, the general principle is that he who asserts a wrong has been committed must prove it. The burden of proving an allegation of undue influence rests upon the person who claims to have been wronged. This is the general rule. The evidence required to discharge the burden of proof depends on the nature of the alleged undue influence, the personality of the parties, their relationship, the extent to which the transaction cannot readily be accounted for by the ordinary motives of ordinary persons in that relationship, and all the circumstances of the case.

Proof that the complainant placed trust and confidence in the other party in relation to the management of the complainant's financial affairs, coupled with a transaction which calls for explanation, will normally be sufficient, failing satisfactory evidence to the contrary, to discharge the burden of proof. On proof of these two matters the stage is set for the court to infer that, in the absence of a satisfactory explanation, the transaction can only have been procured by undue influence. In other words, proof of these two facts is prima facie evidence that the defendant abused the influence he acquired in the parties' relationship. He preferred his own interests. He did not behave fairly to the other. So the evidential burden then shifts to him. It is for him to produce evidence to counter the inference which otherwise should be drawn.

‘ In other words, proof of these two facts is prima facie evidence that the defendant abused the influence he acquired in the parties' relationship. He preferred his own interests. He did not behave fairly to the other. So the evidential burden then shifts to him. It is for him to produce evidence to counter the inference which otherwise should be drawn.’

After considering, at paragraph 15[2]: (1) Bainbrigge v Browne 18 ChD 188; and (2) National Westminster Bank pic v Morgan [1985] AC 686, 707, as illustrative examples, Lord Nicholls went on, from paragraph 16 to 18:

‘Generations of equity lawyers have conventionally described this situation as one in which a presumption of undue influence arises. This use of the term "presumption" is descriptive of a shift in the evidential onus on a question of fact. When a plaintiff succeeds by this route he does so because he has succeeded in establishing a case of undue influence. The court has drawn appropriate inferences of fact upon a balanced consideration of the whole of the evidence at the end of a trial in which the burden of proof rested upon the plaintiff. The use, in the course of the trial, of the forensic tool of a shift in the evidential burden of proof should not be permitted to obscure the overall position. These cases are the equitable counterpart of common law cases where the principle of res ipsa loquitur is invoked. There is a rebuttable evidential presumption of undue influence.

The availability of this forensic tool in cases founded on abuse of influence arising from the parties' relationship has led to this type of case sometimes being labelled "presumed undue influence". This is by way of contrast with cases involving actual pressure or the like, which are labelled "actual undue influence": see Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA v Aboody [1990] 1 QB 923, 953, and Royal Bank of Scotland pic v Etridge (No z) [1998] 4 All ER 705, 711-712, paras 5-7. This usage can be a little confusing. In many cases where a plaintiff has claimed that the defendant abused the influence he acquired in a relationship of trust and confidence the plaintiff has succeeded by recourse to the rebuttable evidential presumption. But this need not be so. Such a plaintiff may succeed even where this presumption is not available to him; for instance, where the impugned transaction was not one which called for an explanation.

The evidential presumption discussed above is to be distinguished sharply from a different form of presumption which arises in some cases. The law has adopted a sternly protective attitude towards certain types of relationship in which one party acquires influence over another who is vulnerable and dependent and where, moreover, substantial gifts by the influenced or vulnerable person are not normally to be expected. Examples of relationships within this special class are parent and child, guardian and ward, trustee and beneficiary, solicitor and client, and medical adviser and patient. In these cases the law presumes, irrebuttably, that one party had influence over the other. The complainant need not prove he actually reposed trust and confidence in the other party. It is sufficient for him to prove the existence of the type of relationship.'

Husband and wife is not one of these special relationships. Lord Nicholls in Etridge (No.2) said, at at paragraph 19:

‘It is now well established that husband and wife is not one of the relationships to which this latter principle applies. In Yerkey v Jones (1939) 63 CLR 649, 675 Dixon J explained the reason. The Court of Chancery was not blind to the opportunities of obtaining and unfairly using influence over a wife which a husband often possesses. But there is nothing unusual or strange in a wife, from motives of affection or for other reasons, conferring substantial financial benefits on her husband. Although there is no presumption, the court will nevertheless note, as a matter of fact, the opportunities for abuse which flow from a wife's confidence in her husband. The court will take this into account with all the other evidence in the case. Where there is evidence that a husband has taken unfair advantage of his influence over his wife, or her confidence in him, "it is not difficult for the wife to establish her title to relief": see In re Lloyds Bank Ltd; Bomze and Lederman v Bomze [1931] 1 Ch 289, 302, per Maugham J.’

Under the heading ‘Independent advice’, Lord Nicholls in Etridge (No.2) said, at paragraph 20:

‘Proof that the complainant received advice from a third party before entering into the impugned transaction is one of the matters a court takes into account when weighing all the evidence. The weight, or importance, to be attached to such advice depends on all the circumstances. In the normal course, advice from a solicitor or other outside adviser can be expected to bring home to a complainant a proper understanding of what he or she is about to do. But a person may understand fully the implications of a proposed transaction, for instance, a substantial gift, and yet still be acting under the undue influence of another. Proof of outside advice does not, of itself, necessarily show that the subsequent completion of the transaction was free from the exercise of undue influence. Whether it will be proper to infer that outside advice had an emancipating effect, so that the transaction was not brought about by the exercise of undue influence, is a question of fact to be decided having regard to all the evidence in the case.’

Under the heading ‘Manifest disadvantage’, Lord Nicholls in Etridge (No.2) said, at paragraph 21 to 31:

‘21 As already noted, there are two prerequisites to the evidential shift in the burden of proof from the complainant to the other party. First, that the complainant reposed trust and confidence in the other party, or the other party acquired ascendancy over the complainant. Second, that the transaction is not readily explicable by the relationship of the parties.

22 Lindley LJ summarised this second prerequisite in the leading authority of Allcard v Skinner 36 ChD 145, where the donor parted with almost all her property. Lindley LJ pointed out that where a gift of a small amount is made to a person standing in a confidential relationship to the donor, some proof of the exercise of the influence of the donee must be given. The mere existence of the influence is not enough. He continued, at p 185 "But if the gift is so large as not to be reasonably accounted for on the ground of friendship, relationship, charity, or other ordinary motives on which ordinary men act, the burden is upon the donee to support the gift." In Bank of Montreal v Stuart [1911] AC 120,137 Lord Macnaghten used the phrase " immoderate and irrational" to describe this concept.

23 The need for this second prerequisite has recently been questioned: see Nourse LJ in Barclays Bank pic v Coleman [2001] QB, 20, 30-32, one of the cases under appeal before your Lordships' House. Mr Sher invited your Lordships to depart from the decision of the House on this point in National Westminster Bank pic v Morgan [1985] AC 686.

24 My Lords, this is not an invitation I would accept. The second prerequisite, as expressed by Lindley LJ, is good sense. It is a necessary limitation upon the width of the first prerequisite. It would be absurd for the law to presume that every gift by a child to a parent, or every transaction between a client and his solicitor or between a patient and his doctor, was brought about by undue influence unless the contrary is affirmatively proved. Such a presumption would be too far-reaching. The law would be out of touch with everyday life if the presumption were to apply to every Christmas or birthday gift by a child to a parent, or to an agreement whereby a client or patient agrees to be responsible for the reasonable fees of his legal or medical adviser. The law would be rightly open to ridicule, for transactions such as these are unexceptionable. They do not suggest that something may be amiss. So something more is needed before the law reverses the burden of proof, something which calls for an explanation. When that something more is present, the greater the disadvantage to the vulnerable person, the more cogent must be the explanation before the presumption will be regarded as rebutted.

25 This was the approach adopted by Lord Scarman in National Westminster Bank pic v Morgan [1985] AC 686, 703-707. He cited Lindley LJ's observations in Allcard v Skinner 36 ChD 145, 185, which I have set out above. He noted that whatever the legal character of the transaction, it must constitute a disadvantage sufficiently serious to require evidence to rebut the presumption that in the circumstances of the parties' relationship, it was procured by the exercise of undue influence. Lord Scarman concluded, at p 704:

"the Court of Appeal erred in law in holding that the presumption of undue influence can arise from the evidence of the relationship of the parties without also evidence that the transaction itself was wrongful in that it constituted an advantage taken of the person subjected to the influence which, failing proof to the contrary, was explicable only on the basis that undue influence had been exercised to procure it." (Emphasis added.)

26 Lord Scarman attached the label "manifest disadvantage" to this second ingredient necessary to raise the presumption. This label has been causing difficulty. It may be apt enough when applied to straightforward transactions such as a substantial gift or a sale at an undervalue. But experience has now shown that this expression can give rise to misunderstanding. The label is being understood and applied in a way which does not accord with the meaning intended by Lord Scarman, its originator.

27 The problem has arisen in the context of wives guaranteeing payment of their husband's business debts. In recent years judge after judge has grappled with the baffling question whether a wife's guarantee of her husband's bank overdraft, together with a charge on her share of the matrimonial home, was a transaction manifestly to her disadvantage.

28 In a narrow sense, such a transaction plainly ("manifestly") is disadvantageous to the wife. She undertakes a serious financial obligation, and in return she personally receives nothing. But that would be to take an unrealistically blinkered view of such a transaction. Unlike the relationship of solicitor and client or medical adviser and patient, in the case of husband and wife there are inherent reasons why such a transaction may well be for her benefit. Ordinarily, the fortunes of husband and wife are bound up together. If the husband's business is the source of the family income, the wife has a lively interest in doing what she can to support the business. A wife's affection and self-interest run hand-in-hand in inclining her to join with her husband in charging the matrimonial home, usually a jointly owned asset, to obtain the financial facilities needed by the business. The finance may be needed to start a new business, or expand a promising business, or rescue an ailing business.

29 Which, then, is the correct approach to adopt in deciding whether a transaction is disadvantageous to the wife: the narrow approach, or the wider approach? The answer is neither. The answer lies in discarding a label which gives rise to this sort of ambiguity. The better approach is to adhere more directly to the test outlined by Lindley LJ in Allcard v Skinner 36 ChD 145, and adopted by Lord Scarman in National Westminster Bank pic v Morgan [1985] AC 686, in the passages I have cited.

30 I return to husband and wife cases. I do not think that, in the ordinary course, a guarantee of the character I have mentioned is to be regarded as a transaction which, failing proof to the contrary, is explicable only on the basis that it has been procured by the exercise of undue influence by the husband. Wives frequently enter into such transactions. There are good and sufficient reasons why they are willing to do so, despite the risks involved for them and their families. They may be enthusiastic. They may not. They may be less optimistic than their husbands about the prospects of the husbands' businesses. They may be anxious, perhaps exceedingly so. But this is a far cry from saying that such transactions as a class are to be regarded as prima facie evidence of the exercise of undue influence by husbands.

31 I have emphasised the phrase "in the ordinary course". There will be cases where a wife's signature of a guarantee or a charge of her share in the matrimonial home does call for explanation. Nothing I have said above is directed at such a case.’

Under the heading ‘A cautionary note’, Lord Nicholls in Etridge (No.2) said, at paragraph 32 to 33:

'I add a cautionary note, prompted by some of the first instance judgments in the cases currently being considered by the House. It concerns the general approach to be adopted by a court when considering whether a wife's guarantee of her husband's bank overdraft was procured by her husband's undue influence. Undue influence has a connotation of impropriety. In the eye of the law, undue influence means that influence has been misused. Statements or conduct by a husband which do not pass beyond the bounds of what may be expected of a reasonable husband in the circumstances should not, without more, be castigated as undue influence. Similarly, when a husband is forecasting the future of his business, and expressing his hopes or fears, a degree of hyperbole may be only natural. Courts should not too readily treat such exaggerations as misstatements.'

Inaccurate explanations of a proposed transaction are a different matter. So are cases where a husband, in whom a wife has reposed trust and confidence for the management of their financial affairs, prefers his interests to hers and makes a choice for both of them on that footing. Such a husband abuses the influence he has. He fails to discharge the obligation of candour and fairness he owes a wife who is looking to him to make the major financial decisions.’

Lord Nicholls in Etridge (No.2) considered policy considerations behind the law in this area, in relation to spouses standing as surety’s for their spouses’ debts. He stated, at paragraph 34- 36:

’The problem considered in O'Brien's case and raised by the present appeals is of comparatively recent origin. It arises out of the substantial growth in home ownership over the last 30 or 40 years and, as part of that development, the great increase in the number of homes owned jointly by husbands and wives. More than two-thirds of householders in the United Kingdom now own their own homes. For most home-owning couples, their homes are their most valuable asset. They must surely be free, if they so wish, to use this asset as a means of raising money, whether for the purpose of the husband's business or for any other purpose. Their home is their property. The law should not restrict them in the use they may make of it. Bank finance is in fact by far the most important source of external capital for small businesses with fewer than ten employees. These businesses comprise about 95% of all businesses in the country, responsible for nearly one-third of all employment. Finance raised by second mortgages on the principal's home is a significant source of capital for the start-up of small businesses.

If the freedom of home-owners to make economic use of their homes is not to be frustrated, a bank must be able to have confidence that a wife's signature of the necessary guarantee and charge will be as binding upon her as is the signature of anyone else on documents which he or she may sign. Otherwise banks will not be willing to lend money on the security of a jointly owned house or flat.

At the same time, the high degree of trust and confidence and emotional interdependence which normally characterises a marriage relationship provides scope for abuse. One party may take advantage of the other's vulnerability. Unhappily, such abuse does occur. Further, it is all too easy for a husband, anxious or even desperate for bank finance, to misstate the position in some particular or to mislead the wife, wittingly or unwittingly, in some other way. The law would be seriously defective if it did not recognise these realities.’

[Lord Nicholls continued]

Nature Resorts

In Nature Resorts, on 4.4.22, Lord Briggs and Lord Burrows JJSC gave the judgment of the Board (Lord Kitchen and Lady Rose JJSC agreeing; Lady Arden dissenting). The judgment commences with:

'This case is primarily about the doctrine of undue influence.It is accepted that the law on undue influence in Trinidad and Tobago is the same as that in English law. This case therefore requires the Board to examine and apply the law on undue influence that was so rigorously and helpfully analysed by the House of Lords in the leading modern case of Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Etridge (No 2) [2002] 2 AC 773...' (paragraph 1)

Under the heading 'The law on undue influence', Lord Briggs and Lord Burrows JJSC said, at paragraphs 10 to 15:

'10. Putting to one side illegitimate threats (which are nowadays better viewed as falling within the doctrine of duress: see Times Travel (UK) Ltd v Pakistan International Airlines Corpn [2021] 3 WLR 727, paras 8–9 and 89–90) undue influence is concerned with a situation where, by reason of the relationship between them, one party (B) has such influence over the other (A) that A does not exercise a free judgment, independent of B, in relation to the making of a transaction between A and B (or, in a three-party situation, between A and a third party, C).

11. Ever since Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145, it has been commonplace to divide undue influence into two categories: actual and presumed. But in Etridge the House of Lords made clear that undue influence is a single concept. It does not have two different forms. The correct analysis of the two categories is that they refer to different ways of proving undue influence. Presumed undue influence refers to where the person alleging undue influence relies on an evidential presumption. Actual undue influence refers to where the person alleging undue influence relies on direct proof (of A's conduct, within a relationship with B, which led to B not exercising a free and independent judgment).

12. As Etridge also made clear, there are two requirements for establishing the (rebuttable) presumption of undue influence. First, there must be a relationship of influence. This may be established on the facts. But in respect of some relationships there is what is commonly referred to as an irrebuttable legal presumption (but is more appropriately referred to as a legal rule) that the relationship is one of influence (but note not undue influence). Examples of such relationships are doctor and patient (Mitchell v Homfray (1881) 8 QBD 587), spiritual adviser and follower (Allcard v Skinner), parent and young child (Lancashire Loans Ltd v Black [1934] 1 KB 380) and, of direct relevance to the facts of this case, solicitor and client (Wright v Carter [1903] 1 Ch 27). The second requirement is that the transaction must not be readily explicable on ordinary motives. The House of Lords preferred this test, which uses the words of Lindley LJ in Allcard v Skinner, to a test of whether the transaction was manifestly disadvantageous which had been put forward by Lord Scarman in National Westminster Bank plc v Morgan [1985] AC 686, 703–707. The underlying idea behind the test is that the nature and/or contents of the transaction must make one conclude, in the context of the relationship of influence, that, absent evidence to the contrary, undue influence has been exercised. A contract between A and B which is substantively very unfair to A stands on one side of the line: a Christmas present by A to B stands on the other side of the line.

13. If those two requirements are satisfied, so that there is a presumption of undue influence, the burden of proof shifts and it is for the party seeking to uphold the transaction to rebut the presumption by showing that A was not acting under undue influence (ie that A exercised free and independent judgment) when entering into the transaction. Although neither necessary nor conclusive, the main method of rebuttal is to show that A obtained the fully informed and competent independent advice of a qualified person, most obviously a lawyer: see Inche Noriah v Shaik Allie Bin Omar [1929] AC 127 and Etridge.

14. In a three-party situation, where there is undue influence by B over A such that A enters into a transaction with C, the transaction will be voidable by A provided that C had notice of the undue influence or that B was acting as C's agent in procuring the transaction. The concept of notice, and how it applies in this context, was explained in detail in Etridge. That the law of agency has a role to play in the context of undue influence was accepted in cases such as Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA v Aboody [1990] 1 QB 923, 972 and Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180, 191, 195; see also Chitty on Contracts, 34th ed (2021), para 10-139.

15. Finally, it should be pointed out that there is no need to classify undue influence as a civil wrong (as opposed to a factor vitiating a transaction) in order to explain why transactions are set aside for undue influence: see Birks and Chin, “On the Nature of Undue Influence” in Good Faith and Fault in Contract (eds Beatson and Friedmann) (1995), pp 57–97. This was clearly explained by Mummery LJ (with whom Pill and Jacob LJJ agreed) in Pesticcio v Huet [2004] WTLR 699 at para 20:

“Although undue influence is sometimes described as an ‘equitable wrong’ or even as a species of equitable fraud, the basis of the court's intervention is not the commission of a dishonest or wrongful act by the defendant, but that, as a matter of public policy, the presumed influence arising from the relationship of trust and confidence should not operate to the disadvantage of the victim, if the transaction is not satisfactorily explained by ordinary motives … A transaction may be set aside by the court, even though the actions and conduct of the person who benefits from it could not be criticised as wrongful.”'

One Savings [update: the Supreme Court overruled the Court of Appeal in relation to the proper approach to a 'hybrid case']
In One Savings, Vos MR said, at paragraph 4:

‘It is common ground between the parties that the authorities provide for two different categories of case relating to secured borrowing by two persons in a relationship.’

Paragraphs 5 and 6, Vos MR in One Savings said:

'First, there is the category of case described, perhaps only partly accurately, as a "surety case". A surety case covers non-commercial situations where, for example, (a) one borrower guarantees the debts of the other or of a company, or (b) of more relevance to our case, the borrowers take secured borrowing on jointly owned property to pay for the debts of only one of them. In such circumstances, the lender will normally have constructive notice of the possibility of one borrower being unduly influenced by the other, and will be put "on inquiry". In current terms, if a lender is put on inquiry, it is normally required to follow what the parties before us called the "Etridge protocol". The Etridge protocol involves the series of steps described by Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead at para 79 in Etridge.

Secondly, there are cases, epitomised by Pitt, where a loan is taken for the joint non-commercial purposes of two borrowers in a relationship (whether husband and wife or not). In Pitt, the bank was told that the purpose was to remortgage previous debts and to release capital for a jointly owned holiday home. In such circumstances, the lender will not normally have constructive notice of the possibility of one borrower being unduly influenced by the other, and will not be put on inquiry. I shall refer to these two clear cut categories of case as the "surety case" and the "joint borrowing case”.'

Vos MR said though that the case before the Court of Appeal was a hybrid case. At paragraph 7 he said,

‘That is the situation in which the borrowers seek a loan partly for their joint non-commercial purposes and partly for the benefit of one borrower only (described before us as a “hybrid case”).’

And

‘The case before us raises an issue that has not seemingly been addressed (at least head on) before.’

Update: In Waller-Edwards v One Savings Bank Plc [2025] UKSC 22, Lady Simler (with whom Lord Briggs, Lord Hamblen, Lord Stephens and Lady Rose agreed) held that the approach to a 'hybrid case' adopted by the Court of Appeal was wrong ('hybrid', meaning, somewhere between: (a) a straightforward/pure 'surety case'; and (b) a straightforward/pure 'joint borrowing' or 'joint borrowing transaction' case; i.e. a case where: (a) part of the loan will benefit (only) one of the two (the 'surety' aspect); while (b) the other part of the loan will benefit both borrowers (the 'joint borrowing' aspect). In reaching this conclusion, she considered the general law of undue influence.

Under the heading 'Introduction', Lady Simler commenced her judgment with:

'The law recognises that there are certain (non-commercial) relationships where there is a heightened risk that one party has an undue influence over the other: the husband-and-wife relationship is an obvious example but there are others too. In certain circumstances the vulnerable party to such a relationship (say, a wife) who has been induced to enter into a financial transaction by the undue influence of her husband, is entitled to have it set aside as against the husband. The question that can then arise is whether the undue influence as between husband and wife affects the lender with whom the husband has been dealing, even where the lender has entered into the transaction in good faith and without actual knowledge of the undue influence.

Following a series of well-known cases discussed below (Barclays Bank plc v O'Brien [1994] 1 AC 180 ("O'Brien"), CIBC Mortgages plc v Pitt [1994] 1 AC 200 ("Pitt") and Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Etridge (No 2) [2001] UKHL 44; [2002] 2 AC 773 ("Etridge No 2"), the law regards banks and other lenders as put on inquiry (that one party's agreement to the transaction may have been obtained by undue influence) whenever on the face of a three-way transaction, the wife (or other vulnerable partner in the relationship) is offering to stand surety for her husband's debts (or vice versa). By contrast, where on the face of the transaction the lending is advanced to husband and wife jointly, the bank is not put on inquiry unless the bank is aware that the loan is being made for the husband's purposes as distinct from their joint purposes. The distinction between these two cases is straightforward and binary.

But it is common ground on this appeal that there may be less straightforward transactions involving non-commercial loans sought by a husband and wife that are, on the face of it, partly for their joint benefit and partly for either the husband or wife's sole benefit and therefore to that extent apparently to the financial disadvantage of the other. This sort of transaction is described below as a "hybrid" transaction. The issue for resolution on this appeal is to identify the correct legal test for deciding when a lender is put on inquiry in a non-commercial hybrid loan transaction.' (paragraphs 1 to 3)

Lady Simler added, at paragraph 6:

'I refer to the non-commercial relationship of husband and wife, and to the wife as the vulnerable party since that is the fact pattern in this appeal, and an all too common one. However, the same points apply equally to other non-commercial relationships open to abuse and men can also be abused or exploited by their intimate partners.'

After setting out some facts, Lady Simler discussed the authorities O'Brien, CIBC Mortgages pic v Pitt [1994] 1 AC 200 and Etridge No 2, under the heading 'The trilogy of cases: O'Brien, Pitt and Etridge No 2'. This discussion, at paragraphs 18 to 36, is too extensive to set out here, but is set out in the footnote([2a].

As to the law in respect to a 'hybrid case' (otherwise labelled a 'hybrid transaction' or 'mixed borrowing transaction' or 'partial surety transaction' case), Lady Simlar recalled the contention put forward by the appellant, at paragraph 5:

'The proper test is a bright line test: namely, where the relationship is non-commercial, if it appears on the face of the transaction that one party to the relationship is offering or has offered to stand surety to any extent more than a de minimis extent for the other (and therefore apparently to her financial disadvantage), the lender is "put on inquiry".'

before adding, at paragraph 5, that:

'...I have concluded that the appellant's bright line test is the correct test.'

How Lady Simler reached this conclusion in relation to the 'hybrid case' , is set out in under headings:

(a) '3 preliminary points' - paragraphs 37 to 41([2b]; and

(b) 'The test to be applied to hybrid transactions' - paragraphs 42 to 63([2c].

The extracts referred to in (a) and (b) above are set out in their respective footnotes. 

Effectively re-starting what she said in paragraph 5, Lady Similar, in paragraph 57, held that:

'...a creditor is put on inquiry in any non-commercial hybrid transaction where, on the face of the transaction, there is a more than de minimis element of borrowing which serves to discharge the debts of one of the borrowers and so might not be to the financial advantage of the other. The transaction must be viewed from the bank's perspective. Such a transaction, if viewed in this way, should be regarded as a "surety" transaction and the creditor placed on inquiry of the possibility of undue influence. The steps set out in the Etridge protocol must then be taken.'

Annex - O'Brien

There is a large cross over between the legal wrongs[3] of: (a) ’misrepresentation’ and (b) ’undue influence’. O’Brien is a misrepresentation case, but refers to the law of undue influence in detail.

In O’Brien, the facts were that H and W (the defendants) were married. H (alone) had an interest in a company (Heathrow Fabrications Ltd; the ‘Company’). A bank, P (Woolwich Branch of Barclays Bank), granted the Company an overdraft. H and W owned a matrimonial home, in their joint names, subject to a first mortgage.

The Company needed the overdraft increasing. P and the Company agreed that it be raised to £135,000 (reducing to £120,000 after 3 weeks), and that security be granted for the overdraft.

As security for repayment of any money drawdown on the overdraft, H gave an unlimited guarantee (‘PG’) of the Company’s overdraft debt. This PG was in turn, secured. H and, crucially, W, granted an in rem security (the ‘H/W Legal Charge’) over their home, to ‘secure any liability of [H] to the bank’ (at 186)

In terms of the execution of the H and W in rem security, P’s employee (at Woolwich branch) gave instructions to another branch (Burnham branch) about the execution of the in rem security. But these instructions were ignored by the Burnham branch.

(1) on 1.7.87, H signed the guarantee and legal charge
(2) on 2.7.87, W went to the branch with H. Whereupon, as Lord Browne-Wilkinson described, at 186-187:

‘There were produced for signature by [W], the legal charge on the matrimonial home together with a side letter which reads:

"We hereby agree acknowledge and confirm as follows: (1) That we have each received from you a copy of the guarantee dated 3 July 1987 (a copy of which is attached hereto) under which [H] guarantees the payment and discharge of all moneys and liabilities now or hereafter due owing or incurred by [the Company] to you. (2) That the liability of the said [H] to you pursuant to the said guarantee is and will be secured by the legal charge dated 3 July 1987 over the property described above made between (1) [H] (2) [H] and [W] and (3) Barclays Bank Plc. (3) That you recommended that we should obtain independent legal advice before signing this letter."

In fact the Burnham branch gave [W] no explanation of the effect of the documents. No one suggested that she should take independent legal advice. She did not read the documents or the side letter. She simply signed the legal charge and side letter and her signature was witnessed by the clerk. She was not given a copy of the guarantee.

In other words, ‘…to the knowledge of the bank…[W] signed the documents without any warning of the risks or any recommendation to take legal advice.’ (at 199)

In doing so, W relied upon H’s (mis)representations (that the H/W Legal Charge was limited to £60,000 and would only last 3 weeks) (at 199).

Subsequently, the Company’s borrowing on the overdraft increased to £154,000. P issued a demand to H on H’s PG. When the demand was not met, P commenced possession proceedings founded upon the H/W Legal Charge, seeking an order for possession and sale of the matrimonial home.

W defended on the basis she signed the H/W Legal Charge as a result of:
(a) H’s undue influence - however, this was not pursued following its rejection at first instance and in the Court of Appeal (at 187)
(b) misrepresentation - the first instance judge had found that H had falsely represented to W ‘…that the charge was to secure only £60,000 and that even this liability would be released in a short time when the house was remortgaged’ (at 187)

Lord Browne-Wilkinson (with whom Lord Templeman, Lord Lowry, Lord Slynn and Lord Woolf agreed) framed, at 186, the question as:

‘…whether a bank is entitled to enforce against a wife an obligation to secure a debt owed by her husband to the bank where the wife has been induced to stand as surety for her husband's debt by the undue influence or misrepresentation of the husband.’

Lord Browne-Wilkinson in O’Brien then set out some policy consideration[4], considering
(a) more homes are put into the joint names of both spouses
(b) when finance is sought for a business enterprise, ‘…the jointly owned home has become a main source of security.’ (at 188)
(c) the concept of the wife as subservient to the husband in the management of the family’s finances is an outmoded concept (at 188). But while ‘…the concept of the ignorant wife leaving all financial decisions to the husband is outmoded, the practice does not yet coincide with the ideal.’ (at 188) and that,

‘In a substantial proportion of marriages it is still the husband who has the business experience and the wife is willing to follow his advice without bringing a truly independent mind and will to bear on financial decisions. The number of recent cases in this field shows that in practice many wives are still subjected to, and yield to, undue influence by their husbands. Such wives can reasonably look to the law for some protection when their husbands have abused the trust and confidence reposed in them.’

(d) on the other hand, ‘it is important to keep a sense of balance in approaching these cases.’ - to avoid ‘…wealth currently tied up in the matrimonial home does not become economically sterile.’ - because bank’s won’t accept it as security, it is too vulnerable to being unenforceable as security.[5]

Lord Browne-Wilkinson then turned to the law of undue influence, which Lord Browne-Wilkinson expressly recognised, was ‘…not directly applicable in the present case…’ - but was relevant, because Turnbull & Co. v. Duval [1902] A.C. 429 in the Privy Council, the then case the then modern law in this area was founded upon, was founded upon it.

Under the heading ‘Undue Influence’, Lord Browne-Wilkinson in O’Brien said, at 189:

'A person who has been induced to enter into a transaction by the undue influence of another ("the wrongdoer") is entitled to set that transaction aside as against the wrongdoer. Such undue influence is either actual or presumed. In Bank of Credit and Commerce International S.A. v. Aboody [1990] 1 Q.B. 923, 953, the Court of Appeal helpfully adopted the following classification.

Class 1: Actual undue influence

In these cases it is necessary for the claimant to prove affirmatively that the wrongdoer exerted undue influence on the complainant to enter into the particular transaction which is impugned.

Class 2: Presumed undue influence

In these cases the complainant only has to show, in the first instance, that there was a relationship of trust and confidence between the complainant and the wrongdoer of such a nature that it is fair to presume that the wrongdoer abused that relationship in procuring the complainant to enter into the impugned transaction. In Class 2 cases therefore there is no need to produce evidence that actual undue influence was exerted in relation to the particular transaction impugned: once a confidential relationship has been proved, the burden then shifts to the wrongdoer to prove that the complainant entered into the impugned transaction freely, for example by showing that the complainant had independent advice. Such a confidential relationship can be established in two ways, viz.,’

Under the heading ‘Class 2(A)’, Lord Browne-Wilkinson in O’Brien said, at 189:

‘Certain relationships (for example solicitor and client, medical advisor and patient) as a matter of law raise the presumption that undue influence has been exercised.’

Under the heading ‘Class 2(B)’, Lord Browne-Wilkinson in O’Brien said, at 189-190:

Even if there is no relationship falling within Class 2(A), if the complainant proves the de facto existence of a relationship under which the complainant generally reposed trust and confidence in the wrongdoer, the existence of such relationship raises the presumption of undue influence. In a Class 2(B) case therefore, in the absence of evidence disproving undue influence, the complainant will succeed in setting aside the impugned transaction merely by proof that the complainant reposed trust and confidence in the wrongdoer without having to prove that the wrongdoer exerted actual undue influence or otherwise abused such trust and confidence in relation to the particular transaction impugned.

As to dispositions by a wife in favour of her husband, the law for long remained in an unsettled state. In the 19th century some judges took the view that the relationship was such that it fell into Class 2(A) i.e. as a matter of law undue influence by the husband over the wife was presumed. It was not until the decisions in Howes v. Bishop [1909] 2 K.B. 390 and Bank of Montreal v. Stuart [1911] A.C. 120 that it was finally determined that the relationship of husband and wife did not as a matter of law raise a presumption of undue influence within Class 2(A). It is to be noted therefore that when the Duval case was decided in 1902 the question whether there was a Class 2(A) presumption of undue influence as between husband and wife was still unresolved.’

Under the heading ‘An invalidating tendency?’, Lord Browne-Wilkinson in O’Brien said, at 190-191:

Although there is no Class 2(A) presumption of undue influence as between husband and wife, it should be emphasised that in any particular case a wife may well be able to demonstrate that de facto she did leave decisions on financial affairs to her husband thereby bringing herself within Class 2(B) i.e. that the relationship between husband and wife in the particular case was such that the wife reposed confidence and trust in her husband in relation to their financial affairs and therefore undue influence is to be presumed. Thus, in those cases which still occur where the wife relies in all financial matters on her husband and simply does what he suggests, a presumption of undue influence within Class 2(B) can be established solely from the proof of such trust and confidence without proof of actual undue influence.

In the appeal in C.I.B.C. Mortgages Plc. v. Pitt (judgment in which is to be given immediately after that in the present appeal), post, p. 200, Mr. Price for the wife argued that in the case of transactions between husband and wife, there was an "invalidating tendency" i.e. although there was no Class 2(A) presumption of undue influence, the courts were more ready to find that a husband had exercised undue influence over his wife than in other cases. Scott L.J. in the present case also referred to the law treating married women "more tenderly" than others. This approach is based on dicta in early authorities. In Grigby v. Cox (1750) 1 Ves.Sen. 517 Lord Hardwicke, whilst rejecting any presumption of undue influence, said that a court of equity "will have more jealousy" over dispositions by a wife to a husband. In Yerkey v. Jones (1939) 63 C.L.R. 649, 675, Dixon J. refers to this "invalidating tendency." He also refers to the court recognising "the opportunities which a wife's confidence in her husband gives him of unfairly or improperly procuring her to become surety:" see p. 677.

In my judgment this special tenderness of treatment afforded to wives by the courts is properly attributable to two factors. First, many cases may well fall into the Class 2(B) category of undue influence because the wife demonstrates that she placed trust and confidence in her husband in relation to her financial affairs and therefore raises a presumption of undue influence. Second, the sexual and emotional ties between the parties provide a ready weapon for undue influence: a wife's true wishes can easily be overborne because of her fear of destroying or damaging the wider relationship between her and her husband if she opposes his wishes.

For myself, I accept that the risk of undue influence affecting a voluntary disposition by a wife in favour of a husband is greater than in the ordinary run of cases where no sexual or emotional ties affect the free exercise of the individual's will.’

Lord Browne-Wilkinson recognised that up until this point, he had been dealing with a two party situation: (a) claimant wife vs (b) wrongdoer husband. But he recognised that in surety cases, it was a 3 party situation, involving also the creditor/bank. In such a 3 party situation, a surety case, Lord Browne-Wilkinson said, at 191, that:

‘…the decisive question is whether the claimant wife can set aside the transaction, not against the wrongdoing husband, but against the creditor bank.’

Where it is a 3 party situation, and the wrongdoer is an agent for the creditor bank
On this Lord Browne-Wilkinson said, at 191:

‘Of course, if the wrongdoing husband is acting as agent for the creditor bank in obtaining the surety from the wife, the creditor will be fixed with the wrongdoing of its own agent and the surety contract can be set aside as against the creditor.’

Non wrongdoer agent of creditor bank situations
But, apart from this scenario, where it is a 3 party situation, there needs to be an additional ingredient, for the creditor bank to have its rights affected. That ingredient is: notice

In this regard, Lord Browne-Wilkinson said, at 191:

‘…if the creditor bank has notice, actual or constructive, of the undue influence exercised by the husband (and consequentially of the wife's equity to set aside the transaction) the creditor will take subject to that equity and the wife can set aside the transaction against the creditor (albeit a purchaser for value) as well as against the husband…’

So the notice is:
(a) either actual or constructive;
(b) of the undue influence, which in turn is notice of the (innocent party) wife’s ‘equity’ (‘Equity’). That is, that the wife has an Equity. The Equity being a right - an entitlement - to cause the impugned transaction set aside (rendered void / getting it avoided). In other words, a right to convert what is a voidable transaction, into a void transaction.

It is the principle of notice in a 3 party situation, which means a creditor, who is not the wrongdoer, might have a voidable transaction (voidable at a surety’s election on an Equity). Lord Browne-Wilkinson said ‘…it is the proper application of the doctrine of notice which provides the key to finding a principled basis for the law.’ (at 194).

Lord Browne-Wilkinson then said that the law for misrepresentations was the similar to the law of undue influence. Lord Browne-Wilkinson said, at 191:

‘Similarly, in cases such as the present where the wife has been induced to enter into the transaction by the husband's misrepresentation, her equity to set aside the transaction will be enforceable against the creditor if either the husband was acting as the creditor's agent or the creditor had actual or constructive notice.’

Finding that Duval case had given the law ‘unsure foundations’ (at 194), Lord Browne-Wilkinson reasoned that the House of Lords ‘…should seek to restate the law in a form which is principled, reflects the current requirements of society and provides as much certainty as possible.’ (At 195)

Under ‘Conclusions’, Lord Browne-Wilkinson restated the law, dealing with (a) wives; and then (b) other persons, from 195-199. The following passage is long, but necessarily set out in full:

‘(a) Wives

My starting point is to clarify the basis of the law. Should wives (and perhaps others) be accorded special rights in relation to surety transactions by the recognition of a special equity applicable only to such persons engaged in such transactions? Or should they enjoy only the same protection as they would enjoy in relation to their other dealings? In my judgment, the special equity theory should be rejected. First, I can find no basis in principle for affording special protection to a limited class in relation to one type of transaction only. Second, to require the creditor to prove knowledge and understanding by the wife in all cases is to reintroduce by the back door either a presumption of undue influence of Class 2(A) (which has been decisively rejected) or the Romilly heresy (which has long been treated as bad law). Third, although Scott L.J. found that there were two lines of cases one of which supported the special equity theory, on analysis although many decisions are not inconsistent with that theory the only two cases which support it are Yerkey v. Jones, 63 C.L.R. 649, and the decision of the Court of Appeal in the present case. Finally, it is not necessary to have recourse to a special equity theory for the proper protection of the legitimate interests of wives as I will seek to show.

In my judgment, if the doctrine of notice is properly applied, there is no need for the introduction of a special equity in these types of cases. A wife who has been induced to stand as a surety for her husband's debts by his undue influence, misrepresentation or some other legal wrong has an equity as against him to set aside that transaction. Under the ordinary principles of equity, her right to set aside that transaction will be enforceable against third parties (e.g. against a creditor) if either the husband was acting as the third party's agent or the third party had actual or constructive notice of the facts giving rise to her equity. Although there may be cases where, without artificiality, it can properly be held that the husband was acting as the agent of the creditor in procuring the wife to stand as surety, such cases will be of very rare occurrence. The key to the problem is to identify the circumstances in which the creditor will be taken to have had notice of the wife's equity to set aside the transaction.

The doctrine of notice lies at the heart of equity. Given that there are two innocent parties, each enjoying rights, the earlier right prevails against the later right if the acquirer of the later right knows of the earlier right (actual notice) or would have discovered it had he taken proper steps (constructive notice). In particular, if the party asserting that he takes free of the earlier rights of another knows of certain facts which put him on inquiry as to the possible existence of the rights of that other and he fails to make such inquiry or take such other steps as are reasonable to verify whether such earlier right does or does not exist, he will have constructive notice of the earlier right and take subject to it. Therefore where a wife has agreed to stand surety for her husband's debts as a result of undue influence or misrepresentation, the creditor will take subject to the wife's equity to set aside the transaction if the circumstances are such as to put the creditor on inquiry as to the circumstances in which she agreed to stand surety.

It is at this stage that, in my view, the "invalidating tendency" or the law's "tender treatment" of married women, becomes relevant. As I have said above in dealing with undue influence, this tenderness of the law towards married women is due to the fact that, even today, many wives repose confidence and trust in their husbands in relation to their financial affairs. This tenderness of the law is reflected by the fact that voluntary dispositions by the wife in favour of her husband are more likely to be set aside than other dispositions by her: a wife is more likely to establish presumed undue influence of Class 2(B) by her husband than by others because, in practice, many wives do repose in their husbands trust and confidence in relation to their financial affairs. Moreover the informality of business dealings between spouses raises a substantial risk that the husband has not accurately stated to the wife the nature of the liability she is undertaking, i.e., he has misrepresented the position, albeit negligently.

Therefore in my judgment a creditor is put on inquiry when a wife offers to stand surety for her husband's debts by the combination of two factors: (a) the transaction is on its face not to the financial advantage of the wife; and (b) there is a substantial risk in transactions of that kind that, in procuring the wife to act as surety, the husband has committed a legal or equitable wrong that entitles the wife to set aside the transaction.

It follow that unless the creditor who is put on inquiry takes reasonable steps to satisfy himself that the wife's agreement to stand surety has been properly obtained, the creditor will have constructive notice of the wife's rights.

What, then are the reasonable steps which the creditor should take to ensure that it does not have constructive notice of the wife's rights, if any? Normally the reasonable steps necessary to avoid being fixed with constructive notice consist of making inquiry of the person who may have the earlier right (i.e. the wife) to see whether such right is asserted. It is plainly impossible to require of banks and other financial institutions that they should inquire of one spouse whether he or she has been unduly influenced or misled by the other. But in my judgment the creditor, in order to avoid being fixed with constructive notice, can reasonably be expected to take steps to bring home to the wife the risk she is running by standing as surety and to advise her to take independent advice. As to past transactions, it will depend on the facts of each case whether the steps taken by the creditor satisfy this test. However for the future in my judgment a creditor will have satisfied these requirements if it insists that the wife attend a private meeting (in the absence of the husband) with a representative of the creditor at which she is told of the extent of her liability as surety, warned of the risk she is running and urged to take independent legal advice. If these steps are taken in my judgment the creditor will have taken such reasonable steps as are necessary to preclude a subsequent claim that it had constructive notice of the wife's rights. I should make it clear that I have been considering the ordinary case where the creditor knows only that the wife is to stand surety for her husband's debts. I would not exclude exceptional cases where a creditor has knowledge of further facts which render the presence of undue influence not only possible but probable. In such cases, the creditor to be safe will have to insist that the wife is separately advised.

I am conscious that in treating the creditor as having constructive notice because of the risk of Class 2(B) undue influence or misrepresentation by the husband I may be extending the law as stated by Fry J. in Bainbrigge v. Browne, 18 Ch. D. 188, 197, and the Court of Appeal in the Aboody case [1990] 1 Q.B. 923, 973. Those cases suggest that for a third party to be affected by constructive notice of presumed undue influence the third party must actually know of the circumstances which give rise to a presumption of undue influence. In contrast, my view is that the risk of Class 2(B) undue influence or misrepresentation is sufficient to put the creditor on inquiry. But my statement accords with the principles of notice: if the known facts are such as to indicate the possibility of an adverse claim that is sufficient to put a third party on inquiry.

If the law is established as I have suggested, it will hold the balance fairly between on the one hand the vulnerability of the wife who relies implicitly on her husband and, on the other hand, the practical problems of financial institutions asked to accept a secured or unsecured surety obligation from the wife for her husband's debts. In the context of suretyship, the wife will not have any right to disown her obligations just because subsequently she proves that she did not fully understand the transaction: she will, as in all other areas of her affairs, be bound by her obligations unless her husband has, by misrepresentation, undue influence or other wrong, committed an actionable wrong against her. In the normal case, a financial institution will be able to lend with confidence in reliance on the wife's surety obligation provided that it warns her (in the absence of the husband) of the amount of her potential liability and of the risk of standing surety and advises her to take independent advice.

Rejecting a submission that this would impose too heavy a burden on financial institutions, Lord Browne-Wilkinson said, at 197-198:

'...the Code of Banking Practice (adopted by banks and building societies in March 1992) provides in paragraph 12.1 as follows:

"Banks and building societies will advise private individuals proposing to give them a guarantee or other security for another person's liabilities that: (i) by giving the guarantee or third party security he or she might become liable instead of or as well as that other person; (ii) he or she should seek independent legal advice before entering into the guarantee or third party security. Guarantees and other *198 third party security forms will contain a clear and prominent notice to the above effect."

Thus good banking practice (which applies to all guarantees, not only those given by a wife) largely accords with what I consider the law should require when a wife is offered as surety. The only further substantial step required by law beyond that good practice is that the position should be explained by the bank to the wife in a personal interview. I regard this as being essential because a number of the decided cases show that written warnings are often not read and are sometimes intercepted by the husband. It does not seem to me that the requirement of a personal interview imposes such an additional administrative burden as to render the bank's position unworkable.

(b) Other persons

I have hitherto dealt only with the position where a wife stands surety for her husband's debts. But in my judgment the same principles are applicable to all other cases where there is an emotional relationship between cohabitees. The "tenderness" shown by the law to married women is not based on the marriage ceremony but reflects the underlying risk of one cohabitee exploiting the emotional involvement and trust of the other. Now that unmarried cohabitation, whether heterosexual or homosexual, is widespread in our society, the law should recognise this. Legal wives are not the only group which are now exposed to the emotional pressure of cohabitation. Therefore if, but only if, the creditor is aware that the surety is cohabiting with the principal debtor, in my judgment the same principles should apply to them as apply to husband and wife.

In addition to the cases of cohabitees, the decision of the Court of Appeal in Avon Finance Co. Ltd. v. Bridger [1985] 2 All E.R. 281 shows (rightly in my view) that other relationships can give rise to a similar result. In that case a son, by means of misrepresentation, persuaded his elderly parents to stand surety for his debts. The surety obligation was held to be unenforceable by the creditor inter alia because to the bank's knowledge the parents trusted the son in their financial dealings. In my judgment that case was rightly decided: in a case where the creditor is aware that the surety reposes trust and confidence in the principal debtor in relation to his financial affairs, the creditor is put on inquiry in just the same way as it is in relation to husband and wife.

Lord Browne-Wilkinson then, under the heading ‘Summary’ said, at 198-199:

‘I can therefore summarise my views as follows. Where one cohabitee has entered into an obligation to stand as surety for the debts of the other cohabitee and the creditor is aware that they are cohabitees: (1) the surety obligation will be valid and enforceable by the creditor unless the suretyship was procured by the undue influence, misrepresentation or other legal wrong of the principal debtor; (2) if there has been undue influence, misrepresentation or other legal wrong by the principal debtor, unless the creditor has taken reasonable steps to satisfy himself that the surety entered into the obligation freely and in knowledge of the true facts, the creditor will be unable to enforce the surety obligation because he will be fixed with constructive notice of the surety's right to set aside the tranxaction [sic]; (3) unless there are special exceptional circumstances, a creditor will have taken such reasonable steps to avoid being fixed with constructive notice if the creditor warns the surety (at a meeting not attended by the principal debtor) of the amount of her potential liability and of the risks involved and advises the surety to take independent legal advice.

I should make it clear that in referring to the husband's debts I include the debts of a company in which the husband (but not the wife) has a direct financial interest.’

As an aside, Lord Browne-Wilkinson in O’Brien said:

(a) ‘a transaction between husband and wife cannot, in the absence of undue influence or misrepresentation, be set aside simply on the ground that the wife did not fully understand the transaction.’ (at 193:)

(b) ‘…the Romilly heresy … is bad law.’ (at 194)

‘…the heresy propounded by Lord Romilly to the effect that when a person has made a large voluntary disposition the burden is thrown on the party benefiting to show that the disposition was made fairly and honestly and in full understanding of the nature and consequences of the transaction: see Hoghton v. Hoghton (1852) 15 Beav. 278. Although this heresy has never been formally overruled, it has rightly been regarded as bad law for a very long time: see the account given by Dixon J. in Yerkey v. Jones, 63 C.L.R. 649, 678 et seq.’ (at 193)

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[1] In One Savings Bank plc v Waller-Edwards [2024] EWCA Civ 302, Sir Geoffrey Vos MR (with whom Peter Jackson LJ and Falk LJ, agreed), said, at paragraph 23:

'In Etridge [2002] 2 AC 773, the House of Lords was dealing with eight cases of alleged undue influence and constructive notice in the context of loans secured on matrimonial property. All five judges gave substantive judgments. Every member of the House agreed with Lord Nicholls, whose judgment is, therefore, the most authoritative.'

[2] In Royal Bank of Scotland pic v Etridge (No 2) [2002] 2 AC 773, Lord Nicholls said, at paragraph 15:

'Bainbrigge v Browne 18 ChD 188, already mentioned, provides a good illustration of this commonplace type of forensic exercise. Fry J held, at p 196, that there was no direct evidence upon which he could rely as proving undue pressure by the father. But there existed circumstances "from which the court will infer pressure and undue influence". None of the children were entirely emancipated from their father's control. None seemed conversant with business. These circumstances were such as to cast the burden of proof upon the father. He had made no attempt to discharge that burden. He did not appear in court at all. So the children's claim succeeded. Again, more recently, in National Westminster Bank pic v Morgan [1985] AC 686, 707, Lord Scarman noted that a relationship of banker and customer may become one in which a banker acquires a dominating influence. If he does, and a manifestly disadvantageous transaction is proved, "there would then be room" for a court to presume that it resulted from the exercise of undue influence.'

[2a] In Waller-Edwards v One Savings Bank Plc [2025] UKSC 22, Lady Simler (with whom Lord Briggs, Lord Hamblen, Lord Stephens and Lady Rose agreed), under the heading 'The trilogy of cases: O'Brien, Pitt and Etridge No 2', summarised those cases, at paragraphs 18 to 36:

'18. O'Brien and Pitt were decided at the same time. Both concerned the circumstances in which a bank, faced with a mortgage (or other lending) transaction involving two non-commercial parties, might be put on inquiry that there has been undue influence by one party to the transaction over the other.

19. In O'Brien, the husband-and-wife defendants had agreed to execute a second mortgage over their matrimonial home as security for overdraft facilities extended by the plaintiff bank to a company in which the husband, but not the wife, had an interest. The wife signed the mortgage deed, without reading it and without the benefit of legal advice, relying on her husband's false statements that the second mortgage was limited to £60,000 and would last only three weeks. When the company's overdraft exceeded £154,000 the bank sought to enforce the second mortgage to its full extent.

20. In the House of Lords, Lord Browne-Wilkinson referred to changes in society that meant that a high proportion of privately owned wealth was being invested in the matrimonial home, mostly in the joint names of both spouses, making them an attractive means of raising finance for the business enterprises of one or other of the spouses, but requiring the consent of both spouses to use the jointly owned home as security. Having acknowledged that the concept of the "ignorant wife" leaving all financial decisions to her husband was outmoded, Lord Browne-Wilkinson referred to the number of recent cases in this field which showed that in practice "many wives are still subjected to, and yield to, undue influence by their husbands" and should therefore be able to look to the law for some protection where a transaction has been procured by his undue influence (p 188). As he explained, the real question (in a surety transaction) was whether, and if so, when the claimant wife could set aside the transaction, not against the wrongdoing husband, but against the lending bank:

"A wife who has been induced to stand as a surety for her husband's debts by his undue influence, misrepresentation or some other legal wrong has an equity as against him to set aside that transaction. Under the ordinary principles of equity, her right to set aside that transaction will be enforceable against third parties (eg against a creditor) if either the husband was acting as the third party's agent or the third party had actual or constructive notice of the facts giving rise to her equity. …The key to the problem is to identify the circumstances in which the creditor will be taken to have had notice of the wife's equity to set aside the transaction." (p 195F)

21. In identifying those circumstances, Lord Browne-Wilkinson recognised that some development in the law was necessary to give wives (and other vulnerable parties) some protection in this situation, given the risk of a husband exercising his influence improperly regarding the provision of security for his debts and the increased risk that his explanations of the transaction to her might be misleading or inaccurate. He described the necessary development as follows:

"Therefore in my judgment a creditor is put on inquiry when a wife offers to stand surety for her husband's debts by the combination of two factors: (a) the transaction is on its face not to the financial advantage of the wife; and (b) there is a substantial risk in transactions of that kind that, in procuring the wife to act as surety, the husband has committed a legal or equitable wrong that entitles the wife to set aside the transaction.

It follows that unless the creditor who is put on inquiry takes reasonable steps to satisfy himself that the wife's agreement to stand surety has been properly obtained, the creditor will have constructive notice of the wife's rights." (p 196E)

22. The reasonable steps to be taken by the bank to ensure that it was not fixed with constructive notice of the wife's rights were not steps that involved making any actual inquiry. Rather, they were steps that would reduce or eliminate the risk of her entering into the transaction at all, by bringing home to her the risk she was running by providing a free legal guarantee of her husband's debts, including advising her to take independent advice. This approach would "hold the balance fairly between on the one hand the vulnerability of the wife who relies implicitly on her husband and, on the other hand, the practical problems of financial institutions asked to accept a secured or unsecured surety obligation from the wife for her husband's debts." (p 197D)

23. The result in O'Brien was that the bank was bound by the wife's rights arising out of the husband's misrepresentation, with the consequence that the second mortgage could only be enforced against her to the extent of £60,000 which was the limit of the second mortgage as represented by the husband.

24. By contrast, in Pitt the lender was not put on inquiry. Again, the defendants were husband and wife. The husband had persuaded the wife to re-mortgage their home as security for a loan for purchasing shares on the stock market. The plaintiff mortgage lender offered to make a loan on the security of the defendants' house, but on the understanding that the loan was to be used for the purchase of a second home. The wife signed the re-mortgage documents without reading them and was unaware that the stated purpose of the loan was the purchase of a second home. The re-mortgage loan was advanced and paid over to solicitors acting for all three parties to the transaction. The solicitors then paid the loan monies into the joint account of the husband and wife. The husband's share dealings were unsuccessful. He failed to make re-payments on the mortgage and the lender brought possession proceedings against the husband and wife. The wife established that her consent to the remortgage had been obtained by the husband's undue influence and as against her husband she was entitled to have the remortgage set aside. However, the plaintiff lender had no knowledge of the undue influence. On the face of the transaction, the loan was advanced to both husband and wife jointly to buy a second home and there was nothing else to put the plaintiff on inquiry. Lord Browne-Wilkinson explained the distinction between joint borrowing and surety cases as follows (at p 211G):

"What distinguishes the case of the joint advance from the surety case is that, in the latter, there is not only the possibility of undue influence having been exercised but also the increased risk of it having in fact been exercised because, at least on its face, the guarantee by a wife of her husband's debts is not for her financial benefit. It is the combination of these two factors that puts the creditor on inquiry."

25. For some time after the decision in O'Brien the two factors identified by Lord Browne-Wilkinson as putting the creditor on inquiry in a surety case (see the passage at p 196E cited at para 21 above) appear to have been understood by some as requiring that the factual conditions in each factor had to be satisfied on the facts of the individual case. In other words, if factor (a) was satisfied, it was understood that the bank was only put on inquiry if the bank was aware that the relationship in question was one in which the husband had acquired influence over the wife because she placed trust and confidence in him in relation to her financial affairs, so that the risk arose. That approach was rejected in Etridge No 2.

26. Etridge No 2 concerned eight appeals where there had been alleged undue influence and constructive notice in the context of loans secured on matrimonial homes. All members of the House of Lords agreed with Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, whose judgment is therefore the most authoritative (though each wrote separate judgments). Lord Nicholls discussed the change in the law introduced by O'Brien at paras 40 to 43:

"40. … The law imposes no obligation on one party to a transaction to check whether the other party's concurrence was obtained by undue influence. But O'Brien has introduced into the law the concept that, in certain circumstances, a party to a contract may lose the benefit of his contract, entered into in good faith, if he ought to have known that the other's concurrence had been procured by the misconduct of a third party.

41. There is a further respect in which O'Brien departed from conventional concepts. Traditionally, a person is deemed to have notice (that is, he has 'constructive' notice) of a prior right when he does not actually know of it but would have learned of it had he made the requisite inquiries. A purchaser will be treated as having constructive notice of all that a reasonably prudent purchaser would have discovered. In the present type of case, the steps a bank is required to take, lest it have constructive notice that the wife's concurrence was procured improperly by her husband, do not consist of making inquiries. Rather, O'Brien envisages that the steps taken by the bank will reduce, or even eliminate, the risk of the wife entering into the transaction under any misapprehension or as a result of undue influence by her husband. The steps are not concerned to discover whether the wife has been wronged by her husband in this way. The steps are concerned to minimise the risk that such a wrong may be committed.

42. These novelties do not point to the conclusion that the decision of this House in O'Brien is leading the law astray. Lord Browne-Wilkinson acknowledged he might be extending the law: see [1994] 1 AC 180, 197. Some development was sorely needed. The law had to find a way of giving wives a reasonable measure of protection, without adding unreasonably to the expense involved in entering into guarantee transactions of the type under consideration. The protection had to extend also to any misrepresentations made by a husband to his wife. In a situation where there is a substantial risk the husband may exercise his influence improperly regarding the provision of security for his business debts, there is an increased risk that explanations of the transaction given by him to his wife may be misleadingly incomplete or even inaccurate.

43. The route selected in O'Brien ought not to have an unsettling effect on established principles of contract. O'Brien concerned suretyship transactions. These are tripartite transactions. They involve the debtor as well as the creditor and the guarantor. The guarantor enters into the transaction at the request of the debtor. The guarantor assumes obligations. On the face of the transaction the guarantor usually receives no benefit in return, unless the guarantee is being given on a commercial basis. Leaving aside cases where the relationship between the surety and the debtor is commercial, a guarantee transaction is one-sided so far as the guarantor is concerned. The creditor knows this. Thus the decision in O'Brien is directed at a class of contracts which has special features of its own. …"

27. Lord Nicholls explained that the House of Lords in O'Brien had set a low level for the threshold which must be crossed before a bank is put on inquiry. He said that for practical reasons "the level is set much lower than is required to satisfy a court that, failing contrary evidence, the court may infer that the transaction was procured by undue influence. …" (para 44). Having referred to the combination of two factors described by Lord Brown-Wilkinson in O'Brien at p 196E, Lord Nicholls held, "In my view, this passage, read in context, is to be taken to mean, quite simply, that a bank is put on inquiry whenever a wife offers to stand surety for her husband's debts."

28. Lord Nicholls observed that the Court of Appeal had interpreted this passage more restrictively, setting the threshold somewhat higher. He disagreed with that approach:

"46. I respectfully disagree. I do not read (a) and (b) as factual conditions which must be proved in each case before a bank is put on inquiry. I do not understand Lord Browne-Wilkinson to have been saying that, in husband and wife cases, whether the bank is put on inquiry depends on its state of knowledge of the parties' marriage, or of the degree of trust and confidence the particular wife places in her husband in relation to her financial affairs. That would leave banks in a state of considerable uncertainty in a situation where it is important they should know clearly where they stand. The test should be simple and clear and easy to apply in a wide range of circumstances. I read (a) and (b) as Lord Browne-Wilkinson's broad explanation of the reason why a creditor is put on inquiry when a wife offers to stand surety for her husband's debts. These are the two factors which, taken together, constitute the underlying rationale.

47. The position is likewise if the husband stands surety for his wife's debts. Similarly, in the case of unmarried couples, whether heterosexual or homosexual, where the bank is aware of the relationship: see Lord Browne-Wilkinson in O'Brien's case, at p 198. Cohabitation is not essential. The Court of Appeal rightly so decided in Massey v Midland Bank Plc [1995] 1 All ER 929 : see Steyn LJ, at p 933."

29. At paras 48 and 49 Lord Nicholls discussed the clear dividing line between surety cases on the one side, and joint borrowing cases on the other:

"48. As to the type of transactions where a bank is put on inquiry, the case where a wife becomes surety for her husband's debts is, in this context, a straightforward case. The bank is put on inquiry. On the other side of the line is the case where money is being advanced, or has been advanced, to husband and wife jointly. In such a case the bank is not put on inquiry, unless the bank is aware the loan is being made for the husband's purposes, as distinct from their joint purposes. That was decided in CIBC Mortgages plc v Pitt [1994] 1 AC 200."

30. Lord Nicholls made no reference to mixed or hybrid transactions but his approach to differentiating between the two different types of transaction in issue was explicitly a binary one, with a clear dividing line between them and a binary outcome dependent on which side of the line the transaction falls. Likewise, his discussion of "less clear cut" cases involving a wife who becomes surety for the debts of a company whose shares are held by her and her husband follows the same binary approach:

"49. Less clear cut is the case where the wife becomes surety for the debts of a company whose shares are held by her and her husband. Her shareholding may be nominal, or she may have a minority shareholding or an equal shareholding with her husband. In my view the bank is put on inquiry in such cases, even when the wife is a director or secretary of the company. Such cases cannot be equated with joint loans. The shareholding interests, and the identity of the directors, are not a reliable guide to the identity of the persons who actually have the conduct of the company's business."

31. Later in his speech Lord Nicholls made clear that the principle established by these cases could not sensibly be confined to undue influence arising in the context of sexual relationships:

"87. These considerations point forcibly to the conclusion that there is no rational cut-off point, with certain types of relationship being susceptible to the O'Brien principle and others not. Further, if a bank is not to be required to evaluate the extent to which its customer has influence over a proposed guarantor, the only practical way forward is to regard banks as 'put on inquiry' in every case where the relationship between the surety and the debtor is non-commercial. The creditor must always take reasonable steps to bring home to the individual guarantor the risks he is running by standing as surety. As a measure of protection, this is valuable. But, in all conscience, it is a modest burden for banks and other lenders. It is no more than is reasonably to be expected of a creditor who is taking a guarantee from an individual. If the bank or other creditor does not take these steps, it is deemed to have notice of any claim the guarantor may have that the transaction was procured by undue influence or misrepresentation on the part of the debtor.

88. Different considerations apply where the relationship between the debtor and guarantor is commercial, as where a guarantor is being paid a fee, or a company is guaranteeing the debts of another company in the same group. Those engaged in business can be regarded as capable of looking after themselves and understanding the risks involved in the giving of guarantees."

32. The test formulated in O'Brien and Etridge No 2 for situations involving non-commercial sureties was new. It moved away from a test of actual or constructive notice in fixing the bank with knowledge, and introduced a low threshold for putting the bank on inquiry unless further steps were taken to bring home to the surety the risks she was running. Etridge No 2 was an extension of O'Brien and to the extent that the threshold had been misunderstood, Etridge No 2 confirmed that the low-level set for triggering a requirement on the bank was much lower than required to satisfy a court that the transaction was in fact procured by undue influence. No factual inquiry or assessment of any kind was required of the bank. Rather, the "on inquiry" threshold is triggered whenever a wife offers to stand surety for her husband's debts; in other words, in every case where the relationship between the surety and the debtor is "non-commercial" because the surety is gratuitously taking on a liability to pay a debt on behalf of her husband for which she is not otherwise legally liable. However, the quid pro quo for that low threshold was the correspondingly modest requirement imposed on a bank "put on inquiry" as to the steps it must take to avoid being affected by the rights of the wife whose consent may have been procured by her husband's wrongdoing. As Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough explained at para 108 of Etridge No 2 :

"…the advantage of this low threshold is that it assists banks to put in place procedures which do not require an exercise of judgment by their officials and I accept Lord Nicholls's affirmation of the low threshold. This, however, is not to say that banks are at liberty to close their eyes to evidence of higher levels of risk or fail to respond appropriately to higher risks of which they have notice."

33. The steps that must be taken by a bank in these circumstances have been described as "the Etridge protocol". Lord Nicholls set them out at para 79. They can be summarised as follows:

(a) The bank must communicate directly with the wife, informing her that for her own protection it will require written confirmation from a solicitor, acting for her, to the effect that the solicitor has fully explained to her the nature of the transaction and its practical implications for her; and that the purpose of this requirement is that she will not be able to dispute that she is legally bound by the transaction once the surety documents are signed.

(b) The bank must ask the wife to nominate a solicitor she is willing to instruct to advise her, separately from her husband, and act for her in giving the necessary confirmation to the bank; that solicitor may be the same solicitor who is acting for the husband but if a solicitor is already acting, she should be asked whether she would prefer a different solicitor.

34. Lord Nicholls made clear that the bank should not proceed with the transaction until it has received an appropriate response directly from the wife. The bank should provide information to the wife about the husband's financial affairs, either directly or through solicitors, and if consent from the husband to do so is not forthcoming, the transaction cannot proceed. In an exceptional case where the bank suspects the wife has been misled (or is not acting of her own free will), the bank must inform the wife's solicitor of the facts giving rise to the suspicion. The bank should obtain written confirmation from the wife's solicitor that the information and necessary advice have been given.

35. Plainly, the risk that the wife's consent has been procured by undue influence or misrepresentation will not be eliminated by compliance with the Etridge protocol. But those steps are liable to reduce it to a level which makes it appropriate for a lender to proceed: see paras 3, 37 and 148.

36. Finally, Lord Nicholls described the development of the principle in O'Brien in the following way:

"89. … It is a workable principle. It is also simple, coherent and eminently desirable. I venture to think this is the way the law is moving, and should continue to move. Equity, it is said, is not past the age of child-bearing. In the present context the equitable concept of being 'put on inquiry' is the parent of a principle of general application, a principle which imposes no more than a modest obligation on banks and other creditors. The existence of this obligation in all non-commercial cases does not go beyond the reasonable requirements of the present times. In future, banks and other creditors should regulate their affairs accordingly."'

[2b] In Waller-Edwards v One Savings Bank Plc [2025] UKSC 22, Lady Simler (with whom Lord Briggs, Lord Hamblen, Lord Stephens and Lady Rose agreed), under the heading 'Three preliminary points', said, at paragraphs 38 to 41:

'First, it might have been thought that the increased participation of women in the labour market over the decades since O'Brien coupled with an increase in their levels of financial and other independence would mean that the prevalence of economic abuse between women and their spouses or intimate partners has reduced. But the evidence shown to the court in the form of reports and regulatory activity suggests that is wrong. Indeed, a report published by the Financial Conduct Authority suggests that as many as one in six women in the UK has experienced financial abuse by a current or former intimate partner: see "The hidden cost of domestic financial abuse: working together to improve outcomes" by Joanna Legg, 17 May 2024. Legislation and greater regulation in this area suggest an increasing awareness and understanding of economic abuse as a form of domestic abuse (see for example section 1(3) of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021) and its damaging effects.

Secondly, in all cases, whether of surety or joint borrowing, the proposed transaction must always be considered from the bank's perspective. It is the bank's perception of the nature of the transaction that is critical.

Thirdly, as Lord Nicholls emphasised in Etridge No 2, although the trigger for action by a bank is described as being "put on inquiry", this is not an inquiry in the traditional constructive notice sense. The bank does not have to carry out any investigation or to ask any questions about the reasons why the wife was agreeing to the transaction or about her relationship with her husband. The bank is not expected to try to find out whether or not undue influence or misrepresentation is taking place, or indeed whether it is being misled as to the purposes of the loan. The bank is simply on notice of a risk of undue influence or similar impropriety. The most the bank is then expected to do is to take reasonable steps to minimise the risk that such a wrong may be committed by satisfying itself that the wife (or vulnerable partner) has had brought home to her, in a meaningful way, the implications of the proposed transaction, so that if she continues with it, she does so with her eyes wide open.

Even in surety or joint borrowing cases, there may be indicators of concern, often described as "red flags". These are different. They may indicate in a particular case that the wife's consent has or may have been procured by undue influence or misrepresentation and further inquiry is required. The existence or adoption of the Etridge protocol does not mean that banks can simply close their eyes to evidence indicating that there is a higher level of risk in a particular case: see Etridge No 2 at para 108 per Lord Hobhouse. As the House of Lords recognised, even in apparently straightforward surety or joint borrowing transactions, there may be features which should put the bank on alert. The development of bright line rules for the straightforward cases does not absolve the banks of the need to exercise their judgment as to any increased risk of undue influence where red flags exist.'

[2c] In Waller-Edwards v One Savings Bank Plc [2025] UKSC 22, Lady Simler (with whom Lord Briggs, Lord Hamblen, Lord Stephens and Lady Rose agreed), under the heading 'The test to be applied to hybrid transactions', said, at paragraphs 42 to 63 (Ms Wicks KC was counsel for the respondent Bank in the Supreme Court):

'42. Against that background I come to the question to be resolved on this appeal. It is common ground that there may be circumstances where a bank is treated as being put on notice in a case involving a non-commercial transaction with features of both surety and joint borrowing. The question is what test should be applied to decide whether the bank (or other creditor) is put on inquiry by such a hybrid transaction so as to trigger the requirement to take the steps in the Etridge protocol to avoid the risk of the transaction being set aside in the future for undue influence by one of the borrowers over the other.

43. None of the appeals dealt with in Etridge No 2 or the earlier cases addresses the approach to partial surety transactions. O'Brien, Pitt and most of the individual appeals heard in Etridge No 2 were concerned either with straightforward surety or with straightforward joint borrowing transactions. The only possible exception is UCB Home Loans Corpn Ltd v Moore (one of the cases on appeal in Etridge No 2). This case was recognised by Lord Hobhouse at para 127 as "not wholly straightforward" because it involved both the refinancing of existing debt secured on the matrimonial home (about 60% of the loan) as well as an additional advance (about 40%) to a company under the husband's control and direction but in which the wife was a director. As Lord Scott of Foscote made clear at para 306, the lender ("UCB") knew that Mrs Moore was offering her share in the matrimonial home as security for the loan to the company. The company was unsuccessful and went into liquidation and UCB brought possession proceedings. The case came to the House of Lords on an appeal by Mrs Moore against an order striking out her defence to UCB's claim for possession of the matrimonial home on the basis that her consent to the grant of the legal charge had been obtained by undue influence. The House of Lords allowed the appeal, plainly considering it arguable that UCB was put on inquiry in relation to this mixed borrowing transaction. But none of the speeches addressed this aspect of the case in terms of identifying the approach to be adopted in a hybrid case involving mixed borrowing of this kind.

44. Similarly, I have not found Davies v AIB Group (UK) plc [2012] EWHC 2178 (Ch); [2012] 2 P&CR 19 of any real assistance. The judge, Norris J, rejected the wife's claim of undue influence in that case. Nonetheless at para 117, he expressed the view (obiter) that had he found undue influence by the husband, he would have held that AIB was put on inquiry because "it was aware the loan [was] being made (as regards a significant part, namely the replacement of the Barclays' stocking facility in the sum of £420,000) for the purposes of [the husband's] company, as distinct from their joint purposes". In other words, although there was joint borrowing, the bank was aware that a significant part of the loan was made for the benefit of the husband's company as distinct from their joint benefit. There is, however, no discussion of the underlying basis for this obiter view.

45. It seems to me that it is therefore necessary as a starting point for answering the question as to the court's approach to hybrid transactions, to understand the underlying rationale for treating surety transactions differently from joint borrowing transactions.

46. The rationale for the principle established in O'Brien, Pitt and Etridge No 2 (that a bank is put on inquiry as to undue influence or misrepresentation in a surety transaction, but not a joint borrowing transaction), is the recognition that such transactions are more likely than others to be tainted by undue influence or misrepresentation. A tripartite non-commercial surety transaction carries with it an increased risk of undue influence having been exercised because on the face of the transaction, the wife assumes a legal liability that she would not otherwise have (whether under a guarantee or charge) for her husband's debts but receives no apparent financial benefit in return. Put another way, she incurs the financial risk for no apparent personal gain and that is what gives rise to a greater risk that the wife's consent will have been procured by undue influence or misrepresentation by her husband. The transaction is one-sided as far as she is concerned, and this is apparent on the face of the transaction and so known to the lender.

47. Of course, the recognition of a higher risk of undue influence or misrepresentation in surety transactions does not mean that all surety transactions are procured by wrongdoing. There are many good reasons why a wife or husband may knowingly and willingly agree to be a surety for their spouse's borrowing, and it is likely to be only in a minority of cases that the wife is in fact being exploited or abused. On the other hand, a joint borrowing transaction is different. The risk in such cases is much lower because, on the face of it, wife and husband are both personally liable for the debt which is secured by the charge and so both stand to benefit from the giving of security, for example by a reduction in the interest rate compared to the rate for an unsecured loan.

48. In O'Brien and Etridge No 2, the risk of wrongdoing affecting the wife's agreement to enter into the surety transaction was viewed as sufficiently high to lead the courts to conclude that it is proportionate to place a requirement on banks faced with surety transactions to follow the Etridge protocol to avoid being fixed with notice of wrongdoing. All that is required is that the lender knew or ought to have known that the relationship between the wife and the husband (the borrower) was a non-commercial one and that the transaction involved the wife acting as surety for her husband's obligations to the lender. That is sufficient to put the lender on inquiry. Once that has occurred, an improperly procured surety transaction will be set aside as against the lender unless it can show that it took the modest steps described in the Etridge protocol.

49. On the other hand, in a joint borrowing transaction the risk of wrongdoing is sufficiently low to conclude that it would be unduly burdensome to borrowers and banks to require the bank to take any additional steps. In Pitt at 211E-F, Lord Browne-Wilkinson rejected "without hesitation" the submission that the risk of undue influence inherent in all transactions between husband and wife, including joint borrowing transactions, was itself sufficient to put a bank on inquiry. Lord Browne-Wilkinson recognised that the introduction of friction into ordinary borrowing transactions comes at a cost. He said that the "average" married couple enter into a joint borrowing transaction free of any taint of undue influence or misrepresentation and it is not to their benefit to require them to pay for additional steps designed to protect against the risk of such wrongdoing.

50. Non-commercial hybrid transactions are less straightforward. They come in different shapes and sizes. The ratio of joint borrowing to surety in a hybrid transaction may vary significantly from one transaction to another. It is also the case, as Ms Wicks KC submitted on behalf of the Bank, that a husband's personal borrowing might be used for the benefit of both partners: the family car might be in his name but used by both, or joint household debts might be in his sole name. Hybrid transactions may arise where some of the borrowing is for joint purposes, some is to pay off debt in the sole name of the husband, and some to pay off debt in the sole name of the wife. In some circumstances the couple may seek to borrow, in part, to pay off one spouse's debts. In others, they may apply for a loan for a joint purpose, but the lender will make it a condition of lending that the husband's personal debts are paid (as happened here). The extent to which the wife will in fact benefit from the transaction will also vary and depend on the circumstances. But none of these features will necessarily be apparent to the lender on the face of the transaction.

51. Ms Wicks relied on the infinitely variable nature of such transactions to support the fact and degree approach adopted by the Court of Appeal. She submitted that the fact that certain transactions are more likely than others to be tainted by undue influence or misrepresentation indicates that there is a spectrum of risk, emphasising the observation of Lord Hobhouse in para 108 in Etridge No 2 that situations "will differ across a spectrum from a very small risk to a serious risk verging on a probability" and that there "has to be a proportionality between the degree of risk and the requisite response to it." It follows in her submission that there is a spectrum of risk; and transactions must be considered on that spectrum and looked at as a whole from the perspective of the bank, to determine whether the transaction is one which presents a substantial risk that the wife's entry into it has been procured by the undue influence or misrepresentation of the husband because of the extent to which it is not for her benefit. Ms Wicks submitted that this approach maintains the policy balance between competing interests which underpins the decisions in O'Brien, Pitt and Etridge No 2. It applies the low threshold for the bank being put on inquiry to cases where there is an elevated risk of undue influence or misrepresentation because the transaction is substantially for the benefit of the husband. But equally, it avoids disproportionate and costly steps being required of banks, to the disadvantage of borrowers generally and the UK economy, where the risks of wrongdoing are low.

52. Persuasively as these submissions were advanced, I do not accept them. It is true of course that the level of risk posed by a particular transaction will depend on its particular facts and that, as a matter of fact, there may be a spectrum of risk posed by different types of transaction. However, that is not the approach that was adopted by the House of Lords in O'Brien, Pitt and Etridge No 2. Instead, the approach adopted is a binary one. Either the creditor is on notice of the risk of undue influence, or it is not; and if the creditor is on notice, then the Etridge protocol must be followed, whereas if it is not, there is nothing to be done, and no steps are required at all. There is no spectrum of lesser or greater steps to be taken by a creditor put on inquiry that varies depending on a spectrum of differing levels of risk. Since there is no scope for a nuanced approach to the steps required to be taken once the creditor is on notice, I see no scope for a nuanced (or fact-sensitive) approach to whether the creditor is on notice or not. In my view, this is a binary question: either there is, on the face of the non-commercial transaction, a surety element giving rise to a heightened risk of undue influence or there is not. Moreover, as a matter of fact and logic, the level of risk presented by a surety transaction is the same whether it is accompanied by joint-borrowing or not. The hybrid element does not reduce that risk. In any event, the level of risk is infinitely variable, and not for the lender to judge on some fact-specific basis.

53. In my view the Court of Appeal was also wrong at para 38 to focus on the purpose for which the loan is used. The court postulated that what may ostensibly be debt in the name of the husband could also have been enjoyed by the wife because she might have driven the husband's car or used his credit card. However, that is not the point. It is not a question of who benefits from the money loaned. That is a matter which will not usually be apparent to the lender. It is a question of whether the wife has, for no consideration, taken on a legal liability that is not hers and for which she is otherwise not responsible. That is the only relevant question and is fully apparent from the face of the proposed transaction. If on the face of the proposed transaction she is undertaking to provide a guarantee of her husband's debts for nothing in return, that legal liability should be explained to her under the Etridge protocol. The fact that she expects to benefit indirectly from the use of the money loaned solely to her husband may be what prompts her to agree to the transaction when the Etridge protocol is followed. It may be a factor militating against a finding of undue influence. But it does not detract from the relevant point which is that it is apparent from the face of the transaction that she has gratuitously taken on a liability for a debt which is being used to discharge her husband's indebtedness.

54. Nor do I find support for the fact and degree test adopted by the Court of Appeal from Lord Nicholls' speech at paras 48 and 49 in Etridge No 2 as is suggested at paras 32-34 of the Court of Appeal judgment. At para 34 Sir Geoffrey Vos MR said it was from the passages at paras 48 and 49 that "the judges below drew the need to look at the transaction as a whole and to decide, as a matter of fact and degree whether the loan was being made for 'the [purposes of the borrower with the debts], as distinct from their joint purposes'". Lord Nicholls explained in those passages (see paras 29-30 above) that there is a clear dividing line between surety and joint borrowing transactions, and no question of fact or degree conceivably arises. However, in a case of joint borrowing (which is on the wrong side of the line for this purpose) the bank is put on inquiry if it is made aware that what purports on the face of a loan application to be joint borrowing for both spouses is really being made for the purposes of one of them (for example, as a loan advance for the husband's business). In other words, the bank is not put on inquiry in relation to security given for joint borrowing unless there are particular facts which if established, put the bank on inquiry that the transaction is not what it seems to be on the face of the documents. But that is different from a case such as this, where on the face of the transaction, part of the loan secured by the house was to discharge the husband's personal liability on his credit card and car loan and the bank is or should have been aware that this part of the loan was made for the husband's purposes as distinct from securing their joint liabilities, yet the wife is taking on a legal liability in relation to it for nothing in return. Nothing in what Lord Nicholls said about joint borrowing requires an evaluation in an apparent partial surety case, to determine whether, as a matter of fact and degree, the loan was being made for the purposes of one spouse, as distinct from their joint purposes.

55. There is nothing in the speeches in Etridge No 2 that envisaged a debate about fine distinctions as to the meaning of surety, or as to differing proportions of joint and sole borrowing or differing purposes for which borrowers borrow to pay off the debts of one partner or the other. It is difficult to see how such a debate could help underwriting departments faced with deciding whether to apply the Etridge protocol. There is a need for the same workable simplicity as established in Etridge No 2 to assist banks to put in place procedures which can be applied in a routine, straightforward manner and which "do not require an exercise of judgment by their officials" (para 108 per Lord Hobhouse). The bright line approach to non-commercial hybrid cases achieves just that. It is clear, promotes certainty, and most significantly, it is easy to apply effectively in all non commercial hybrid transactions. Banks and other creditors have both the commercial incentive and the practical ability to arrange their procedures so that it is harder for mortgage transactions to be misused to facilitate domestic undue influence and fraud. Discharge of the onus of inquiry is not difficult. It involves recommending that the wife (or other vulnerable party) should obtain independent legal advice. That onus can be discharged simply and inexpensively in accordance with the Etridge protocol, described by Lord Nicholls at para 87 as "a modest burden for banks and other lenders. It is no more than is reasonably to be expected of a creditor who is taking a guarantee from an individual."

56. Contrary to the view of the Court of Appeal, this does not involve there being a third test for hybrid cases. This approach simply involves treating a non-commercial hybrid transaction as a surety transaction and not as a joint loan. The existence of any exclusive benefit for one borrower (not being de minimis) moves the case out of the joint loan category and into the surety category, engaging the need for a bank to take the simple steps identified in the Etridge protocol. It satisfies the need, identified in Etridge No 2, for simplicity of operation by the banks who are more likely to wish to play safe by issuing an Etridge protocol letter to remove possible risk, than to litigate about the need for one subsequently. This bright line approach should encourage banks to prevent future litigation by taking the modest, reasonable step of issuing Etridge protocol letters, rather than encouraging controversial or finely balanced judgments to be formed by underwriting staff about whether there is, or is not, an appearance of suretyship.

57. I would therefore hold that a creditor is put on inquiry in any non-commercial hybrid transaction where, on the face of the transaction, there is a more than de minimis element of borrowing which serves to discharge the debts of one of the borrowers and so might not be to the financial advantage of the other. The transaction must be viewed from the bank's perspective. Such a transaction, if viewed in this way, should be regarded as a "surety" transaction and the creditor placed on inquiry of the possibility of undue influence. The steps set out in the Etridge protocol must then be taken.

58. This is not a radical departure from the present position. Rather, it accords with the principle in, and policy objectives of, O'Brien, Pitt and Etridge No 2 that favour certainty and afford a broad scope of protection by putting a bank "on inquiry" in every non-commercial case where a wife offers to stand surety for a loan used to pay off her husband's debts to a more than de minimis extent. It recognises and applies, on the one hand, the low threshold for the bank being put on inquiry in such cases given the elevated risk of undue influence or misrepresentation because the transaction is on its face not to the financial advantage of the wife; and on the other, the modest steps which a bank must take to acquire protection in a case where the bank is put on inquiry.

59. It is also consistent with what Lord Bingham of Cornhill described as the paramount need in this important field that the requirements of the law should be clear, simple and practically operable (see para 2 in Etridge No 2).

60. The Court of Appeal criticised this bright line test as likely to engender argument as to whether a particular percentage was or was not de minimis or "non-trivial" (see para 35). That may be true, but I find it hard to see how any other test would engender as much argument as a "fact and degree" test. I agree with the appellant that the de minimis principle is of such long standing that it is surprising to regard it as a source of unworkable uncertainty. Courts have little difficulty in identifying what is and is not caught by the principle. Lord Briggs, giving the judgment of this court in Brown v Ridley [2025] UKSC 7; [2025] 2 WLR 371, stated, at para 30, that:

"[The de minimis] principle is enshrined in the Latin tag de minimis non curat lex, which is often translated as meaning that the law is not concerned with trifles. Well-known authorities on the principle describe it as excluding matters which are trifling, insubstantial, inconsequential, immaterial, irrelevant or negligible: see eg Chatterton v Cave (1878) 3 App Cas 483, 490, 492, 499, and Fish & Fish Ltd v Sea Shepherd UK [2015] AC 1229, para 50."

Certainly, in this case, no-one could regard a surety component of £39,500 as de minimis or trivial.

61. Ms Wicks submitted that the appellant's proposed test would be onerous for lenders and for many borrowers. I do not accept that compliance with the Etridge protocol in non-commercial hybrid cases would be onerous. Lord Nicholls dismissed such concerns in Etridge No 2 and Lord Hobhouse considered that the Etridge protocol would assist banks by requiring them to put in place procedures which do not require an exercise of judgment by their officials. Developments in information technology since 2001 have no doubt reduced that burden even further. It is true that there is a requirement for independent legal advice (inevitably paid for by the borrowers), but that can sometimes be delivered by the same solicitor as is acting for the husband in a case where the wife is content that this should be so. In any event, I cannot see that such advice is likely to add materially to the cost of the borrowing in a case where undue influence is absent. The fact that more transactions will be affected is nothing to the point. Nor is there any basis for concluding that it will introduce unnecessary friction at significant cost into the lending system by requiring a wider category of borrowers to have independent legal advice or inhibit or unduly delay transactions which are important to the overall economy. Although this was asserted by Ms Wicks, there was no evidence adduced to support it.

62. In fact, it seems to me that a bright line test is likely to be less onerous for lenders dealing with large volumes of loan applications at any one time. Examining every non-commercial loan application to decide whether a transaction, viewed as a whole, is being made for the purposes of suretyship as distinct from the borrowers' joint purposes is unlikely to be easy or practicable. It is far simpler and clearer to have a bright line rule that applies in all (save de minimis) non-commercial partial surety cases. Indeed, for the reasons I have given, I consider that a bright line of this kind favours the banks.

63. Ms Wicks submitted that banks have been effectively operating the "fact and degree" test since Etridge No 2 for over 20 years. When pressed, she accepted that the court has been provided with no evidence that this is the case. It is equally possible that banks have been operating the proposed bright line test in non-commercial partial surety transactions for many years. To have done so would have reduced their risk in a modest and cost-effective way. The absence of any authorities dealing with the treatment of such transactions is itself neutral as to the way in which banks have been managing the risk of undue influence in hybrid transactions, and I am satisfied that this decision will not disturb any settled understanding or practice in relation to non-commercial hybrid transactions. The mere fact that the evidence of the Bank's underwriter in this case, that, if the Bank had known that £142,000 from the re-mortgage was to go to discharge Mr Bishop's liability to pay his ex-wife, it would have required the appellant to obtain independent legal advice (see the judgment of HHJ Mitchell at paras 46 and 128) tells one nothing about standard operating practices. I note in this regard that there has been no application to intervene by other banks said to be affected by the outcome of this appeal, nor any attempt to rely on evidence of standard banking practices and procedures. While it is likely that adoption of a bright line test in partial surety cases may have the effect of opening up more historic transactions to legal challenge than a test based on fact and degree, there is no evidential foundation for Ms Wicks' assertion that it will have profound implications for the lending industry.' [bold added]

[3] In Barclays Bank Plc v O’Brien [1994] 1 A.C. 180 [1993] 3 W.L.R. 786, Lord Browne-Wilkinson referred to these two as ‘legal wrongs’ (at 194)

[4] In Barclays Bank Plc v O’Brien [1994] 1 A.C. 180 [1993] 3 W.L.R. 786, Lord Browne-Wilkinson said, under the heading ‘Policy considerations’, at 188: ‘The large number of cases of this type coming before the courts in recent years reflects the rapid changes in social attitudes and the distribution of wealth which have recently occurred. Wealth is now more widely spread. Moreover a high proportion of privately owned wealth is invested in the matrimonial home. Because of the recognition by society of the equality of the sexes, the majority of matrimonial homes are now in the joint names of both spouses. Therefore in order to raise finance for the business enterprises of one or other of the spouses, the jointly owned home has become a main source of security. The provision of such security requires the consent of both spouses. In parallel with these financial developments, society's recognition of the equality of the sexes has led to a rejection of the concept that the wife is subservient to the husband in the management of the family's finances. A number of the authorities reflect an unwillingness in the court to perpetuate law based on this outmoded concept. Yet, as Scott L.J. in the Court of Appeal rightly points out [1993] Q.B. 109, 139, although the concept of the ignorant wife leaving all financial decisions to the husband is outmoded, the practice does not yet coincide with the ideal. In a substantial proportion of marriages it is still the husband who has the business experience and the wife is willing to follow his advice without bringing a truly independent mind and will to bear on financial decisions. The number of recent cases in this field shows that in practice many wives are still subjected to, and yield to, undue influence by their husbands. Such wives can reasonably look to the law for some protection when their husbands have abused the trust and confidence reposed in them.’

[5] In Barclays Bank Plc v O’Brien [1994] 1 A.C. 180 [1993] 3 W.L.R. 786, Lord Browne-Wilkinson said, at 188:

‘On the other hand, it is important to keep a sense of balance in approaching these cases. It is easy to allow sympathy for the wife who is threatened with the loss of her home at the suit of a rich bank to obscure an important public interest viz., the need to ensure that the wealth currently tied up in the matrimonial home does not become economically sterile. If the rights secured to wives by the law renders vulnerable loans granted on the security of matrimonial homes, institutions will be unwilling to accept such security, thereby reducing the flow of loan capital to business enterprises. It is therefore essential that a law designed to protect the vulnerable does not render the matrimonial home unacceptable as security to financial institutions.’